Problems of Communism

African National Liberation
Colin Legum

SALT and the Soviet Military
Raymond L. Garthoff

Special Book Section

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1975



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Problems of Communism

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JAN-FEB 1975 VOL XXIV

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1 "National Liberation" in Southern Africa
by Colin Legum

21 SALT and the Soviet Military
by Raymond L. Garthoff

SPECIAL BOOK SECTION

38 The Dubcek Era Revisited
by Radoslav Selucky

43 Stalinism and Freedom
by Frederick C. Barghoorn

48 Through a Glass Sharply
by Abraham Brumberg

51 Systemic Ills in Soviet Agriculture
by Arthur W. Wright

55 Asian Communism in the Crucible
by Justus M. van der Kroef

61 Peking's Profile in Southeast Asia
by Lea E. Williams

63 Mobilizing the Chinese Masses
by William L. Parish, Jr.

67 Views of the Latin American Left
by Benedict Cross

NOTES & VIEWS

72 Some Perspectives on Chinese Politics
78 Correspondence

Cover: A guerrilla fighter of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) during the movement's struggle against Portuguese colonial troops. Photo by Gerard Klijn/Pictorial Parade.

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"National Liberation" in Southern Africa

By Colin Legum

The struggle of the black liberation movements challenging the status quo in Southern Africa and its white defenders took a major turn as a result of the April 1974 army coup in Lisbon and the ensuing decision by Portugal to abandon five centuries of colonialism. The overthrow of Marcello Caetano's regime knocked away one of the three props on which white supremacy in the region had rested, and led to the establishment of an independent government under the control of a former armed liberation movement in Guinea-Bissau, to the installation in power of a triumphant armed liberation movement in Mozambique, and to negotiations to determine the role that the three liberation movements in Angola will play in that land's transition to independence. These developments, in turn, left more exposed the remaining two props of the white status quo—Rhodesia and South Africa.

Elimination of Portugal as a military factor in Africa has clearly introduced a fluid new political situation, one that affects not only those liberation movements which have formed or are about to form postcolonial governments but also those which will continue to carry on the liberation struggle south of the Cunene, Zambesi, and Limpopo rivers (that is, in Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa). The purpose of the present study is to examine the orientations of the various groups and the factors that bear on their policies. Before we proceed to a country-by-country analysis, however, it would be useful to consider the broader political context in which these movements operate.

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Toward Black-White Deténte

The most salient feature of the new situation in Southern African liberation politics is the increased emphasis being placed on détente and negotiation, as opposed to the policies of armed insurgency that have dominated the struggle for more than a decade.

The alternatives of violence or negotiation have, of course, always been present in African minds. They were perhaps most explicitly laid out in the Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969. This statement, adopted by 13 of the 14 member-states of the East and Central Region of the Organization of African Unity, expressed a clear preference for peaceful liberation of Southern Africa. It pledged that guerrilla activities would be curbed once the white colonial and local regimes accepted the principle of democratic rule by all peoples of the respective states, adding that black Africa would be flexible about the timetables for ultimate majority rule once the white governments undertook to negotiate with their own representative black leaders about means of achieving this goal. Barring such commitments, however, the signatories vowed to continue to support violent struggle.[1]

[1] For the text of the Lusaka Manifesto, see Colin Legum, Ed., *African Contemporary Record, 1969-70,* London, Rex Collings, 1970, pp. C41-C45. Malawi abstained from signing this Manifesto, holding out for a strategy of negotiation and no violence. The Manifesto was subsequently unanimously endorsed by the Organization of African Unity and then submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, where it was approved.

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Inasmuch as nothing came of this proposal for peaceful negotiations aimed at constitutional change,[2] black Africa saw no alternative to pursuing armed insurgency with renewed vigor, concentrating on the overthrow of Portuguese rule in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau (the last located, of course, not in Southern Africa but in Western Africa—see map on p. 6). With the change in regimes in Portugal in 1974, however, the leaders of black Africa concluded that a significant new opportunity for progress via negotiation had presented itself. They were encouraged in this belief by a more conciliatory tone in the speeches of South Africa's Prime Minister Balthazar J. Vorster in October 1974,[3] at a time when the Republic was facing expulsion from the United Nations, which it only narrowly escaped through vetoes cast by the United States, Great Britain, and France. (At the time they employed their veto rights, the Western nations had privately warned the South Africans that such support in the future would depend on some positive indication that the Republic was willing to meet the more realistic demands of the General Assembly—notably, to grant independence to Namibia and to make positive changes in its own racial policies.[4])

Mr. Vorster's promise that his government would move in a new direction evoked immediate and positive African response. Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda—after consultations with his closest allies (Julius Nyerere, the President of Tanzania; Sir Seretse Khama, the President of Botswana; General Mobuto Sese Seko, the President of Zaire; and Samora Moises Machel, the President designate of Mozambique)—announced that black Africa was ready to begin talks with Pretoria to promote détente.[5]

Behind these public statements, there had been a number of highly secret moves. In September, Mr. Vorster had visited the Ivory Coast for talks with President Félix Houphouët-Boigny and his neighbor, President Léopold Senghor of Senegal. The South African Prime Minister had likewise been to Malawi, where he had consulted with President Kamuzu Banda, and to Botswana. South African intermediaries, including Harry Oppenheimer, Chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation, were also involved in paving the way for diplomatic talks between Zambian and South African envoys.

These developments culminated in a series of meetings in Lusaka in late November and early December 1974. In these talks black Africa privately offered Pretoria détente (*i.e.*, cessation of guerrilla action) on three conditions: that an agreement be reached on negotiations for a new constitution in Rhodesia, that constitutional talks aimed at the establishment of an independent Namibia be launched, and that meaningful discussions between the Vorster government and representative black leaders of the Republic (including those political prisoners held on Robben Island and elsewhere) be initiated for the purpose of negotiating a new constitution acceptable to the entire population of the country. Progress toward fulfillment of the first condition took place in early December, when representatives of the Ian Smith government met in Lusaka with the newly-united leadership of the three major Rhodesian liberation movements to work out an agreement for détente and negotiation in the breakaway British colony. The Lusaka Agreement provided that the Smith regime would immediately release all political prisoners and open talks with representative black leaders to find an acceptable new constitution for Rhodesia's legal independence, that the liberation forces would end guerrilla attacks during the period of negotiations, and that South Africa would withdraw its 2,000 paramilitary police from Rhodesia once all "terrorism" had ceased.[6]

While Vorster's apparent commitment to pull South African forces out of Rhodesia clearly weakens the position of Ian Smith, it is by no means certain that the talks between the Rhodesian leader and his black challengers, which began early in February 1975, will be successful. Mr. Smith's obvious reluctance to make any move toward permitting majority rule has led to an increasingly tough response from Mr. Vorster, as reflected in the critical com-

[2] It should be noted that South Africa did attempt to initiate a "dialogue" with certain African countries of its own choosing, including the Ivory Coast, Malawi, Lesotho, Gabon, and Madagascar. However, these efforts were repudiated by an overwhelming majority of the OAU and came to naught. See Colin Legum, "Dialogue: The Great Debate," in Colin Legum, Ed., *Africa Contemporary Record, 1971-72*, London, Rex Collings, 1972.

[3] Vorster addressed the South African Senate on October 24, 1974, and the Republic's UN Ambassador made a conciliatory speech before the General Assembly the following day. On November 10, Mr. Vorster spoke in Nigel, Transvaal, where he asked to be given a "six months' chance," during which he promised "surprising changes" in South Africa (see *Rand Daily Mail*—Johannesburg—Nov. 11, 1974).

[4] For details of the Western position, see "Britain's Year in Africa," in Colin Legum, Ed., *Africa Contemporary Record, 1974-75*, London, Rex Collings, 1975.

[5] *The Times* (London), Oct. 28, 1974.

[6] *Ibid.*, Dec. 12, 1974.

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Signs of the debilitating colonial struggle: a Portuguese soldier wearing a peace symbol pauses in April 1973 maneuvers against guerrillas of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO); to the right, FRELIMO forces on the march with a foreign anti-tank weapon.

—*London Daily Express* and Gerard Klijn via Pictorial Parade.

ments published in the pro-government Afrikaans press.[7]

The likelihood of progress in the promised negotiations on Namibia's independence must be rated as reasonably high, although there probably will not be any quick agreements. Far more problematical is Mr. Vorster's willingness to move toward the kind of changes inside his own Republic that would be acceptable to its black majority. It is much easier for him to be flexible about modifying conditions in territories on South Africa's periphery—Rhodesia and Namibia—than in his own heartland.

Once started, nevertheless, the process of détente is bound to produce a number of vital changes which will further alter the balance of power in Southern Africa. At the same time, should the advance toward the achievement of full democratic rights for all peoples of the region encounter bottlenecks or proceed too slowly, black Africans retain the option of reverting to violent guerrilla action—an option rendered all the more viable by the dismantling of Portugal's colonial empire and the rapid movement toward black majority rule in Lisbon's former African colonies.

In this general connection, it is essential to note that the collapse of Portuguese colonialism carries several important lessons which may not have been lost on the white regimes in Salisbury and Pretoria. In fact, the decision of the black African presidents to turn to a policy of détente and negotiation seems predicated on a serious reading by the white governments of the writing scribed on the wall by the Portuguese experience.

The first lesson is that an armed insurrectionary movement need not achieve *military* superiority as an absolute condition for its success, that the *political* repercussions of a prolonged struggle may be of greater importance than military victory. Except in Guinea-Bissau, the anti-Portuguese guerrilla forces did not win their wars. While they were getting progressively stronger on the ground in Angola and Mozambique and might, over a long period,

[7] A number of critical editorials were published in Afrikaaner Nationalist papers like *Die Transvaler* (Johannesburg), *Rapport* (Johannesburg), and *Die Burger* (Capetown). For a summary, see *The Guardian* (Manchester), Jan. 13, 1975.

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Mapping a strategy for African national liberation—Holden Roberto, left, then President of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile, confers with Algerian Premier Ben Bella in Dakar on August 24, 1963. In Dakar the newly-formed Organization of African Unity pledged aid to the war of liberation in Angola.

—*Paris-Match* via Pictorial Parade.

have defeated an attenuated Portuguese army, that stage had not yet been reached in April 1974. However, the Lisbon military coup that enabled the black majorities of Portugal's African colonies to gain their liberation was in an important sense precipitated by the long, drawn-out struggles in these colonies. As the demands that the wars made on Lisbon's national budget and on Portuguese manpower mounted, serious doubts arose in Portugal about the value of the conflicts in terms of Portuguese national interests, and public confidence in the country's leadership waned. It is extremely doubtful whether the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement could so easily have taken power without the contributions of the guerrillas in the African bush to an undermining of the old Salazarist system.

Thus it was not enough that the Portuguese possessed greater military strength than the guerrillas opposing them. Once the ruling minority power group had proved itself incapable of winning decisively and had fallen into a debilitating defensive struggle, the clear advantage of military strength disappeared. At that point, the familiar attempt to engage in "a battle for the minds" of the increasingly hostile or uncommitted native populations was almost certain to fail. (This is perhaps one of the most crucial lessons inherent not only in the Portuguese colonial wars but in all the recent armed conflicts in the Third World.)

Besides shedding new light on the significance of the political dimension of armed guerrilla struggle, the demise of Portuguese colonialism also served to confirm the workability of the broad strategic approach to the liberation of Southern Africa proposed by the former Algerian leader, Ahmed Ben Bella, in discussions with black South African leaders in 1963.[8] Ben Bella argued at that time that the newly-formed Organization of African Unity (OAU)—a grouping of independent African states—should concentrate its efforts on winning majority rule in the weakest of the white-minority redoubts in the region. In short, it should seek first to knock out Portuguese colonial power, then to topple the white regime in Rhodesia, and finally to confront the South African government.

The OAU did operate according to these priorities and, having achieved its initial objective, is now clearly drawing aim on the next target—Rhodesia. In fact, the OAU's special organ, the African Liberation Committee (ALC), has already decided to allocate to the groups opposing the Smith regime the share of arms and the bulk of the funds that previously went to the anti-Portuguese liberation movements. One can therefore anticipate a considerable strengthening of the Zimbabwe liberation forces ("Zimbabwe" being the African nationalist name for Rhodesia). The ALC also intends to increase support for the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia. For the present the ALC will devote lesser attention and aid to the liberation forces arrayed against South Africa.[9]

Sources of External Aid

As suggested by the preceding discussion, external aid has been important to the liberation movements. They have drawn the major portion of such assistance from the states of black Africa,

[8] See Colin and Margaret Legum, *South Africa: Crisis for the West*, New York, Praeger, 1963, p. 4.

[9] This is reflected in the ALC budget allocation for 1974-75. While this is kept secret, for some details, see "The Organization of African Unity in 1974," by Zdenek Cervenka and Colin Legum, in *Africa Contemporary Record, 1974-75*. Also see the speech by President Nyerere to the 24th session of the ALC, published in *Tanzania News Letter* (Dar Es Salaam), October 1974/January 1975, under the heading "Rhodesia and Namibia Next Targets."

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but they have received substantial economic, military, and political support from other countries as well, in particular from the Communist nations. It is useful to examine the reasons for this specific configuration of external assistance and to determine what, if anything, it indicates about the political orientations of the liberation movements and the sort of policies that they are likely to follow.

The liberation movements have found a natural ally and staunch supporter in the Organization of African Unity, which from its founding conference in 1963 has been dedicated to collective action against the "white South" in order to complete "the unfinished African revolution." The OAU has sought to maximize the effectiveness of its aid to the liberation struggle and to minimize the risks of big-power competition and intervention in it by insisting that all aid both from inside Africa and from abroad be channeled exclusively through the African Liberation Committee. Inasmuch as this aid was disbursed to the various movements in accordance with the priorities suggested by the Ben Bella strategy just discussed, this arrangement unquestionably affected the fortunes of the liberation struggle in different areas.

However, the OAU has been only partially successful in enforcing its principle of exclusivity. To be sure, the bulk of economic and military aid from the black African states has been proffered collectively through the ALC to the various liberation movements, as has aid from the governments of Yugoslavia, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Holland and from such nongovernmental groups as the World Council of Churches and the British Labor Party. However, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states, as well as the People's Republic of China (before 1970 at least), have channeled only part of their assistance through the ALC. Perhaps the larger share of the aid that these Communist states have provided has gone directly to specific liberation groups favored by the donor states. Thus, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (*Movimento Popular para a Libertaçao de Angola*—MPLA), the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the African Party for the Independence of "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (*Partido Africano de Independencia de Guiné "portuguesa" e das Ilhas de Cabo Verde* (PAIGC), and, to a lesser extent, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (*Frente de Libertaçao de Moçam-*

Supplies on their way to Mozambique's FRELIMO guerrillas from the neighboring black African state of Zambia.

—Gerard Klijn/Pictorial Parade.

Maj. Hashim Mbita, right, Executive Secretary of the ALC, examines Portuguese army weapons picked up during a 1972 tour of insurgency areas.

—*London Daily Express* via Pictorial Parade.

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

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bique—FRELIMO) have all benefited from direct Soviet aid. In the 1960's, the Chinese, pursuing their rivalry with the Soviet Union, attempted to extend their patronage to rival groups in each of these countries, but since the latter movements were generally the least effective on the scene, Peking by 1970 appears to have tired of this futile gambit and to have opted to give its assistance through the ALC—a shift which predictably won the approval of many African leaders.[10]

Those liberation movements that have sought and/or accepted direct assistance from non-African sources (and it should be noted that not all the groups that have wanted such aid have received it[11]) have clearly done so out of a desire to enhance their own local political prospects. The Communist states, on the other hand, have provided assistance, first, because of an understandable wish to take advantage of the opportunity to undermine such Western powers as Portugal and South Africa and, second, because of the ongoing rivalry between Peking and Moscow for recognition as the principal patron of the African liberation struggle.

The intensity of this competition for influence in Africa is suggested by two representative propaganda items. Peking's *Hung Ch'i* recently accused the USSR of being "a rapacious international exploiter" which had set up its own multinational corporations to buy cheap and sell dear to developing countries, and which placed stiff repayment terms on the aid it gave.[12] Moscow's *Sovetskaia Rossiia* countered with an article on "What Peking Wants in Africa," which charged the Chinese with trying to foist a kind of development on Africa that—by emphasizing "self-reliance" and the primacy of agriculture—ensured continuation of the continent's economic backwardness. Chinese aid to small agricultural projects, the food industry, and light industry was pictured as preventing the flow into Africa of top scientific and technical know-how and financial resources from countries of the "socialist community."[13]

Articles of this type have been reproduced and widely distributed among African leaders. Furthermore, African leaders have complained privately that whenever they have visited either the USSR or China, they have invariably found themselves subjected by their hosts to condemnations of the other Communist power. In addition, once a given movement has accepted the aid of, and voiced support for, one of the two antagonists, it has been unable to obtain direct assistance from the other. (Aid received via the ALC, of course, has not entailed such complications.)

The major Western powers have been conspicuously absent from the rolls of benefactors of the African liberation movements. (There was, to be sure, a brief moment during the Kennedy Administration when Holden Roberto's Front for the National Liberation of Angola [*Frente Nacional de Libertaçao de Angola*—FNLA] received some backing from the United States, and the late Eduardo Mondlane's Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, did garner some nonmilitary US aid.[14]) This situation reflects no *a priori* anti-Western orientation within the African liberation movements; in fact, these groups have never ceased to knock at Western doors for support. Rather, it is the major NATO powers that have held back, for fear of encouraging the violent overthrow of regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa or the weakening of Portugal. The West has preferred to rely on persuasion in trying to influence the Portuguese and white-minority regimes of Southern Africa to liberalize domestic policies. So far, however, this reliance on persuasion has failed to produce any meaningful change, and black Africans have come to see the major Western countries, as, at best, ambiguous backers of the liberation effort, if not, in fact, direct or indirect upholders of the white regimes.

In sum, the black liberation movements in Southern Africa have looked for external assistance and taken it from wherever they could get it. The fact that aid has tended to come from certain portions of the globe rather than from other areas is more a function of the attitudes of the donors than of any particular leanings on the part of the re-

[10] These expressions of approval are always made in private since the source of foreign funds is obviously a delicate matter for the ALC. However, the author has on a number of occasions been told in private by African leaders of their efforts to discourage the Russians and the Chinese from bypassing the ALC.

[11] Of the active guerrilla groups, the following have failed to attract any substantial aid from non-African sources: the Pan-African Congress in South Africa; the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (until 1974); the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola; and the three rival Rhodesian groups—the Zimbabwe African National Union, the Zimbabwe African People's Union, and the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe.

[12] Quoted in *West Africa* (London), Sept. 23, 1974.

[13] Quoted in *ibid.*, Dec. 2, 1974.

[14] These facts have emerged at various times in the period 1970-73 in various US Congressional hearings, especially in discussions of CIA conduit organizations.

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cipient guerrilla movements. Moreover, while the major aid supplied by the ALC contributed to the success of the struggle against Portuguese colonialism, and while in some cases aid from African and non-African sources has bolstered the fortunes of one or another of contending guerrilla groups, it can be stated in general that the source of foreign aid has not proved to be a major determinant of the orientations of the various movements. Whether this rule will continue to pertain as the liberation movements make the transition from insurgency to positions of power in their lands, only time will tell.

Having described in broad terms the political environment in which Southern Africa's black liberation forces are operating and the various factors that bear on their activities, let us now turn to a more detailed examination of the individual movements. In particular, we shall attempt to define the orientations and the likely policies of these groups as they assume power or wage the struggle for black self-determination. We shall begin our survey with the insurgent groups of Portuguese Africa in the postcolonial setting.

The Liberators of Guinea-Bissau

Portugal's three major African colonies have progressed toward independence at a pace directly proportionate to the effectiveness of their respective liberation movements. Thus, the first colony to achieve independence (in September 1974) has been Guinea-Bissau. There, the PAIGC had waged a successful guerrilla insurrection and has now assumed control of the fledgling government. At the moment, the PAIGC has no obvious political rivals; however, its future depends on its being able to maintain the unity forged by its former charismatic leader, the revolutionary Marxist Amilcar Cabral, who was assassinated in 1972. One decisive element within the movement is the rivalry between some of the black leaders from the mainland and the *mestiço* (persons of mixed ancestry) intelligentsia originating from the capital, Bissau, or the Cape Verde Islands. In fact, the tensions growing out of this rivalry may have led to Cabral's murder. The recent announcement of Portugal's intention to grant the Cape Verdes independence on July 5, 1975,[15] did not indicate whether they would be united with Guinea-Bissau, but the proposal for a referendum to decide their future gives the PAIGC a major role in the undertaking as the only local party authorized to assist in the preparations for the voting.

The present PAIGC government is a coalition of pragmatic African nationalists and Marxists. The latter group includes individuals who insist—as does the Republic of Guinea's President Sékou Touré (the PAIGC's principal ally during the years of guerrilla struggle and hence a strong influence on his small neighbor)—on giving their Marxism an idiosyncratic African style, and those who lean—as does Cuba's Fidel Castro (another strong supporter of the PAIGC struggle)—toward international

Luiz Cabral, President of the newly-independent state of Guinea-Bissau and brother of the late Amilcar Cabral.

—Camerapix via Keystone.

[15] *The Washington Post*, Dec. 19, 1974.

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alliance with Moscow. Luiz Cabral, the new Republic's President, is strongly influenced by the distinctive Marxist ideas of his late brother, Amilcar, and by his own personal friendship with Fidel Castro, but like his brother, he has remained well-disposed toward the Portuguese and is capable of pursuing a pragmatic course.

What the final shape of the PAIGC government's policies will be remains unclear as yet, and there are bound to be political conflicts among the ruling élite—as have occurred in all liberation movements on the morrow of independence. But the nature of the relationship that Guinea-Bissau and Portugal work out with each other will have an important bearing on these policies. This, in turn, will depend on the character of the regime that ultimately emerges inside Portugal itself. The present government in Lisbon has gone far toward undoing the bitterness of the liberation struggle by the speed with which it transferred power to the PAIGC and by its agreement to concede a major role to the party in Cape Verde as well.

Another factor that may affect the PAIGC's future direction significantly is where Guinea-Bissau obtains its foreign aid. Portugal itself cannot afford to offer much assistance to this pitifully poor little country. The Soviet Union and China have already offered substantial aid, but without mentioning any figures; it remains to be seen whether other sources —*e.g.*, the European Economic Community—will match the amounts that the Communist powers are prepared to give. The OAU has voted $1 million for the new republic, to come out of the ALC's 1975 budget.

FRELIMO and Mozambique

In Mozambique, it is FRELIMO that will assume control of the country at independence in July 1975. FRELIMO leaders, like those of the PAIGC, have been influenced by the experiences of a hard guerrilla struggle; moreover, they, too, are a mixture of African nationalists and Marxists. But in FRELIMO's case, both nationalists and Marxists have been strongly attracted by Peking's example of building self-reliance by rural revolution and by its agrarian policies. This is true of FRELIMO's chief (and the likely first president of the new republic), Samora Moises Machel, and his deputy, Joaquim Chissano. Both men, however, are less rigorously ideological in their approach than the probable new Foreign Minister, Marcellino dos Santos, a poet and intellectual who has been influenced more by Moscow than by Peking.

Although the Marxist intellectuals managed to acquire a strong position in the exile movement during the period of armed struggle, their political strength is likely to decline when FRELIMO confronts the realities of independent Mozambique. One may predict that, once FRELIMO has assumed power, it will draw more upon the perspectives of Tanzania's President, Julius Nyerere, than upon any non-African political influences. Nyerere served as the patron of the Mozambique struggle, and his marked aversion to foreign ideologies and his championing of a non-Marxist African socialism have strongly influenced Samora Machel. (Machel's pragmatic leadership has already been demonstrated by his readiness to cooperate with the new regime in Lisbon and by his expressed willingness to discuss economic links with his powerful neighbor, South Africa.)

FRELIMO's policies toward Rhodesia and South Africa are likely to be crucial in determining the course of events as the African strategy moves into its second phase, and they will probably differ considerably. There is no reason to suppose that FRELIMO will act with anything but hostility toward Rhodesia. Controlling the landlocked, breakaway colony's most direct and cheapest route to the sea—via the port of Beira—FRELIMO will have the power to cut off Mr. Smith's former channel for evading international economic sanctions. However, Mozambique will have to pay a price for stopping the Rhodesian trade traffic. Beira for a number of years depended largely on trade traffic from Rhodesia and Zambia for its economic health. Because of the closing of the border between Rhodesia and Zambia in 1972, the latter state now routes much of its trade to the north through Tanzania (a channel whose attractiveness will likely increase with completion of the Chinese-built Tanzam—now renamed TANZARA—railway in late 1975), or to the west through Angola. Even should Rhodesia be liberated, attracting the Zambian traffic back to Beira will not be easy.

In the past, FRELIMO actively helped the Zimbabwe liberation movement infiltrate Rhodesia via the crucial Tête province of western Mozambique, and currently FRELIMO is beginning to make some of its old military camps available to Zimbabwean guerrillas. This cooperation could open up Rhodesia's eastern flank to guerrilla insurgency.

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The possibility of FRELIMO committing itself at an early stage against South Africa, however, is another matter entirely. When Mozambique gains its independence at mid-year, it will find itself almost bankrupt and will require not only massive local efforts but also major international assistance just to reestablish its economy on a noncolonial basis, particularly since the country possesses few natural resources. In this context, it becomes highly significant that the economies of Mozambique and South Africa are closely intertwined as a result of a combination of traditional policies and geographic realities. One may trace three major areas of economic interdependency. First, the viability of Lourenço Marques (Mozambique's capital city and second most important port) depends largely on South African traffic, which currently accounts for some 75 percent of the trade passing through the port city. For South Africa, hauling exports from the Eastern Transvaal through Mozambique to the sea not only affords the cheapest transportation route but also eases congestion at South Africa's own heavily-used ports. Second, Mozambique's largest single source of foreign-exchange earnings derives from the wages of some 135,000 migrant workers at the Rand gold mines, a labor force which is, in turn, vital to South African gold mining. Third, the controversial Cabora-Bassa hydroelectric power complex in Mozambique—whose construction was financed largely by South African sources—is now nearing completion. Cabora-Bassa has an energy potential far greater than Mozambique's imaginable needs, and its only other sizable potential customer is South Africa.

These mutual economic interests impose their own inexorable demands on the policies of both countries. Only a Mozambique revolutionary government willing to sacrifice its own immediate national interests and ready to plunge the country into an even deeper state of bankruptcy could contemplate breaking off all economic relations with Pretoria. Such a decision, to judge from Machel's

Samora Moises Machel, head of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique and now President-designate of Mozambique (due to receive its independence from Portugal in July), shown addressing village peasants in 1973 during the war with the Portuguese.

—Colin Legum.

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initial policy statements, seems improbable. What remains to be seen is the kind of bargains that the two natural political adversaries can strike in order to serve their essential and at present complementary national economic interests.

The Future of Angola

The internal situation in Angola is altogether different from that in Mozambique and potentially quite explosive. Angola's liberation movements, three in number, failed to get firmly established on the ground prior to the Portuguese collapse and long eschewed any common action. Moreover, Angola's riches—oil, minerals, and cash crops—have created important vested interests among the Portuguese of Angola. (The important oil fields around Luanda and in the Cabinda Enclave constitute an exception, for they are largely controlled by American-owned multinational firms). Finally, the Portuguese form a community of some 600,000 out of a total population of six million and hence constitute a minority twice as large as the white minority of Rhodesia at the time of the latter's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. As a result of these many factors, Angola runs the risk of plunging into a civil war with potential consequences as dire as those that befell the Congo in 1960 after the precipitate ending of Belgian rule.

However, there is ground for hope that this eventuality may be avoided. So far, Portugal and the African states have cooperated to try to form a stable national coalition government that could assume responsibility for the country's future. The conclusion of an agreement between the competing liberation groups in Mombasa, Kenya, on January 5, 1975, and subsequently ratified in the Algarve agreement with the Portuguese government at the end of January, marks a significant stride forward in this regard. Each of the movements is to provide three ministers for a coalition government, which will also include three ministers appointed by Lisbon. This government, which was installed in Luanda early in February, is to preside over the transition to independence, now expected to come within 12 months.[16]

While the Mombasa agreement has diminished the threat of civil war, it remains to be seen how well differences among the rival movements and their various supporters will be worked out during the transitional period or after independence is granted. Particularly thorny is the question of the creation of a unified Angolan army.

Of the insurgent groups, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)—led by Dr. Agostinho Neto, a distinguished poet in the Portuguese language—has been the one favored by the OAU. It also enjoys direct and heavy backing from Moscow. The MPLA suffers from internecine conflicts that have little to do with ideology, however much some of the rivals pretend otherwise. These stem from personality conflicts centering on the introverted and secretive Dr. Neto. His rivals accuse him of having clandestine dealings with foreign supporters, and he denounces his detractors as tribalists and neocolonialist agents who have betrayed MPLA's radical principles. Neto boasts two major assets—the loyalty of perhaps a major part of the MPLA's fighting force in the eastern zone and his popularity among the black urban population.

Within the MPLA, the most important rival to Neto is one of his former lieutenants, Daniel Chipenda, a guerrilla fighter and onetime Portuguese football star. Chipenda's main internal support comes from among the Ovimbundu people of southern Angola, but he also enjoys the favor of the Zambian government.[17] A third faction—the Active Revolt Group—is led by a former Catholic priest, Father Pinta Andrade, who spent 12 years in Portuguese prisons. His headquarters is in Brazzaville, the capital of the Congo People's Republic, which, as a neighbor of the oil-rich Cabinda Enclave, has a strong interest in Angola's future. The Group's principal domestic backing stems from a section of Angola's intellectuals. These divisions, it should be underscored, continue to persist despite repeated attempts by the ALC, as well as by the presidents of the Congo, Zaire, Zambia, and Tanzania, to restore unity to the movement.

The faction-ridden MPLA's main competitor has been the FNLA, led by Holden Roberto. This group, once recognized by the OAU as the Angolan government-in-exile,[18] receives its main internal sup-

[16] *The New York Times*, Jan. 5, 1975, reported the unity accord in Mombasa. Agreement on the transitional government and the setting of Nov. 11, 1975, as the date for Angolan independence, was reported in *The Washington Post*, Jan. 16, 1975.

[17] Chipenda has threatened to unleash civil war because he was excluded from the talks in Lisbon and from the transitional government established there (see the dispatch by David B. Ottaway in *The Washington Post*, Jan. 29, 1975).

[18] For a history of the episode, see Douglas Wheeler and René Pélissier, *Angola*, New York, Praeger, 1971.

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port from the Bakongo people in northern Angola, but its strength derives from the massive support of Zaire, which allows the FNLA to maintain three military camps on its territory. Roberto, it should be added, is the brother-in-law of Zaire's General Mobutu.

The final contender for power among Angola's black liberation forces is the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (*União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA). Its leader,* Dr. Jonas Savimbi, has somehow managed to maintain his forces inside Angola, mainly in the Ovimbundu country, without assistance from the OAU or other foreign backers. A much-publicized overture to the Chinese in 1969 came to naught.[19] Both the MPLA and the FNLA have accused Savimbi of having a secret understanding with the Portuguese army, which they see as the only possible explanation of his forces' survival. These allegations, however, have not prevented Savimbi from emerging as one of the triumvirate of liberation leaders to share power in the transition to independence.

As the Angolan liberation groups seek to patch up their differences of some 14 years and to establish a framework within which to assume the responsibilities of government, it is important to keep in mind the nature of the foreign support that the rival groups have enjoyed in the past and the bearing that this consideration might have on the evolving Angolan situation.

The strongest force on the scene is Zaire's General Mobutu, who not only possesses the largest army in the area but also is capable of providing economic assistance to his chosen candidate—Holden Roberto. Zaire has an important economic stake in Angola's future stability because mineral exports from Katanga Province (renamed Shaba Province) must pass through the heart of Angola on the Benguela rail line to reach the sea and because recent oil discoveries in off-shore Zaire territory adjoin the Cabinda fields. However, Mobutu's prime concern would seem to be to prevent civil war from breaking out in Angola and thus to preclude the possibility of foreign involvement on Zaire's doorstep. For example, while he has strongly supported the FNLA, he has expanded his contacts by persuading Chipenda and Savimbi to set up offices in his capital, Kinshasa, and by establishing links with the Andrade wing of the MPLA.

In Mobutu's scheme of things, the odd-man-out would appear to be MPLA chief Dr. Neto, whose radical rhetoric and reliance on Soviet support Mobutu may distrust as a result of his own bitter experiences with rebel insurrectionaries and their Communist backers. Nonetheless, Mobutu desires above all to avert civil war and has gone along with the other African leaders in trying to restore unity within the MPLA and in promoting cooperation between it and its two competitors. The other African presidents most closely concerned with Angola's future (Nyerere of Tanzania, Kaunda of Zambia, and Marien Ngouabi of the Congo People's Republic) have consistently refused to endorse any coalition which excluded Neto, seeing such an exclusion as inviting civil war.

The Portuguese authorities both in the metropolitan country and in Angola, with whom Mobutu has maintained working relations, tend to view his candidate as a "black racist" because of Roberto's role in the massacre of Portuguese families in 1961.[20] They prefer either Dr. Neto (because of his Portuguese cultural affinities) or Savimbi (whom they regard as an acceptable moderate).

Neto likewise enjoys the favor of the Soviet Union for several reasons. From its inception in Luanda in the 1950's, the MPLA had among its intellectual leaders a number of prominent Marxists, mainly *mestiços;* moreover, when Roberto launched his own movement in 1960, he adopted a strongly hostile attitude toward communism. The MPLA also had the backing of the clandestine Portuguese Communist Party, whose exile leadership was in Prague. For all these reasons, Moscow saw the MPLA as offering the best medium for deploying its African strategy in Angola.

For their part, the Chinese have by and large steered clear of the Angolan struggle. However, in 1973, after Mobutu had paid a visit to Peking and the OAU had decided to recognize the FNLA once again, China agreed to send 250 commando trainers to assist Roberto's forces. This piece of Peking opportunism was dictated by Chinese interest in having some part in the Angola liberation struggle, but also by Peking's desire to please Mobutu, and especially Nyerere, who had asked for Chinese help at a time when the intensity of the guerrilla struggle was sagging.

One cannot assume from the foregoing, it should be emphasized, that the various liberation move-

[19] See Legum, *Africa Contemporary Record, 1969-70,* p. B-349.

[20] See Wheeler and Pélissier, *op. cit.*

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Jonas Savimbi, President of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, addresses a unification meeting of Angolan national liberation movements in Mombasa, Kenya, in January 1975. Seated from left are: Dr. Antonio Agostinho Neto, head of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola; Daniel T. arap Moi, Vice President of Kenya; Jomo Kenyatta, President of Kenya; and Holden Roberto, head of the Front for the National Liberation of Angola.

—Camerapix via Keystone.

ments feel themselves closely tied to any of their actual or potential foreign champions. They appear to rely most heavily on African backers, the strongest of whom at present is General Mobutu. But whether, in the end, he will turn out to be Angola's kingmaker still remains highly speculative.

Two final elements bearing on the shape of independent Angola deserve brief mention here: the powerful white community and the question of Angolan oil resources. Like the Belgians in the former Katanga, Angola's resident Portuguese retain a strong interest in ensuring that their chosen candidate should emerge as the leader of independent Angola, but there is no obvious Moise Tshombe on whom they can count. Had it not been for Roberto's role in the 1961 affair, he might have fitted the bill, being free of radical ideology and by nature and experience a sound businessman. The white Angolans themselves are by no means united, except in the general objective of seeing a multiracial society established in a free Angola on conditions that will enable them to continue to make their homes there. A small but influential group is more narrowly concerned with maintaining its own considerable economic stake in postcolonial Angola. The leader of this group is Fernando Falçao, a wealthy industrialist, who also heads the Front for a United Angola (a body representing a broader segment of white Angolans, including the financially powerful interests, anxious to preserve their political rights in the future society). Falçao's preference among black Angolan leaders is Savimbi, but the latter has publicly repudiated any such alliance on the ground that Falçao represents precisely those interests that Savimbi would like to eliminate, or at least substantially reduce, in an Angola freed from Portuguese colonial rule.

Oil considerations may also have some effect on Angola's future. Among Africans there were initially two widespread fears: either that Cabinda's neighbors (Zaire and the Congo People's Republic) might seek to gain control of Angola's oil wealth, or that the international oil interests in the enclave might support a secessionist liberation movement—the

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Angolan guerrillas carrying food and arms supplies from their bases and refugee villages in Zaire into their front lines in Angola in 1971.

—Colin Legum.

Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave, led by Luis Franque. At present, however, there seems little doubt that Cabinda's future will be linked with that of an independent Angola—that is, unless the country is plunged into the chaos of civil war.

The Struggle over Namibia

Directly south of Angola lies Namibia (South West Africa), a former German colony mandated to South Africa after World War I and retained by Pretoria despite termination of the mandate and the declaration by the United Nations Security Council in 1966 that South African occupation of the territory was illegal.[21] Armed struggle against South African rule in the territory commenced in the same year, when the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) formed the People's Liberation Army of Namibia and began to send insurgents into Namibia through the territory's Caprivi Strip and through southern Angola.

The leading liberation group in Namibia, SWAPO, differs from other movements in southern Africa in several respects. In the first place, it maintains two wings—one an external group that is organized to carry on the armed struggle, the other an internal group that pursues nonviolent political tactics. SWAPO's military incursions have been on a scale sufficient to require a considerable South African armed police force along Namibia's northern frontier, a force which was strengthened by military units after the Portuguese collapse. The movement has achieved its greatest success, however, in infiltrating trained militants into the territory to politicize black Namibians. SWAPO claims some credit for the general strike of black workers in Ovamboland in 1971-72—the first action of such magnitude under South African rule.

A second distinctive feature of SWAPO is the degree of its nonalignment with any major world power center. The movement has avoided taking sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and it enjoys general acceptance both in Western and in Communist

[21] This position was upheld by a decision of the International Court of Justice in the Hague, handed down on June 21, 1971. See Colin Legum, Ed., *Africa Contemporary Record, 1971-72,* pp. B384-B386.

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capitals, which SWAPO's unchallenged leader, Sam Nujoma, regularly visits. SWAPO's last consultative conference (held in Tanzania at the end of 1969) was attended by observers from West European countries as well as by observers from Czechoslovakia, Romania, the USSR, and Yugoslavia. Its military aid comes principally through the ALC, and its fighters have received military training in Egypt, Algeria, and Tanzania. It draws some foreign aid from the Soviet Union, as well as from Yugoslavia, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, who channel it through the ALC.

SWAPO includes representatives from all major black ethnic groups, but its main strength lies among the Ovambo tribesmen, who constitute almost half of the total black population. Concentrated in the northern province of Ovamboland, the Ovambo have ethnic links with tribal clans across the border in southern Angola.

The sole rival of SWAPO within Namibia has been the South West African National Union (SWANU). Its internal base is largely confined to the small Hereros tribe in the south, whose chieftain, Clemens Kapuuo, is a prominent figure in the National Convention, which is a loose association of all black political organizations inside the territory of Namibia. SWAPO, however, was always a reluctant participant in the Convention and has lately become openly hostile to it and to Kapuuo. Abroad, the stature of SWANU has diminished, and the amount of international support and assistance it receives has declined to minimal levels.

South Africa, while not opposing self-determination for the peoples of Namibia, has sought to resist the independence of a single, undivided country by promoting the idea of seven or eight separate "Homelands," each of which would have the right to opt for separate freedom. However, the growing pressures in the UN Security Council and from its closer Western friends, as well as the emergence of an independent and stable black Angola might increase the pressures beyond Pretoria's military and political capacity to resist. Anticipating such a possibility, Vorster's regime has already begun to prepare white Namibians to face up to the need for fundamental changes. South Africa has offered to allow the country to become independent as two separate states: an all-black north in Ovamboland and a federation of blacks and whites in the south.[22]

On to Rhodesia

Turning to Rhodesia, one finds that, as in Angola, there have been three armed liberation groups aligned against the Smith regime—the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and a splinter group of ZAPU—the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). In addition, the African National Council, led by Bishop Muzorewa, has continued to press for black political rights by legal means within Rhodesia. None of these movements has adopted any particular ideological position or developed strong foreign links outside of Africa, and all are African nationalist in outlook.

ZANU has been the group most active militarily. Its head, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, had been in a Rhodesian prison from 1966 for his political activities against the Smith regime and was only released in November 1974. In his absence, ZANU-in-exile has been led by Herbert Chitepo. However, there appear to have been serious divisions of opinion in prison between Sithole and his lieutenants, notably Robert Mugabe, who claims to have deposed him. Chitepo, too, has been under challenge since the release of the ZANU leaders. The movement has enjoyed the close support of Tanzania and of FRELIMO. Beginning in 1972, ZANU began to operate effectively out of the latter's territory in the Tête Province of Mozambique. In December of that year, ZANU was able to achieve the prerequisite for a successful guerrilla struggle—a military base inside Rhodesia with local peasant support and reasonable communications to facilitate the movement of arms and trained men in and out of the country.[23] In addition to receiving aid from Tanzania and FRELIMO, ZANU is the only Rhodesian guerrilla group that the African Liberation Committee of the OAU has endorsed in the last few years.

For its part, ZAPU is a divided movement. Its external backing has come mainly from Zambia and Algeria, with some Soviet support coming after ZAPU's leaders agreed to break off all relations with Peking in 1965. Its leader, Joshua Nkoma, was in a Rhodesian prison from 1966 until his release in November 1974. ZAPU's experience as an exile

[22] Such a possibility has been freely talked about by officials of the South African government in Namibia since the middle of October 1974, when it was first publicly mentioned by the Commissioner-General for Indigenous Peoples of South West Africa.

[23] See Anthony R. Wilkinson, *Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957-73: An Account and Assessment*, Adelphi Paper No. 100, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1973.

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

Joshua Nkomo, left, now leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union, pictured together at a May 1960 conference in London. These two were released from Rhodesian prisons last December in order to participate in talks with representatives of the Ian Smith government in Lusaka, Zambia.

—Keystone.

group has been schismatic. When a group of young black Rhodesian graduates, known as the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) was formed in Zambia in 1971, one section of ZAPU led by Nkomo's two principal lieutenants—Robert Chikerema and George Nyandoro—joined with it, while a smaller wing of ZAPU attempted to merge with ZANU but failed to do so.

While the net effect of guerrilla actions to date has not been exceptional, this pressure, when combined with an international campaign of economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations, has created something of a siege atmosphere in Salisbury. White immigration—an important barometer of political morale—is declining, and more young white Rhodesians than ever before are now emigrating.[24] Rhodesia has responded to the guerrilla threat with a sharp escalation of security measures. Official sources report killing some 468 guerrillas since December 1972 but estimate that some 350 to 400 are still operating inside the country. Rhodesia has rapidly increased its expenditures on defense and police activities, to a point where they account for 15 percent of the 1975 national budget.[25]

The tendency of the Smith regime to overreact has played into the hands of the guerrillas in one important respect. A tough policy of forcibly relocating some 100,000 tribesmen in the northeastern area has turned a largely passive peasant community into an actively discontented population more willing than before to supply new recruits for insurgent forces.

The collapse of Portuguese power in Africa has sharply changed the environment in which the Zimbabwe liberation forces will be operating. While the potential for guerrilla action has grown as a result of the installation of FRELIMO in power in neighboring Mozambique and the OAU African Liberation Committee's new concentration on the liberation of Rhodesia, there is also a significant new opportunity for negotiations in that country as a result of the move toward détente worked out at Lusaka between certain black African presidents and the Republic of South Africa. Not only is Salisbury now faced with a more credible threat of guerrilla activity the length of its border with Mozambique, but it appears likely to find itself simultaneously deprived of its South African military prop as a result of commitments made by the Vorster regime at Lusaka.

It was in this sober new setting that Ian Smith agreed to release temporarily his black Rhodesian political prisoners, including Sithole and Nkomo, in order that they might travel to Lusaka to participate in working out the agreement of last December. There, the black presidents virtually compelled the liberation forces to consent to unite under the umbrella of the African National Council and to disband all other groups—both in exile and within Rhodesia. The *pro tempore* leadership of the reconstituted Council would comprise Joshua Nkomo, Bishop Muzorewa, and the Rev. Sithole.[26] The black leaders also pledged to cease guerrilla actions subject to agreement on the holding of constitutional talks with the Smith regime and the release of all political detainees.

While the liberation forces have consistently stated that they would accept nothing less than full majority rule, they have not insisted on its immediate achievement. This should leave room for nego-

[24] *Financial Mail* (Johannesburg), Oct. 12, 1973.

[25] *The Military Balance, 1974-75,* London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974.

[26] *The Guardian,* Dec. 9, 1974.

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tiations on a phased timetable for the transfer of power, as proposed in the Lusaka agreement. Mr. Smith, however, has often stated that he does not envisage black majority rule in his own lifetime.[27] Whether he will persevere in this attitude is unclear. Certainly, Rhodesia's new isolation may strengthen the hand of those white Rhodesians who argue that only a negotiated settlement with black Rhodesians can offer any reasonable prospects for the future. The liberation groups hope that this perspective prevails, but should it fail, they are prepared to exercise their option of launching a determined armed struggle. Such an insurrectionary effort would confront Salisbury with the prospect of a debilitating and destructive experience similar to that which toppled Portuguese power in Africa.

Armed Struggle and South Africa

While black liberation movements have yet to become a serious factor in the domestic political situation in the Republic of South Africa—apart from the role of SWAPO in Namibia—there are today three separate South African groups that espouse armed struggle as a means of achieving majority rule in their land. At present, all three operate largely in exile.

The most prominent of these movements is the African National Congress (ANC), the country's oldest black nationalist movement. From its inception in 1912 until 1961, the ANC steadfastly followed a policy of nonviolence. But in the latter year the group took up armed struggle under the lead of Nelson Mandela, who was subsequently sentenced (in 1964) to life imprisonment on Robben Island for his part in establishing the insurrectionary group *Umkonto We Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation). Over the ensuing years, the ANC-in-exile has continued to build up a guerrilla force by recruiting black South Africans to go abroad for training while simultaneously trying to create clandestine cells inside the Republic. The exile group has its headquarters and training camps in Tanzania and also enjoys facilities in Algeria and Zambia. It is under the direction of Oliver Tambo, Mandela's former law partner and ANC Deputy President-General. Except for a brief interlude in 1967 when its forces joined with ZAPU in abortive combined operations against Rhodesia, however, the ANC has made no overt attempt to engage in open armed struggle.

For most of its history, the ANC was militantly opposed to communism and also restricted its membership to blacks only. These policies were weakened during the 1960's, when the ANC established working relations with other "congress" movements inside South Africa—notably, the South African Indian National Congress, the Congress of Democrats, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions. The first of these groups had a strong Communist element in its leadership, and the second was a front organization for the banned South African Communist Party. In exile, the ANC continued its blacks-only policy but came into closer alliance with the other congresses-in-exile. As a result, despite the conscientious efforts of Tambo and his principal lieutenants to maintain the movement's old independence, the ANC was influenced by Communists. Moreover, inasmuch as the main support for the ANC, apart from that offered by the Organization of African Unity, comes from the

Nelson Mandela, founder of the guerrilla forces of the African National Congress, who is serving a life sentence in South Africa's Robben Island prison.

—London Daily Express via Pictorial Parade.

[27] See James Barber, *Rhodesia—The Road to Rebellion*, New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1967.

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Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe, it has been difficult for Tambo to deny a role to the Communists in the movement. (Indeed, the ANC has sided openly with Moscow in the Sino-Soviet struggle, and while most of its military personnel have received their training in Algeria and Tanzania, some cadres have been trained in Eastern Europe and Cuba.)

The ANC's chief rival has for a number of years been the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which seceded from the ANC under Robert Sobukwe's leadership in 1969. This group was outlawed in South Africa in 1960; after spending ten years on Robben Island, Sobukwe is now a banned person living in Kimberley. In exile, the PAC—a black-conscious and militantly anti-Communist movement—has declined in strength, largely because a series of splits robbed it of most of its ablest leaders. Its exile leader is Potlako Kitchener Leballo, around whose personality many of the debilitating quarrels have swirled. Although the PAC has flirted with Peking, it has received only token support from the Chinese. It has very few armed guerrillas in its training camps in Tanzania, and its ability to survive in exile is due entirely to the strong support of the ALC, which, inexplicably, favors it with funds out of all proportion to the movement's effective strength.

Oliver Tambo, President of the African National Congress and head of its external mission.

—Camerapix via Keystone.

The third exile movement committed to armed struggle against the minority white regime in Pretoria is a small elitist group—the African People's Democratic Union of South Africa. It grew out of the Non-European Unity Movement, whose leadership is largely Trotskyite and made up of middle-class professionals. Its exile leader is Isaac Tabata, a well-known Trotskyite pamphleteer and writer, who has campaigned against the dangers inherent in the involvement of Communist governments in the black liberation movement. The APDUSA has infiltrated a number of its trained cadres back into the Republic only to have them quickly caught, tried, and imprisoned. It has, so far, received no ALC financial support.

Few policy options appear open to the weak guerrilla forces as they attempt to wrest liberation from a regime evidently as impregnable as that of Prime Minister Vorster. In light of Pretoria's military strength, the guerrillas seem no more capable of establishing a real foothold inside South Africa on their own today than they were more than a decade ago when Nelson Mandela first proclaimed the necessity of creating a military capability in order to extract political concessions from Pretoria.[28] As a result, South Africa's insurgents have had to rely heavily on outside support, primarily from those black African states most involved in advancing majority rights on the subcontinent.

In the aftermath of the events of 1974, both the South African liberation forces and their mentors in the ALC see improved opportunities to achieve political concessions by posing the threat of armed action against South Africa. They believe that an intensified commitment to armed struggle in the wake of consolidation of black power in Mozambique (and, presumably, in Angola), and in a context of increasing pressure on, or actual elimination of, white supremacy in Rhodesia, will serve to focus international attention on South Africa and help to mobilize African and other support for the liberation cause. This strategy includes among its aims pressuring Western decision-makers to reduce their own economic, political, and military support for the Republic both as a means of weakening the Pretoria

[28] Nelson Mandela, *No Easy Walk to Freedom*, London, Heinemann, 1965.

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regime and of inducing it to make meaningful changes in its domestic policies.

Besides producing these external results, the strategy is also expected to be an important tool (perhaps with the sharpest cutting edge) for bringing about change in a racially discordant but economically flourishing country. A heightening insurgency, it is anticipated, will provide a militant focus for discontented blacks both in the cities and in the countryside. It will exacerbate disagreements among different white political and economic groups over what the proper response should be. It will help intensify the confrontation between white industry and black urban labor and the adverse effects that a policy of restricting the employment of blacks in skilled occupations—even when jobs go unfilled—has on economic growth. It will accentuate the growing militancy and unity of the leaders of the Bantu Homelands, who at their 1973 black summit rejected Pretoria's offer of separate independence and demanded an effective voice in deciding the constitutional future of all South Africa. Finally, it will highlight the failure to date of official policies of "separate development" to reduce racial tensions and to keep down the number of blacks in so-called "white areas," which comprise some two-thirds of the territory of the Republic.

The success of such a strategy will depend essentially on what kind of international and internal situations actually confront the Vorster regime and how it perceives them. Advocates of the armed-struggle strategy claim to see some encouraging trends in this regard. They point to the increasing isolation of South Africa in the world community—evidenced by the overwhelming General Assembly vote to expel the country from the UN; the growing support for the liberation movement not only from African and Arab governments but also from the Soviet Union, China, the Scandinavian states, and other countries; and a greater awareness in Western nations of the seriousness of the racial cleavage in South Africa and its implications for the future of its white-minority regime as well as for Western investments. Inside South Africa, there have been signs of mounting black militancy, as well as of greater readiness on the part of white South Africans to challenge the age-old assumptions behind the status quo of white supremacy; of growing tension in the government about the situation along the northern frontier since the Portuguese collapse; and of an increasingly expressed awareness among whites that, while the external pressures for change are still manageable, domestic pressures are rising. The Prime Minister himself has spoken in urgent terms of the need to change conditions within the Republic and has promised to eliminate the more "irritating" aspects of the application of the policies of *apartheid,* although it is highly doubtful that the kind of cosmetic measures he has in mind will satisfy the country's black majority, or its external supporters.

As suggested at the outset, South Africa's black movements cannot count on the immediate influx of heavy amounts of military aid from the OAU, for the latter has chosen to concentrate for the present on the liberation of Rhodesia. Furthermore, the Pretoria regime appears to have bought some time for itself by at least temporarily coming to terms with such implacable foes as Zambia's President Kaunda and Tanzania's President Nyerere by agreeing to withdraw military support from Rhodesia. (A reversal of that decision would of course embroil Pretoria in an immediate and major conflict with the guerrillas and their backers in a tactically poor setting, with the brooding threat of international involvement—a scenario described by some as the "Vietnamization of Southern Africa.")

Despite the current atmosphere of détente, however, South Africa remains extremely edgy about the challenge posed by the liberation movements and their backers. Over the last several years, government spokesmen have spoken in dire terms of "a state of war," of "outside forces threatening the peaceful coexistence of the people of Africa," or even of the threat of air attack by "perhaps the Egyptian air force or by Tanzania's MIG-17's." [29] In this siege atmosphere, South Africa's defense budget has soared from $688 million in 1973-74 to $1,200 million in 1974-75. The Republic now has 200,000 men under arms and a reserve force of about 80,000.[30]

In its anxiety, Pretoria tends to view the threat of armed struggle as being closely linked to the Soviet Union's growing naval interest in the Indian Ocean and would like to picture the military challenge to *apartheid* as part of a Moscow-inspired offensive against the Western defense system, of which the

[29] These statements were made in 1973 and 1974 by the South African Defense Minister, Mr. P. W. Botha; the Chief of the Army, Lt. Gen. Magnus Malan; and the Commandant-General, Admiral H. H. Biermann. Their statements will be found in *Paratus* (Johannesburg), the magazine of the South African Defense Force.

[30] *The Military Balance, 1974-75, op. cit.*

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Republic considers itself the indispensable linchpin in Southern Africa.[31] This view may find some resonance in mounting NATO uneasiness about the true meaning of the growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and the liberation forces are closely monitoring the debate on the latter subject. They found some satisfaction in Britain's decision in 1974 to end the Simonstown Treaty with South Africa. They hope above all to dissuade the Western powers from extending aid to Pretoria in an effort to bolster South Africa against major strategic threats—a move that would enhance the Vorster regime's ability to resist black liberation. In this connection, liberation groups deny any long-term political significance in the heavy Soviet and Chinese aid to the liberation movements, and they continue to express a readiness to accept Western support, which—they suggest—would strengthen the chances of changing the *apartheid* system and simultaneously would reduce the risk of international conflict in the area.

Balance Sheet

As we have seen, black self-determination in Southern Africa took a major stride forward during 1974. It will continue to advance during the current year as Angola, Mozambique, the Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tomé and Principe, and the French territory of the Comoro Islands achieve independence. Moreover, pressures against the remaining two minority regimes of the subcontinent can be expected to rise.

In their quest for majority rule throughout Southern Africa, the armed liberation groups have enjoyed the firm support of the Organization of African Unity and share with that mentor a basically African nationalist orientation, one which seeks to avoid the injection of external influences into the battle to liberate the white-dominated South. Additional aid has come from other sources, particularly Communist states, but there is little evidence that such assistance has accorded the donors great influence in any of the individual movements. This is not to say that there are no convinced Marxists and Communists among the liberation forces and their leaders. Nor is it to deny that various movements have drawn heavily upon Chinese or Soviet advice and/or models of insurrection and political action in the struggle for independence and self-determination. But nowhere does one find an inexorable commitment to Soviet or Chinese practices or to alliance with one or another Communist state.

It is true that some new black regimes *(e.g.,* those in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique) may require massive economic assistance to survive, and some states may be more willing to furnish aid than others. Should an imbalance in the sources of aid arise in any instance, this imbalance could conceivably have an important bearing on the domestic policies of that government. Yet, as the history of the liberation struggle clearly demonstrates, in Africa one cannot assume any distinct correlation between sources of foreign support and the political orientation of a given black liberation group.

[31] See James Barber, *South Africa's Foreign Policy,* New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1973.

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SALT and the Soviet Military

By Raymond L. Garthoff

EDITORS' NOTE: In November 1969 the USSR and the United States commenced formal talks on the limitation of strategic arms. These talks, commonly known as SALT, led in May 1972 to a treaty between the two powers restricting the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and to an interim agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. During the subsequent phase of the negotiations, popularly called SALT II, the exchanges have focused on further restrictions on strategic offensive weapons systems, and in this connection General Secretary Brezhnev and President Ford reached agreement at Vladivostok in November 1974 on the basis for negotiating during 1975 a 10-year limitation agreement covering such offensive arms.

The talks themselves have been private, and the diplomatic record remains closed. But the following article presents observations and reflections on one important aspect of SALT by a direct participant in the negotiations for more than three years, written from his own personal and informed perspective.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), first proposed by the United States at the end of 1966 and begun late in 1969, have now become a familiar feature in the international political landscape and a particularly important element in US-USSR relations. Much more than any other arms control and disarmament effort entered into to date, SALT has engaged the alert and active attention of the military authorities of both countries. The present article discusses attitudes of the Soviet military toward SALT and military objectives in SALT, the role of the Soviet military in SALT, the interaction of SALT to date with the Soviet military posture and military thinking, and finally some thoughts on the effect of SALT on evolving Soviet political-military relationships.

Mr. Garthoff is the author of numerous writings on Soviet political and military affairs, including Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, *1958 and 1962, and* Soviet Military Policy: A Historical Analysis, *1966. From 1969 through the conclusion of the SALT I agreements of 1972, he served as Executive Officer and senior State Department adviser on the United States SALT delegation.*

Soviet Attitudes Toward SALT

When, in December 1966 and January 1967, the United States first advanced, in private, a proposal for bilateral talks on limiting strategic arms—specifically anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems—the Soviet response was cautious, noting that the question deserved attention, and not rejecting the idea, but couched in terms which left open options either for serious negotiation or for retreat to propagandistic embrace of drastic reductions by both sides down to a minimum deterrent "nuclear umbrella" (an idea earlier championed by the Soviets in Geneva). For the next 18 months, the Soviet side declined to agree on a time and place for beginning

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substantive discussions, despite repeated American importuning.[1]

The precise role of the Soviet military leaders in this initial pre-SALT phase is not known, but it is highly likely (and in accordance with published Soviet military statements) that their predominant reaction was a compound of suspicions—suspicion both of disarmament and of arms control; suspicion of the United States in general, and in particular what it was up to in proposing SALT; suspicion that arms budgets would be reduced; and suspicion of likely further involvement of Soviet political leaders and political considerations in decisions on military affairs. These military attitudes reinforced the wariness of the Soviet political leaders, but did not override the readiness of the latter to keep the possibility of SALT open and under continuing consideration.

The first substantive position taken by the Soviet side was a firm statement at the very outset of the exchanges that strategic offensive arms, as well as anti-ballistic missile systems, must be included in any talks. This position, made known in January 1967, was promptly accepted by the US (perhaps to the surprise of the Soviet side). We do not know whether this position was advanced by the Soviet military or (as the author believes more likely) by the political leaders to provide a basis for "outbidding" the US in moving to the propaganda high ground of proposing drastic nuclear disarmament in case the course of the talks threatened to reveal Soviet unreadiness to agree on apparently reasonable limitations owing to the relative weakness of Soviet strategic forces at that time.

A second Soviet position which became clear in the 1967 diplomatic exchanges was a strong stand eschewing an approach based on freezing the existing strategic balance. The Soviet leaders, political and military, were wary that the US might call for a rigid "freeze" of force levels at a time when the US had a heavy strategic preponderance in all categories of intercontinental forces—ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers. In January 1967, when SALT was proposed, the US had operational 1,054 ICBM's, 576 SLBM's, and 650 B-52 heavy bombers, while the USSR had only 500 ICBM's (many in "soft" deployment), 100 old short-range SLBM's, and 155 inferior heavy bombers.[2] The US total of 2,280 was thus more than three times the Soviet total of 750 operational units (and still nearly twice the Soviet total of 1,200, if the additional ICBM and SLBM launchers then under construction in the USSR were counted).

Concerning strategic defensive systems, the problem from the standpoint of the Soviet military and political leaders was different: they were reluctant to accept limitations on their own freedom of action. ABM deployment at Moscow, publicly disclosed by Secretary of Defense McNamara immediately preceding the American overtures on SALT and the concomitant step toward ABM deployment in the US (marked by the January 1967 administration request for "contingent" funding for such deployment), was not yet operational, although it had been under construction for over two years. The Soviet ABM system was cumbersome and costly; hence it was being deployed only around Moscow (as had been the case with the billion-dollar deployment of the pioneer Soviet air defense missile system, the SA-1, around Moscow—and only around Moscow—a decade earlier). But Soviet military doctrine, and related political-military commentary in the press (such as Major General Nikolai A. Talensky's articles since 1964[3]), was based on the assumption that deployment of all means of strategic defense was morally and politically justified, and strategically sound and stabilizing. This was challenged implicitly by the US proposal (which initially focused exclusively on ABM systems). Moreover, a ban or sharp limitation on ABM deployment, coupled with growing American strategic offensive superiority (or an arms control freeze of the existing US superiority), would have consigned the Soviet Union to permanent inferiority and one-sided vulnerability. In an unconstrained arms race, the Soviet Union at least had a good chance of achieving mutual vulnerability, and of mitigating the nearly complete nakedness of the Soviet Union to American missile attack. Hence the Soviet military insistence on coupling possible strategic offensive limitations with ABM limitations, and hence, too, the Soviet reluctance to become committed to SALT until their

[1] For an account of the US proposal, its background and origins, and initial Soviet reactions, see John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT*, New York, Rinehart and Winston, 1973, pp. 86-95.

[2] These figures on US and USSR strategic force levels, and others cited later, are drawn from authoritative sources, including the annual "Posture Statements" of the US Secretary of Defense, and the unofficial but well-informed annual publication *Strategic Balance*, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, including refinements and corrections presented in later years as well as those current for the dates indicated.

[3] See, for example, Major General Nikolai A. Talensky, "Anti-Missile Systems and Disarmament," *International Affairs* (Moscow), October 1964, pp. 15-19.

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own strategic offensive force buildup had at least brought the Soviet Union within sight of parity with the United States in intercontinental capabilities.

The US decision in September 1967 to deploy a nationwide ABM defense, despite Secretary of Defense McNamara's obvious reluctance and his efforts to rationalize it as directed against a potential Chinese threat, and despite renewed public and private reaffirmation of American desire to proceed with SALT, did compel the Soviet leaders to calculate seriously the impact on the strategic balance of a major US ABM deployment. The prior Soviet testing and developing of an ICBM had not prevented the US from leaping far ahead of the USSR in deploying a much larger and much more capable strategic offensive force, and if the same thing were to be repeated with ABM systems as well, it would seriously prejudice and could confound Soviet aspirations to achieve strategic parity with the United States.

By mid-1968 the Soviet leaders decided to enter SALT and see what it would offer as against the alternative of an unrestricted strategic arms competition with the United States. By the time SALT was originally scheduled to convene, on September 30, 1968, the American strategic offensive force levels had long ago levelled off, while the Soviet buildup of modern silo-protected ICBM's was proceeding apace, and a modern SLBM production program was under way. Accordingly—in striking contrast to the situation at the time SALT had first been proposed—by September 1968 the US had 1,054 ICBM's, 656 SLBM's, and 565 B-52's, while the USSR had operational about 875 ICBM's, 110 SLBM's, and 150 heavy bombers. Counting additional Soviet ICBM and SLBM launchers under construction, the overall totals were 2,275 for the US and 1,650 for the USSR.

SALT was postponed for slightly over a year as a consequence of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (on August 20, 1968, literally on the eve of the planned announcement of a forthcoming US-USSR summit meeting and the commencement of SALT), then the advent of a new American admin-



A December 1974 photo of a Soviet missile silo at an unidentified site.

—A. Ovchinnikov for TASS via Sovfoto.

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istration, the decision of that administration to review its military policy and SALT position, and other delaying factors. But throughout that year the Soviet side reaffirmed its readiness to begin SALT. From the standpoint of developments affecting the strategic balance, the difference of that year was of some significance in two respects: first the US moved from initial testing (beginning in August 1968) to development of deployable MIRV's; and second, the Soviet ICBM and SLBM buildup had proceeded to an extent that now virtually assured parity in the bilateral strategic balance in numbers of missile launchers. As of November 1969, when SALT actually got under way, the US force level remained unchanged from September 1968, except for a slight decline in the number of B-52 bombers, while the USSR then had 1,140 ICBM's operational and some 380 more under construction, about 185 SLBM's operational and 175 more under construction, and 145 heavy bombers. Thus the totals, including Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's under construction, stood at 2,235 for the US and 2,025 for the USSR. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had virtually completed its ABM deployment under way, with only 64 ABM launchers at Moscow, while the US was launched on a major ABM program now called "Safeguard," somewhat reoriented from the "Sentinel" program of 1967 to stress defense of ICBM's, but still nationwide and with well over ten times the number of ABM launchers and interceptors comprising the Soviet deployment.

The Soviet military leaders do not limit their view of "the strategic balance" to a comparison of US and USSR intercontinental strategic forces. As we learned from the first five years of SALT, they insist on considering, in conjunction with these elements, other US (and Allied) nuclear forces capable of striking the Soviet Union. In this respect, it may be somewhat misleading to list only these intercontinental forces in comparing force levels. Nonetheless, the Soviets have recognized in the SALT agreements the key role these elements bear in the strategic equation, and it is important to bear in mind these developments in the changing intercontinental strategic balance, even though this summary does not cover many other important aspects of, and factors affecting, the overall strategic balance. Both the reality and perceptions of the strategic balance are, and have been recognized to be, important both in military and in political terms.

During the critical gestation period of SALT, from 1967 to 1969, the Soviet military leaders (as well as the political leaders) came to realize several important things affecting their approach to SALT:

(1) The United States remained interested in SALT under conditions of near-parity, and not only when it had a three-to-one superiority in strategic offensive forces;

(2) The United States had demonstrated its capability and will to build up qualitatively and quantitatively superior forces rapidly in strategic bombers in the 1950's, and in ICBM's and SLBM's in the 1960's, and it could do so again with ABM's and MIRV's in the 1970's if strategic arms competition remained unrestrained;

(3) The United States had indicated it was prepared to place maximum reliance on unilateral means of verification, in contrast to its earlier demands for on-site inspections to verify strategic arms limitation agreements;

(4) Bilateral strategic arms limitations, if mutually acceptable terms could be negotiated, would contribute to a general lessening of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States, particularly

Andrei A. Grechko, USSR Minister of Defense (left), and Army General Viktor G. Kulikov, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, pictured at Moscow's Vnukovo Airport in February 1973.

—V. Koshevoi for TASS via Sovfoto.

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important given increased Sino-Soviet tensions, and consonant with Soviet political strategy in Europe as well;

(5) There were measures which the Soviet Union and the United States could take that would reduce the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear war, and SALT could serve as a useful and appropriate forum to raise and consider such matters.

Of these, the second point was undoubtedly of highest importance to the Soviet military leaders. They remained suspicious of US intentions in SALT but saw possible advantage if strategic parity would be accepted by the United States and if limitations could be agreed on that would prevent a new US surge in strategic deployments threatening the newly-won and still precarious Soviet prospect of achieving strategic parity.

Throughout the SALT negotiations (including the period since the 1972 SALT agreements were reached), foreign analysts have cited Soviet military statements warning of the possibility of nuclear war, of American aggressive intentions, and of the need for vigilance and for continued efforts to maintain Soviet military might.[4] (Soviet authors have done the same in reverse, the most extensive being a 1971 book called *Pervy Udar,*[5] reviewing American military statements and weapons programs and alleging a US proclivity to seek a first-strike capability.) These statements in support of the Soviet military effort no doubt reflect in part real continuing Soviet military concerns; in part they probably are rationalizations for desired programs; and in part they may represent instruments in bureaucratic maneuver by those opposed to SALT or at least to far-reaching Soviet moves in SALT.

It is evident from the virtual absence of references to SALT in Soviet military publications and in most statements by military leaders that there has been a strong current of reserve and reluctance toward SALT among the military. Much of the explanation may lie simply in concern at undercutting the case for maintaining a strong military posture—a concern which continues since the SALT agreements have been reached. When Army General Viktor G. Kulikov, Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defense, endorsed the SALT I agreements before the Supreme Soviet in August 1972, he coupled this support with a reference to the fact that the party and government at the same time "display constant concern for raising the defense capability of the Soviet Union," affirming that the "Soviet Armed Forces possess everything necessary to reliably defend the state interests of our Motherland." He also noted (as did other speakers) that "the ABM Treaty halts the further buildup of ABM systems in the USSR and the USA, preventing the emergence of a chain reaction of competition between offensive and defensive arms."[6] Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal Andrei A. Grechko stressed this same point on the occasion of the ratification of the ABM Treaty by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet a month later,[7] underlining the arms control aspect of greatest significance to the Soviet military (as well as political) leaders.

Soviet Objectives in SALT

A number of foreign policy, economic, strategic—and bureaucratic—considerations have been noted by various observers as contributing to the formulation of the Soviet positions and objectives in entering SALT.[8]

The Soviet political leaders have been particularly concerned with political, economic, and diplomatic objectives, but they have also shared the interest of the military leaders in military considera-

[4] In particular, see: Leon Gouré, Foy D. Kohler, and Mose L. Harvey, *The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy,* Coral Gables, Fla., University of Miami Press, 1974, passim; Lawrence T. Caldwell, *Soviet Attitudes to SALT,* Adelphi Paper No. 75, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971, esp. pp. 6-19; C. G. Jacobsen, *Soviet Strategy—Soviet Foreign Policy,* Glasgow, Robert Mac Lehose & Co., Ltd., 1972, pp. 71-121; Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Approaches to SALT," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1970, pp. 1-10; *Soviet Power and Europe,* 1945-1970, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1970, pp. 273-77, 437-41, 499-510; "Soviet Interests in SALT," in William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Eds., *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's,* Pittsburgh, Pa., University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973, pp. 21-54; and "Soviet Interests in SALT: Institutional and Bureaucratic Considerations," in Frank B. Horton III, Anthony G. Rogerson, and Edward L. Warner III, Eds., *Comparative Defense Policy,* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1974, pp. 113-20.

[5] Yuri N. Listvinov, *Pervyi Udar* (First Strike), Moscow, IMO, 1971, pp. 183.

[6] As quoted in "In the Interest of Strengthening Peace: Joint Session of the Foreign Affairs Commissions of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet," *Izvestia* (Moscow), Aug. 24, 1972.

[7] As quoted in "Important Contribution to Strengthening Peace and Security: Session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet," *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 30, 1972.

[8] In addition to the writings cited in footnote 4 above, see in particular the excellent discussion by Marshall D. Shulman, "SALT and the Soviet Union," in Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, Eds., *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond,* New York, The Free Press-Macmillan, 1974, pp. 101-21; and David Holloway, "Strategic Concerns and Soviet Policy," *Survival* (London), November 1971.

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tions and objectives. The most fundamental political objective has been American recognition of parity of the USSR with the US—parity in the broadest political and political-military as well as strategic sense, spelling an end to the USSR's inferiority in its relations with the United States. The SALT agreements reached in May 1972 reinforced in Soviet eyes the "Basic Principles on Relations between the USA and the USSR" signed by President Nixon in Moscow at that same time.[9] In a political-military context, these agreements reflected and bore witness to American recognition of the fact that there exists a military parity in the broad sense of inability of either side to prevail militarily over the other, and hence an inability to coerce the other side; in terms more familiar in the West, it reflects an equal vulnerability of both sides and therefore a state of mutual deterrence from nuclear war. Soviet commentaries since May 1972 have consistently stressed this parity and have refrained from any discussion (even from publication) of asymmetrical specifics in the numbers of strategic missile launchers allowed under the Interim Agreement, even though those numbers favor the Soviet side; they know that other asymmetries favor the US, and they do not wish to engage in debate over pluses and minuses on matters of relative detail which do not affect basic parity.

As early as 1968, the Soviet side had agreed that the main objective of SALT would be to achieve and to maintain stable US-USSR strategic deterrence through agreed limitations on the deployment of strategic offensive and defensive arms. Soviet representations stressed then, and throughout SALT, that limitations must be so balanced that neither side could obtain military advantage and that equal security should be assured for both sides.

The military leaders in Moscow, while sharing or at least accepting these political and political-military strategic objectives, also continue to hold to a military doctrine which calls for preparing to wage war if deterrence should fail. Also, they are naturally more concerned with the specifics of the strategic military balance, notwithstanding overall parity in a broad military-political sense.

Among the considerations leading to serious Soviet interest in SALT has been the pressure of an economic pinch.[10] The Soviet leaders have not been compelled by economic pressures to become interested in SALT or to reach any particular arms limitations. But they have found an important economic incentive for dampening down unlimited military competition with the US. And the Soviet military leaders realistically recognize the constraints which competing economic needs have always placed on military programs in the Soviet Union. The economic situation of the USSR contributed to the initial Soviet decision to enter SALT, and growing economic pressures probably played an important role in leading to Soviet agreement to the SALT accords.

It is important to bear in mind that there are varied and sometimes competing interests among the military leaders (and among civilian military-industrial chiefs), since they have differing stakes in particular weapons programs and military forces. "The military" by no means always speak with one voice.[11] But overall, the principal basic objectives of the Soviet military in SALT have been:

(1) to assure that the terms of any negotiated strategic arms limitation would result in no military disadvantage and, if possible, some advantage to the USSR;

(2) to preserve maximum leeway for Soviet military research and development and deployment programs, except when specific limitations are justified by limitations of comparable value placed on US military programs;

(3) to forestall an extensive US deployment of ABM systems, even at the cost of foregoing comparable Soviet ABM defense; and

(4) to preserve the right to maintain Soviet offensive and defensive forces required to counter third-country forces, excepting only special cases where a US-USSR limitation was deemed paramount (*i.e.*, ABM limitation).

In engaging in SALT, the Soviet military have also had certain specific second-order objectives:

[9] See *Documents on Disarmament 1972*, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC, 1974, pp. 207-325, for the texts and other official documents relating to the SALT I agreements. Of greatest significance was the ABM Treaty, limiting the US and the USSR each to no more than two anti-ballistic missile defense sites with no more than 100 ABM launchers and interceptors at each, and further limiting development and deployment of ABM systems. The second SALT agreement, signed at the same time, was an Interim Agreement limiting the numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers each side could have for a five-year period, during which negotiations would continue for a more comprehensive offensive arms limitation.

[10] See especially Wolfe, "Soviet Approaches to SALT," *loc. cit.*, and "Soviet Interests in SALT," *loc. cit.*, pp. 24-28.

[11] In addition to the writings of Thomas Wolfe cited in footnote 4, see Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielman, Jr., *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of US Perspectives on the Arms Race*, New York, Praeger, 1972.

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SALT I opens at Helsinki on November 17, 1969; on the far side of the table, members of the Soviet delegation, including (from the right), chief negotiator Vladimir Semenov, Col. Gen. Nikolai V. Ogarkov, and Col. Gen. Nikolai N. Alekseev; at the left forefront, chief US negotiator Gerard Smith, and to his left, Harold Brown and (partially obscured) Raymond L. Garthoff, the author.

—Wide World.

(1) to avoid any on-site inspection in the USSR and to obtain agreement instead to rely on national technical means of verification;

(2) to obtain, if possible, inclusion of the full range of American nuclear delivery forces deployed within striking range of the Soviet Union in the forces subject to limitation; and

(3) to ensure that the SALT negotiations not become an opening which would compromise Soviet military secrets, in the first instance to the US, and—for an even wider range of matters on which the US was informed—to third countries and the world at large (and, for that matter, to the Soviet public).

The Soviet side, probably at the instance of the political leadership, also decided some time prior to the beginning of SALT to pursue in that forum the tangential but significant objective of seeking agreement with the US on measures to reduce the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear war between the two countries as a result of accident, unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, misconstruction of some technical development or weapons tests, or provocative action by a third nuclear country. The attitude of the Soviet military leadership toward this objective is not known, but there have been no indications of military oppsition to it, and it is more likely that the military agreed on this objective so long as it did not involve intrusion into the secrecy surrounding Soviet military command and control arrangements.

The Role of the Soviet Military

SALT represented the first arms limitation negotiation in which the Soviet military played a direct and major role. Soviet military representatives and experts have attended other disarmament and arms control negotiations as advisors (particularly the conference on measures to avert surprise attack in 1958), but never with the seniority of direct participation represented in SALT.

During the first three "rounds" of SALT from late 1969 to the end of 1970, the second-ranking member

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of the Soviet delegation was Colonel General (now Army General) Nikolai V. Ogarkov, then First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. For a man with this senior position and broad responsibilities to devote eight months in a 14-month period on a delegation abroad—in addition to time spent in Moscow in preparation for each round of negotiation—demonstrates the seriousness which the Soviet government and the Soviet military ascribed to SALT. In addition to General Ogarkov, Colonel General of the Engineering-Technical Service Nikolai N. Alekseev was a member of the Soviet SALT delegation in the first two rounds of negotiation in 1969 and 1970.

Succeeding Generals Ogarkov and Alekseev as the senior military respresentatives on the Soviet SALT delegation have been Lieutenant General Konstantin A. Trusov, a senior General Staff officer with a background of work overseeing advanced weapons development, and Lieutenant General (now Colonel General) Ivan I. Beletsky.

A number of other Soviet officers, some of general-officer or flag rank, have participated directly in the SALT talks as "advisors" or (a less prestigious category) as "experts". As one would expect for a serious negotiation, the Soviet side has sent highly qualified specialists in the key areas under discussion: strategic missile experts, ABM experts, submarine and ASW specialists, and strategic bomber officers, all working under senior officers of the General Staff concerned with advanced weapon development and procurement.

In addition to military representatives, the USSR has included in its delegation two senior figures from the scientific-technological-military production field. Academician Aleksandr N. Shchukin, a highly

Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, left, greets US and Soviet SALT negotiators during their visit to his summer residence on July 9, 1971. Shaking hands with Kekkonen is chief US negotiator Gerard Smith; to his right, chief Soviet negotiator Vladimir Semenov, Col. Gen. Konstantin A. Trusov, and Piotr S. Pleshakov, then Deputy Minister of the USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry.

—Photo by P. Jarmo Hietarante/Lehtikuva.

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respected "elder statesman" in military applications of science and technology, and Piotr S. Pleshakov, initially Deputy Minister and later Minister of Radio Industry, have served throughout SALT to date. (Both, incidentally, are reserve general officers in the Engineering-Technical Service.)

Senior Soviet military representatives participated directly in the SALT negotiations at the Moscow and Vladivostok summit meetings in 1974 and were closely consulted by General Secretary Brezhnev. (In contrast, there were no American military representatives at these summit discussions.)

SALT led to establishment of direct coordination between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs early in 1968, also with participation of Academy of Sciences political and technical institutes and of representatives of the military-industrial production ministries. The participation of senior levels of elements in addition to the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs was manifest in the SALT negotiations at the first Moscow summit meeting in May 1972, when Deputy Prime Minister Leonid V. Smirnov played an important direct part in the final negotiation of the Interim Agreement limiting strategic offensive arms. Smirnov chairs the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK), which handles coordination between the Defense Ministry, ministries concerned with military production, and Academy of Sciences institutes engaged in military research and development. Party Secretary and Politburo candidate member Dmitri F. Ustinov oversees this sector.

The highest body dealing specifically with military and defense matters is the Supreme (or Higher) Defense Council (VSO). Chaired by party General Secretary Brezhnev, this body includes Prime Minister Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium Nikolai V. Podgorny, Party Secretary Dmitri F. Ustinov, and Minister of Defense Andrei A. Grechko. Others are called upon to attend on occasion, including Defense Ministry and General Staff officers, Smirnov and other VPK members, Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, and experts from the Academy of Sciences. It has dealt with SALT issues on a number of occasions.

The highest authoriy is the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The key Soviet decisions on entering SALT and all major positions in SALT are determined by the Politburo. Also chaired by Brezhnev, this body includes the other political leaders who do not usually concern themselves with defense or foreign affairs. In an unusual circumstance, during the intensive five days of negotiations on SALT at the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit conference in Moscow in May 1972, the Politburo (which normally meets weekly) met at least four times.

In 1973, Marshal Grechko (along with Foreign Minister Gromyko and KGB Chief Yuri Andropov) was added to the Politburo. Previously, he had attended not as a member but rather by special invitation on occasions when policy questions under discussion directly concerned him—which occurred increasingly often.

Soviet military participation in SALT planning and decision-making, and in the actual negotiations, has been active and vigorous at all levels. The effect of this active role has probably been to exert a conservative and cautious influence on Soviet positions, but it has not precluded reaching a number of significant agreements.

SALT and Soviet Military Programs

How did SALT interact with Soviet military programs?

The first significant effects of SALT on Soviet military programs were felt long before the representatives of the two sides appeared at the green negotiating table. The Soviet political and military leaders were led by the persistent high-level American request for SALT throughout 1967 and in 1968 to give the idea careful consideration. And even the prospect of Soviet entry into SALT had an impact in certain instances—particularly with respect to the Soviet ICBM buildup.[12]

As we have noted, US strategic offensive forces had leveled off by mid-1967, and each step toward deployment of an ABM system was accompanied by private as well as public urging of strategic arms limitation talks. At the same time, as the Soviet ICBM deployment program moved toward numerical equality with the US and the SLBM program got under way, Soviet ABM development continued to yield disappointing results.

In 1967, the Soviet leaders decided to curtail by one-third the originally planned deployment of 96 ABM launchers in 12 complexes around Moscow, even abandoning some construction already under way. It is unlikely that this move was intended to

[12] See footnote 2 on sources of information on Soviet developments cited in the discussion in this section.

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signal restraint to the US; rather, it appears to have represented a decision, based on the relatively poor performance of the existing ABM system, to cut back even the modest original deployment around Moscow. (Work on the other eight complexes with a total of 64 launchers and associated battle-engagement radars continued, reaching completion shortly before SALT began in late 1969, and construction of three additional sophisticated, large phased-array radars for long-range detection and tracking continued on through the early to mid-1970's.) This pattern of ABM deployment suggested, as early as 1968, that the Soviet side might be prepared to agree, in SALT, to an ABM limitation at 75-100 launchers, for defense of Moscow.

Reflecting these developments, there was a sharp drop during 1968 in the frequency of references to an effective Soviet ABM defense—a claim for years routinely sounded by Soviet military spokesmen. This change clearly indicated reconsideration by the Soviets of their originally more or less automatic commitment to ABM deployment. Following the US "Safeguard" deployment debate, reference to Soviet ABM defense capability resumed in 1970, but again, as agreement on an ABM treaty became more likely in 1971, virtually all references to a Soviet ABM capability ceased, not to be resumed again.

During the period from 1966 through 1969, as we have seen, the Soviet ICBM force was growing by about 300 new silo launchers per year. It seems highly likely that the Soviet military and political leaders were determined that the Soviet Union should equal the US at least in number of ICBM's, and preferably in ICBM's and SLBM's combined. By the time the Soviets were prepared to begin SALT in 1968, the USSR had more ICBM launchers operational and under construction than did the US (although slightly fewer in protected silos). The USSR was, however, still lagging badly in SLBM's, just beginning deployment of a Polaris-class submarine (the nuclear-powered "Y" class, with 16 launchers).

The delay of SALT from the early fall of 1968 to November 1969 gave the Soviet Union the advantage of having an additional 375 ICBM's and SLBM's operational and under construction. At this point, having surpassed the US in number of ICBM's, the Soviet leaders decided to cease the buildup of ICBM launchers. After SALT began, no additional groups of ICBM silos were begun for a year (only a few individual silos needed for filling out standard groups —six silos for SS-9's, 10 silos for SS-11's and SS-13's—were started late in 1969 or early 1970).



A Soviet Y-class nuclear-powered missile submarine shown under way in international waters in 1970.

—US Navy photo.

Indeed, three groups of SS-9's in early construction were abandoned in 1970. Construction of the remaining groups continued, for a putative total of 1,527 ICBM launchers at operational complexes (including 134 of the older SS-7's and SS-8's on "soft" launching pads). Construction of Y-class submarines with SLBM launchers continued apace, as the Soviet Navy still had very few—many fewer than the United States.

The Soviet cessation of its ICBM buildup was, in my view, intended as a "signal" in SALT, although it also reflected a Soviet intention to shift to a new generation of improved ICBM's if SALT did not preclude having more and the ICBM buildup resumed. One can only surmise, but it seems likely that the Soviet decision at that time was a contingent one, designed to seek the benefit for SALT purposes of a display of restraint, while keeping the door open for a renewed buildup if SALT did not result in a timely agreement limiting ICBM's. The "signal" in SALT was gently prompted by some unofficial Soviet spokesmen, but it did not really "catch" until well into 1970, partly owing to seasonal construction patterns but mainly because of the usual caution in reporting favorable intelligence. The Soviet side did not see a response to this signal.

About a year after the first signal, as the talks began to stalemate, a new "signal" of a different kind was made as a limited deployment of new missiles was undertaken—construction began on some 80 new ICBM launcher silos (and some new underground control chambers). This signal hit a little more rapidly, in the early spring of 1971, just before agreement was reached by the highest US and USSR government leaders on a new approach

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in SALT. Probably as a consequence of the agreement of May 20, 1971, on new guidelines for the talks, no additional ICBM launchers were begun thereafter—again a positive signal by the Soviet leaders, unilaterally restraining their own deployment for the year until actual agreement on ICBM limitations was reached.

Skeptics of the value of the SALT accords suggest that the Soviets probably had no intention to build more ICBM's in any case. While conceivably this was so, it may be observed that these skeptics were often the same people who had projected much higher levels of Soviet ICBM deployment, had doubted the "signals" of 1969-70 and 1971-72, and had most ardently during those years argued the need for limiting Soviet ICBM (and particularly SS-9) deployment. In fact, as we have noted, during the two and a half years of SALT negotiations leading up to the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, on strategic offensive arms, the Soviet ICBM buildup was unilaterally limited to 80 additional ICBM launchers, rather than the 300 to 350 each year for the preceding three years, apart from the agreement of the Soviet Union to build no additional ICBM silos over the five-year duration of the Interim Agreement.

The Soviet ICBM force buildup, restraints, and limitation should be considered in light of the fact that this matter was viewed by the Soviet military also in terms of requirements vis-à-vis third countries. Both the USSR and the US would need to consider possible use of some portion of their ICBM forces against China. But, for the Soviet military, that possibility, as well as possible use against yet other countries and against US bases in Eurasia, required balancing ICBM's for these roles against MRBM's and IRBM's. In 1969 it became known that the USSR was deploying SS-11 missiles capable of being fired at targets either in the United States or on the Eurasian periphery, and shortly thereafter it became clear that a number of MRBM's and IRBM's were being phased out. In all, over 100 MRBM and IRBM launchers were deactivated by 1972, and perhaps two or three times as many ICBM's in all were deployed primarily for possible use against peripheral continental, rather than intercontinental, targets. In the SALT negotiations, the Soviet side nonetheless agreed to count all the latter missiles as ICBM's, recognizing that the US could not agree to exempt weapons which could be fired at targets in the United States.

Thus we see that the very proposal for SALT, and then the two and a half years of negotiations leading to the May 1972 accords, almost certainly had an effect—a restraining effect—on Soviet ICBM deployment and may have reinforced other considerations leading to an early leveling-off at a very low level of ABM deployment. On the other hand, they did not affect a standing SLBM buildup.

We do not know what the views of the Soviet military were on the pace and levels of strategic force buildup at various stages of the SALT process. It is likely that particular services had their own advocacies.

The Air Defense Forces probably lobbied for higher levels of ABM deployment, but even the military leadership probably was prepared to agree to forego Soviet ABM deployments if the US also would do so. It seems clear that the Soviet military leaders (and probably the political leaders, too) preferred to keep the Moscow ABM deployment, particularly to provide defense against small third-country strikes and accidental launchings (remote though the latter possibility would be), and perhaps also to have the benefit of some operational experience with an ABM system. But it is not clear that a complete ABM ban could not have been negotiated; the possibility was not fully explored.

The Soviet military, not unlike the American, were evidently inclined to prefer specific deployment limitations, but no more than minimal restraints on research and deployment and on system modifications and improvements. Nonetheless, initial opposition was overcome to such limitations as a ban on deployment of future "exotic" types of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as a ban on development and testing of various ABM systems, such as space, air, sea, and land mobile-based and rapid refire systems.

The strongest military consideration pressed by the Soviet side, and one representing a major difference with the US, was the insistence that strategic offensive arms for purposes of SALT include delivery means capable by virtue of their deployment location of striking the USSR or the US, respectively. This position underlay their opposition to early US proposals to limit Soviet MRBM's and IRBM's deployed against targets in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, but the US did not press this proposal. Much more difficult has been the persistent Soviet attempt to include in some manner US forward-based systems (FBS) deployed within nuclear strike range of the USSR. These are mostly aircraft dual-capable (for nuclear or non-nuclear attack) based on US air

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bases in Allied territory or on US attack aircraft carriers. It is not necessary here to discuss the issue —which bedeviled SALT for five years—save to note that the issue was probably posed by real concerns, exaggerated in their own minds, on the part of the Soviet military. The political leaders probably found these arguments convincing but not overriding in the context of the SALT I accord or, evidently, in the Vladivostok formula for a SALT II settlement. If the matter had been raised primarily to cause difficulties between the United States and its allies or for tactical reasons in the course of negotiations, it would have been much more readily disposed of.

The FBS issue represented but does not exhaust the category of "worst case" calculations which each side can conjure up to justify hedges in limitations favorable to itself as counterweights to such conceivable advantages to the other. The US has had its share, including the onetime exaggerated concerns of some American officials over so-called "SAM upgrade," *i.e.*, the possible upgrading of components of surface-to-air missile (SAM) anti-aircraft systems converting them into low-grade ABM systems. Despite strong Soviet military (and political) suspicions that this concern was both fraudulent and involved unwarranted impingement on air defense systems, the strength of the American concern did lead the Soviet side to accept obligations not to convert or upgrade SAM missiles, launchers, and radars to ABM missiles, launchers, and radars, and to agree not to test such SAM components against strategic ballistic missiles, and not to deploy SAM or other phased-array radars of a certain power (except for agreed special and limited purposes). Real concerns were not without undue impingement on Soviet air defense once exaggerations of concern were set aside.

Perhaps the chief instance of Soviet refusal to accept an American-proposed limitation in the Interim Agreement was the definition of "heavy" ICBM's. In retrospect, it is clear that the Soviet SS-19 (and probably the SS-17) would not have been allowable within the US-proposed limit, and the Soviet military could never have accepted a limitation which precluded their deployment of the long-awaited MIRVed ICBM counterpart to the US Minuteman III. The no "significant increase" in silo size is less constraining and thus permitted a compromise wherein the Soviets agreed not to retrofit SS-9 class missiles in the SS-11 silos (the main American concern), but kept the opportunity to deploy the SS-17 and the SS-19 in modified SS-11 silos, and the SS-18 in SS-9 silos.

In the SALT negotiations, each side has, of course, presented national positions, so that it would usually only be possible to infer which positions were adopted because of "military" concerns and preferences, as distinguished from those of nonmilitary leaders and negotiators. But the examples above illustrate some of the particular interests of the Soviet military establishment as reflected in the SALT negotiations.

It is reasonable to assume that Soviet military men have sought to couple their approval of the SALT limitations with commitments by the political leaders to continuation or intensification of some nonlimited military programs, although we can only infer from what has been happening in the Soviet military forces since the SALT accords. It is, for example, quite possible that the powerful PVO (Air Defense Command) "lobby" sought and secured an assurance that foregoing ABM defenses would not be followed by unilateral or negotiated cutbacks in air defenses—notwithstanding the gap in logic for maintaining costly (and relatively ineffective) strategic air defenses when the massive missile forces of the potential opponent would be unopposed. (Of course, the Soviet Air Defense Command and other military leaders do make a case for maintaining extensive air defenses to defend against possible air attack by other powers on the Eurasian periphery.) Similarly, the military leaders doubtless secured agreement to proceed with MIRVing much of the ICBM force by modifying existing launchers for new MIRVed missiles, and with deploying the additional modern SLBM's allowed under the Interim Agreement.

There is strong basis to conclude that the Soviet military leadership sees the current programs to build up the SLBM force and, above all, to replace part of the SS-11 and SS-9 forces with MIRVed SS-19's and SS-18's (and perhaps to produce a strategic bomber as well) as necessary and prudent actions in order to preserve parity by matching the already programmed buildup of US Minuteman III, Poseidon, Trident, and B-1 strategic forces. However, these Soviet efforts to catch up and then keep up with the US are seen by many in the United States as threatening to move *ahead* of the US in strategic offensive strength. These conflicting prespectives of the two sides have posed a major problem for the SALT negotiations.

Turning now from discussion of interacting in-

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

Two Soviet "Galosh" missiles, used in Moscow's ABM defense system, are displayed in the November 7, 1973, Revolution Day parade in Red Square.

—V. Mastiukov for TASS via Sovfoto.

fluences of Soviet deployment programs on SALT and *vice versa,* it may be useful to consider some aspects of doctrine and military thinking particularly pertinent to SALT and also interacting with it.

Military Doctrine

By 1969, the Soviet military had reached the conclusion that strategic superiority, in the sense of a first-strike option permitting escape from a crushing retaliatory strike, was not possible for either side in contemporary conditions. They recognized that, with the existing level of development of nuclear missile forces, it had become impossible in practice for an attacker to destroy such forces completely, and consequently that it had also become impossible to prevent an annihilating retaliatory strike. In other words, a kind of "nuclear balance" in terms of capabilities for mutual destruction had come into being. At the same time, the military were concerned that this balance could be threatened if one side (the US) achieved a highly effective anti-ballistic missile defense while the other side (the USSR) did not have such a defense. Hence their willingness to support the political leadership in its desire to avoid heavy expenditures on an unpromising and even dangerous further round of strategic arms competition caused by extensive ABM deployment—if a mutually equitable limitation could be reached with the United States.

These views came slowly, in part because they were not self-evidently consistent with the standard military statements implying Soviet victory in a nuclear world war if one should come. Such public statements in the military press and on national military commemoration days have a number of purposes, prominently including indoctrination and morale-boosting of the armed forces and the public. Also, specifically with respect to ABM defenses, since the early 1960's it had been standard military litany to claim in a general implied way the *existence* of reliable anti-missile defenses (although beginning in 1967 a muted countercurrent to this view began to be expressed). Moreover, as noted earlier, it had been the established Soviet view that ABM defenses

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were naturally "good"—a position still publicly voiced by Premier Kosygin in London in February 1967 and again during his visit to the United States in June of the same year.[13] By 1969, however, claims that ABM defense was "good" while offensive weapons were "bad" had ceased, and by early 1971 claims to an ABM defense of the Soviet Union had been quietly dropped.

Some controversy has arisen in Western commentaries over the significance of the Soviet agreement to the 1972 ABM Treaty with its clear acceptance for the indefinite future of assured vulnerability of the USSR (as well as the US) to missile attack. Some commentators who are opposed to the idea of "mutual assured destruction" (calling it "MAD") are also reluctant to conclude that the Soviet leaders subscribe to such a doctrine. They rightly note that Soviet military doctrine has long stressed "damage limitation," and that the USSR continues to maintain extensive strategic antiaircraft defenses. Moreover, a comment by Marshal Grechko that "research and development directed toward resolving the problems of the defense of the country against nuclear missile attack" is not limited[14] suggests that the military did not originate, and may have been cool toward, the Soviet position in favor of an explicit ban on deployment of a ballistic missile defense of the territory of the country. However, these considerations do not negate the fact of the Soviet acceptance in the ABM Treaty of mutual assured vulnerability of the Soviet Union and the United States to missile attack. The Soviet leaders value doctrine, but they are not always doctrinaire.

The SALT negotiations thus far have not led to the kind of far-reaching dialogue on military concepts that some of us hoped to see emerge from SALT. There was early agreement on certain basic concepts such as mutual deterrence, equal security, and strategic stability. But views on specific prescriptions for "strategic stability" in particular have differed significantly. Moreover, each side has stressed those aspects of stability of greatest concern to it and in terms of support for its current proposals. (This has led to some interesting reverse-field-running by both sides at different stages of the negotiation.) But the net result has been to negotiate in a classical bargaining fashion as much as to persuade by debates over doctrine and strategic concepts.

An example can illustrate the difficulty in engaging in discussion of doctrine. During an exchange on strategic stability in the SALT plenary meetings in the spring of 1970, the Soviet side referred to the possibility that ICBM silos might be empty by the time of an enemy strike, since the ICBM's in them could already be in flight owing to information gained from technical early-warning systems. The US delegation took the occasion of this remark to make clear that the US held any "launch on warning" doctrine abhorrent, and a statement to that effect by the Secretary of Defense was subsequently placed on the SALT plenary record. The Soviet side declined, however, to pick up a suggestion that it, too, make an official statement of the Soviet position—not necessarily because "launch on warning" *was* the Soviet doctrine, but because the Soviet military were consistently adamant against any discussion of such matters of operational doctrine.[15]

The Interim Agreement on strategic offensive missile forces did not place serious constraints on Soviet programs already under way, although it did rule out more far-reaching buildups which were otherwise technically possible and had been cited by some American military leaders. In particular, the number of SS-9 and SS-18 launchers at operational ICBM complexes has been limited to about 300, rather than the 400-500 or more projected by the US Secretary of Defense in the 1969-71 period. American concerns next turned to focus on Soviet MIRV programs, which were not limited by the Interim Agreement. This paralleled the continuing Soviet concern over the rapid American buildup in MIRVed missiles (SLBM's as well as ICBM's) since 1970. But it was then too late to agree on more than a rather high ceiling for numbers of MIRVed missile launchers.

The unsuccessful attempt in 1973-74 to isolate a differential MIRV limitation for the late 1970's coupled with an extension of the Interim Agreement fell afoul of the asymmetries in the missile systems and states of MIRV development and deployment of the two sides. This led to the decision at the June 1974 summit to try to work out in 1975 a ten-year agreement to supersede the Interim Agreement and, in November 1974, to the Vladivostok "breakthrough" agreeing on an overall level of 2,400 ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers for each side,

[13] See "Kosygin is Cool to Missile Curb," *The New York Times*, Feb. 10, 1967; and "Transcript of Kosygin News Conference at the UN," *ibid.*, June 26, 1967.

[14] In *Pravda*, Sept. 30, 1972.

[15] See Gerard Smith, "SALT Thoughts," *Journal of International Affairs* (New York), Spring 1975.

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with no more than 1,320 MIRVed ICBM's and SLBM's within that total. The longer-range perspective of a ten-year agreement offered better prospects for balancing military asymmetries of the two sides than had the attempt to agree on a short-term "quick fix." The Soviet military insisted successfully that strategic bombers and their armament be taken into account along with quantitative and some qualitative aspects of intercontinental missiles and missile warheads. No doubt only very reluctantly did they agree not to continue to press for including American FBS.

Political-Military Relations

SALT has affected political-military relations in the USSR in a number of ways. Probably both the political and the military leaders have gained broadened perspectives, the former through acquainting themselves with military matters in ways other than those familiar from Politburo reviews of the military budget, and the latter through thinking more in terms of political uses—and limits on uses—of strategic forces rather than exclusively in terms of deterrence and contingent war-waging requirements. This development should probably be regarded as a modest but significant dividend from SALT; so, too, should the introduction of Soviet military leaders into a bilateral US-USSR dialogue on strategic matters.

As noted earlier, at the "working level" SALT was responsible for the establishment in late 1967 or early 1968 of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Ministry of Defense working group to study the issues and draft positions for higher-level review. Political-military matters have traditionally been handled through *ad hoc* meetings, so this has led to greater contact and probably better mutual understanding. Similarly, SALT has contributed to drawing members of the staffs of institutes—especially the Institute

The US-USSR summit meeting at Vladivostok in November 1974, at which an agreement to negotiate a new strategic arms limitation treaty was announced. Members of the US delegation, from the left: Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger; President of the United States Gerald R. Ford; US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.; Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, William G. Hyland; and US intepreter Alexander Akalovsky. Members of the Soviet delegation, from the right: Soviet interpreter Viktor Sukhodrev; Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Foreign Minister Andrei A.Gromyko; Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly F. Dobrynin; and Georgi M. Kornienko, Chief of the USA Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

—Novosti via Sovfoto.

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on World Economics and International Relations and the USA Institute—including a number of retired military officers, into writing and publishing commentaries on political-military and strategic themes. The role of these institutes in influencing Soviet policy decisions on SALT has probably been quite limited, but their indirect influence may be appreciable.

In the negotiations, the Soviet military were initially very conservative and restrictive and displayed traditional suspicion of Western intelligence "fishing," and they even objected to discussion of matters involving military secrecy in the presence of Soviet civilian officials engaged in SALT. Marshal Grechko in 1969 ordered the Soviet delegation to provide no quantitative or qualitative information on Soviet military and technical capabilities. General Ogarkov, on one occasion early in SALT, took aside his American military counterpart and suggested that it was not necessary to talk so specifically about Soviet military technical matters with civilian colleagues in the joint delegation planning meetings.[16]

It should be observed that the Soviet commitment to SALT was highly tentative, not only prior to the actual beginning of the talks in November 1969 but until April 1971. By the end of the first round of talks in December 1969, the Soviet military (as well as political) leaders had concluded that the US was indeed serious about SALT, and after high-level correspondence between President Nixon and Prime Minister Kosygin, and Kissinger-Dobrynin discussions, over the period of January to May of 1971, they concluded that a mutually acceptable limitation *could* be negotiated. The critical juncture was reached in deliberations in Moscow at the time of the 24th Communist Party Congress in April 1971. And from that time on, the highest-level role in SALT on the Soviet side was assumed directly by General Secretary Brezhnev, now the champion of détente.

There were signs during SALT I that the Foreign Ministry negotiators did not always appreciate fully the depth of certain military concerns, and this may also have been true among higher-level political leaders. Certainly by the time of the April 1972 visit of Dr. Kissinger to Moscow and the first summit meeting a month later, Brezhnev and several other senior civilian leaders were deeply involved in detailed negotiaton. (To a lesser extent, because the initial gap was less, SALT has probably also in parallel helped to bring some American civilian leaders more deeply into strategic matters.)

The Soviet presentation of its own "scare" picture of American strategic capabilities at the third summit in June 1974 may represent a step forward in civilian engagement with military evaluation and in frankness in the dialogue between the two sides. On that occasion, Soviet General Staff representatives presented a picture of US strategic forces (including FBS), operational and planned under current programs, of such overwhelming superiority that it reportedly took the American participants by surprise. In part, the Soviet military may have overstated their case in order to stress their point, but they evidently believed that there was a point to be made—and so did the Soviet political leaders. It was significant that the Soviet military were allowed to have their say directly in negotiations at the summit. In general, such exchanges could lead to a more healthy awareness by each side of the differences in perspective and inherent biases both sides display in their military evaluations. In evaluating the "threat" from the other side, each side tends to hedge by conservative estimates of its own capabilities in a retaliatory situation, while judging the maximum capability of the other side in an initial surprise attack. Moreover, each side, in its military evaluations, looks ahead at what the other side may have the capability to do in the next several years, but again is conservative about its own prospects. Such biases in the military evaluation process make much more difficult the process of agreeing on equitable and mutually acceptable symmetrical limitations on the strategic forces of the two sides. But recognition of the problem, and of the fact that it does not (at least not entirely) spring from intentional attempts of the other side to gain unilateral advantage, is at least a step toward facilitating solution. Other factors, such as public ventilation of "worst case threats" and also attempts to build "bargaining chips" through additional military programs (or, worse, so labelling new programs which it is *not* intended or desired to "cash in" in negotiated tradeoffs and limitations), further compound the problem. But the direct involvement of the military on both sides may help to gain mutual respect and confidence in negotiations seriously pursued.

Several important achievements in SALT were facilitated by recognition of common political-military interests of the two sides. One important example was the agreement to rely on national technical means of verification and its highly significant

[16] See Newhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

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corollary commitment not to interfere actively or passively with the other side's operation of its means of verification. Similarly, notwithstanding the reluctance of the military on both sides to be drawn into discussions of traditionally secret procedures concerning security of means of command and control, both also were prepared to seek agreement on the measures included in the "Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of the Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the USA and the USSR" and the companion "Agreement on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications Link," both negotiated at SALT and signed on September 30, 1971 (and in the "US-USSR Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas" negotiated in separate parallel talks and signed on May 25, 1972).[17] Finally, there was no difficulty in agreeing on the establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission to deal with details of implementation of the SALT agreements. This body has a considerable potential, if it is utilized.

Concluding Observations

The Soviet military approached SALT warily. Their active participation in the negotiations probably contributed to a constructive, if conservative, approach. Public statements of Soviet military leaders and other articles in the Soviet military press have practically ignored SALT; they have continued to stress the requirements for deterrence and for waging war if deterrence should fail; and they have criticized new American military programs. Nonetheless, they have refrained from taking positions that would preclude agreements.

In SALT, the Soviets have accepted mutual deterrence, both through advocacy of equal security for the US and the USSR and even more tellingly through sponsoring an ABM limitation specifically precluding a defense of the country against overwhelming strategic missile attack and thus ensuring mutual vulnerability. They have accepted strategic parity as reflected in the SALT agreements and as a goal of further agreements. They have acknowledged the strategic offensive-defensive and action-reaction interrelationships. They have recognized the importance of crisis management, agreed on specific measures to deal with possible nuclear accidents or unauthorized nuclear or missile firings, advocated defense of the National Command Authorities of both sides, agreed on upgrading the "Hot Line" Moscow-Washington Direct Communications Link through satellite communication, and agreed on consultations in crisis situations to avoid the outbreak of nuclear war.

SALT has led Soviet military and political leaders alike to understand as never before the indivisibility of strategy and arms control, and therefore of certain political-military considerations which impact on internal Soviet decision-making on military affairs. SALT has also led to recognition of the importance of both strategic and "political-military" interaction between the US and the USSR and indeed has enhanced considerably the importance of that interrelationship.

Finally, in addition to the substantial first step in arms control marked by SALT I and the prospective further stabilization of strategic arms competition under SALT II, SALT as a common endeavor of the two superpowers has hopefully also led to the beginning of a more realistic common understanding of the strategic military balance and of a stabilizing role for strategic military power, as well as of limitations on that power.

[17] See *Documents on Disarmament 1971*, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington DC, 1973, pp. 634-41, for the texts of the agreements to reduce the risk of war and to improve the Washington-Moscow direct communications link.

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Books

The Dubcek Era Revisited

By Radoslav Selucky

ALAN LEVY: *Rowboat to Prague.* New York, Grossman Publishers, 1972.
VLADIMIR V. KUSIN: *Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1972.
GALIA GOLAN: *Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia.* London, Cambridge University Press, 1973.
A. OXLEY, A. PRAVDA, and A. RITCHIE: *Czechoslovakia: The Party and the People.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1973.
WILLIAM SHAWCROSS: *Dubcek.* New York, Simon and Schuster, 1971.
Z.A.B. ZEMAN: *Prague Spring.* New York, Hill and Wang, 1969.
HEINZ BRAHM: *Der Kreml und die CSSR* (The Kremlin and the CSSR). Stuttgart, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1970.

THESE SEVEN BOOKS all contribute in different ways to our knowledge of the highly significant attempt to reform Czechoslovakia's Soviet-type political system that culminated in the "Prague Spring" of 1968 and the subsequent Warsaw Pact intervention that crushed it. *Rowboat to Prague* is an intelligent summary narrative of events, while William Shawcross' work is a biography of Alexander Dubcek, the man who gave his name to this brief era in Czechoslovak politics. Heinz Brahm's study concentrates on the important and difficult external, interparty aspects of the reform experience. Vladimir V. Kusin provides a brilliant analysis of the sociological backgrounds of the various political groups that spontaneously emerged in the Dubcek era, although he has reserved a discussion of the Communist Party—the most important power group on the Czechoslovak political scene in the years 1968-69—for a subsequent volume.[1] Mssrs. Oxley, Pravda, and Ritchie focus their attention on the Czech press, providing and intelligently commenting on a sampling of the diverse and conflicting views published there during the important years 1967-68. Mr. Zeman's book offers an informative report on the mainstream of the reform process both before and during the Prague Spring. Unquestionably the most satisfactory volume is Dr. Golan's *Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia,* which supplements her earlier study of the reform movement[2] to round out the most detailed account yet available in English of the origins and evolution of the Czechoslovak experiment.

As one reads these books, however, the crucial question keeps coming to mind: Why did this highly original reform of a Soviet-type system fail? Unfortunately, none of the present works provides a definite answer; and, what is even more unusual, a number of the authors do not even seem interested in this aspect of the Prague Spring. In seeking to arrive at a satisfactory answer, it seems essential to this reviewer to focus not only on the strengths and weaknesses of the reform program itself, but also on the strong and weak points of its practical implementation. Unlike philosophical ideas, political concepts must be judged, not according to their theoretical merits, but according to their practical results. Let us proceed, then, to reexamine the Dubcek era from this perspective.

PART OF THE problem stems from the diversity of conceptions of the reform process which surfaced in

[1] This essay will appear in a forthcoming volume, *The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,* edited by A. H. Brown and G. Wightman. Like the present volume by Dr. Kusin, it is part of an 11-volume series on "Political and Social Process in Eastern Europe," published by Macmillan Press, London, and distributed in the United States by Columbia University Press, New York.

[2] Galia Golan, *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: Communism in Crisis, 1962-1968,* London, Cambridge University Press, 1971.

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the public debates initiated in early 1968. Not surprisingly, those persons—like the former Social Democrats—who had suffered discrimination, persecution, and imprisonment had quite different perceptions of the reform than the people in power. Dr. Kusin amply demonstrates how people's expectations and understanding of the reform varied from group to group—be it the workers, the intelligentsia, farmers, youth, or members of different nationalities and religions.

Notwithstanding this diversity, the beginning and end of the reform rested with the liberal wing of the Communist Party. Yet even this group consisted of two basic elements with apparently differing views of the reform. The first were the *reform politicians*—including, among others, Alexander Dubcek, Josef Smrkovsky, Frantisek Kriegel, and Joseph Spacek—who sought to improve and democratize both the political and the economic system according to the cautiously formulated principles of the Action Program adopted on April 5, 1968. The second group consisted of the *reform intellectuals* within the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS): those specialists who served as the "brain trust" of the Party's Central Committee, Secretariat, and Politbureau—who advised, and wrote speeches for, the top reform politicians; and who helped in drafting such basic conceptual documents as the Action Program. In contrast to the reform politicians, the reform intellectuals seemed to want to change the very structure of state socialism and to replace it with a planned, self-managed market economy with a pluralist political system.

As a consequence of this dichotomy, the language used by the reform politicians and reform intellectuals (when they wrote or spoke on their own behalf) frequently differed. The politicians spoke in concrete terms, whereas the intellectuals dealt with theoretical and rather abstract models; the former pursued short-term goals (including the strengthening of their own political power), while the latter aimed at long-term systemic changes. Since the main political struggle of the pre-August period was between the Communist reformers as a whole and the anti-reform wing of the party, it is difficult to determine how substantive the differences within the reform wing actually were. It is at least conceivable that, barring the Soviet military intervention, new political conflicts might have emerged after the scheduled 14th Congress of the CPCS—this time between the leading reform politicians, with their practical concerns, and their intellectual advisers, less encumbered with tactical considerations.

Putting such conjecture aside and looking beyond the sharp conflicts over questions of principle which characterized the open debate during the brief Dubcek era, one can safely say that on the level of practical politics there was wide support for Dubcek's program even among advocates of non-Marxist ideas. Politics is the art of the possible, and it can be stated

Reviewers in This Issue

RADOSLAV SELUCKY—Professor of Political Science at Carleton University (Ottawa, Canada); formerly, as adviser to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Economic Council of the Czechoslovak government, participated in drafting the economic and political programs for the Prague Spring and the 14th Czechoslovak Party Congress; author of *Czechoslovakia: The Plan That Failed*, 1970, and *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe*, 1972.

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WILLIAM L. PARISH, JR.—Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago; author of a forthcoming book on the village and family in rural China since 1949; contributor to *The China Quarterly* and *American Sociological Review*.

BENEDICT CROSS—pen name of an American observer of Communist affairs who has recently lived in Latin America for several years.

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unequivocally that in the spring of 1968 the Action Program was the only realistic and legitimate blueprint for the country's future. As a consequence, it was backed by a majority of the population, a majority of party members, and —from the end of May 1968— by a majority of elected party secretaries as well.[3]

The Action Program called for national reconciliation and for the rehabilitation of all victims of political persecution by the former regime. It sought to preserve the leading role of the CPCS—although more in terms of ideas than in terms of absolute political power. While envisaging an active role for small private enterprises both in services and in production, it did not advocate decollectivization of agriculture or the return of public enterprises to private ownership, nor did it challenge central planning. The reform did, however, seek to replace command planning with indicative planning and to substitute economic methods of management for bureaucratic controls. It also envisaged some kind of workers' control of enterprises, as well as steps to implement constitutional guarantees of civil rights and democratic freedoms. In foreign policy, there was never any intent to break with Comecon or the Warsaw Pact.[4]

Did this official program go too far, or did it remain too "Communist"? From the point of view of non-Communists it could have been regarded as too modest because it fell far short of restoring a traditional Western-type democracy. But could one realistically have expected that from Communist reformers? The reform wing of the CPCS was quite frank on this point: it repeatedly stressed that *this* reform did not mean a return to a liberal political system. Given the political status quo in Czechoslovakia and in Eastern Europe generally, only a political dreamer could have expected the ruling party—which had, after all, launched the reform and which enjoyed popular support—to relinquish its power.

THE KEY REFORM leader during the Prague Spring was, of course, Alexander Dubcek. Mr. Shawcross does his best to help us reach a better understanding of this person as a man, as a Communist official, and as a reform politician, and the resulting biography is a respectable piece of journalism. One can take issue with the author's judgment that Dubcek was naive, as well as with one or another of his conclusions. A more important deficiency, however, is that Mr. Shawcross—as an outside observer—had to rely on second-hand information and at times has utilized sources whose reliability can rightfully be questioned both by scholars and by those who were intimately involved in the reform movement. At one point, the author—on the basis of an unspecified source—quotes Dubcek as having described his tactics in dealing with Soviet party leader L. I. Brezhnev with the statement that "I just try to smile at Brezhnev as he shouts at me. I say 'Yes, yes, I agree' and then I come home and do nothing (p. 175)." To put it mildly, such tactics were not at all part of Dubcek's style.

It was not insincerity on Dubcek's part, but rather a serious lack of communication that lay at the base of the misunderstandings between Dubcek and Brezhnev. To cite one example, Brezhnev told Dubcek at Dresden that Smrkovsky was not a promising political figure. Dubcek neither agreed nor disagreed—he simply remained silent. Brezhnev took this silence as signifying acquiescence, whereas Dubcek meant it as dissent. A few days later Dubcek proceeded to promote Smrkovsky to the presidency of the National Assembly and membership in the CPCS Presidium. Brezhnev blamed Dubcek for breaking an agreement which the Czechoslovak leader felt he had never made.[5]

What kind of a man was Dubcek? A convinced Communist, of course, and an experienced party *apparatchik* as well. But also a sincere believer in "socialism with a human face" and a courageous reformer. Domestically, he achieved much more than was generally expected, yet at the same time he never once yielded to strong public pressures in favor of actions that went beyond what he thought proper and feasible. Thus, he did not follow the suggestion to abandon the people's militia, and he categorically rejected demands to legalize the Social Democratic Party. Nor did he ever sanction the ambitions of the organizations KAN (The Club of Committed Non-Party People) and K-231 (The Club of Former Political Prisoners) to become political parties, and he strongly condemned the liberal "2000 Words Manifesto."[6] But while Dubcek did

[3] A poll taken in May 1968 revealed that about 90 percent of non-party members, 85 percent of party members, and 87 percent of secretaries of district and regional committees of the CPCS preferred the new political model to its predecessor. See *Rok 1968* (The Year 1968), Prague, 1969, p. 170.

[4] *Documents on Today's CSSR*, Prague, Svoboda Publishing House, July 1968.

[5] From a personal interview with Mr. Smrkovsky in May 1968.

[6] This document, written by Ludvik Vaculik and published in *Literarni listy* (Prague) on June 27, 1968, was a strong appeal to push the democratization of Czechoslovakia.

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not retreat in the face of these political pressure groups, neither did he outlaw them. He expressed deep disagreement with the Communists who signed the "2000 Words Manifesto," but he did not expel them from the party or take action against any of the non-Communist signatories. He sought to control the reform movement by political rather than traditional bureaucratic-administrative means. And these tactics enabled him to refuse demands going beyond the limits of the Action Program without losing popular support.

The situation dictated such a cautious approach. The pre-January 1968 composition of the CPCS Central Committee remained unchanged until after the August invasion, and Dubcek had to steer a precarious course between the Scylla of public opinion and the Charybdis of the conservative majority in the party's ruling body. The fact that he managed to win the unanimous support of the July session of the CC for his firm reply to the threatening Warsaw letter of July 15, 1968,[7] attests to his political acumen.

A skillful political tactician, yes, but unfortunately less perceptive as a political strategist. For instance, it was poor strategy for Dubcek needlessly to delay until early April publication of the Action Program which had been available as early as February 1968, and it was equally unwise for him to hold off on convoking the extraordinary 14th Congress of the party much sooner.[8]

However, the most serious failure of Dubcek's leadership lay in his handling of the external side of the Prague Spring. It has become commonplace to quote Dubcek's famous statement of the night of August 20, 1968, when he heard that troops of his Warsaw Pact allies had illegally entered Czechoslovakia:

I who have devoted my whole life to cooperation with the Soviet Union, now they do this to me. This is the great tragedy of my life.[9]

Indeed, it was the greatest tragedy for Dubcek and for his country. But much of the fault must be laid at Dubcek's door. The Prague Spring could have succeeded *only* if cooperation between Czechoslovakia and her Soviet and East European allies had been preserved. With the CPCS Presidium divided, with hundreds of Soviet agents operating in the Czechoslovak army, state apparatus, and security forces, and with the people's militia and the workers yet to be shocked into militant support of the Dubcek regime by the trauma of invasion—there was no realistic hope of protecting the Prague Spring by military means. The only course open was to convince the Soviet leaders that the reform was fully controlled by the party and realistically limited by the parameters set forth in the Action Program.

Was Dubcek, in fact, in control of the situation? If we mean "control" in a democratic sense, he was. If we mean "control" in Soviet terms, he was not. In the July 29-August 1 meeting at Cierna-nad-Tissou, Brezhnev expressed doubts whether Dubcek was still in control of the Czechoslovak reform movement; Dubcek was quite sure that he was, and he pointed out that he had received a resolution supporting his policies signed by four million people. Brezhnev argued that this was no evidence, that he knew how resolutions could be produced. Dubcek assured the Soviet leader that *this* resolution was different, having been initiated directly by the people. Brezhnev rejoined: "How can you claim that you are in control of the situation if the people sign a resolution without your prior knowledge?"[10] This brings us back to the unavoidable conclusion: even if there had been no KAN, no K-231, no Social Democrats, no "2000 Words Manifesto"—in short, none of the controversial elements of the Prague Spring—the gap between the revived democratic political culture of the Czechoslovak reform movement and the Soviet *interpretation* of this movement would likely have proved unbridgeable.

TO BE SURE, it was no easy task to keep the process of the Czechoslovak political revival within limits acceptable to the CPSU. This

[7] This letter was sent to the CPCS Central Committee by leaders of Warsaw Pact states Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union after a July 14 meeting in Warsaw which Czechoslovakia had refused to attend. The message expressed strong concern over the threat to socialism and to continued Communist control in Czechoslovakia and strongly suggested that fellow socialist states would not stand by idly *if the situation deteriorated further.* For a translation of the text, see Robin Alison Remington, Ed., *Winter in Prague—Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis,* Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1969, pp. 225-31.

[8] The Congress was originally slated for early 1969, but at the May 1968 Plenum of the CPCS CC, Dubcek, acceding to liberal forces pressuring him to move forward the date in order to hasten renovation of the party leadership, rescheduled the Congress for September 9, 1968. On the day after the August 21 Warsaw Pact invasion, a large number of delegates elected to attend the September gathering held an emergency secret session at a Prague factory. As noted below, the Soviet Union soon forced the Czechoslovak party leadership to nullify these proceedings.

[9] Quoted in Galia Golan, *Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia,* p. 239.

[10] This symptomatic episode was reported to the reviewer by a participant in the Cierna meeting.

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is made abundantly clear in the selections published in *Czechoslovakia: the Party and the People,* particularly those written by the former Communist, Ivan Svitak. While one may agree with his doubts concerning the ability of the Communist politicians to forsake their one-party system, his slogan, "Push your head against the wall," was hardly useful guidance for young people and no alternative to the positive Action Program. Likewise, one may sympathize with the honest effort of Social Democrats to revive their political party, described with great scholarly objectivity by Dr. Kusin. But should one have expected anything other than immediate Soviet invasion had they succeeded? Anyone reading Dr. Golan's careful analysis of events, the report of Dr. Zeman, or Dr. Brahm's summary of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations during 1968-69 cannot escape the impression that, on the one hand, the possibilities for reform were very limited, while, on the other, the reform program was too far-reaching and was carried forward in too democratic a manner to remain within those limits. Ironically, it was the very democratic momentum developed by the reform that was at once its greatest strength and its Achilles' heel.

These observations lead to the further question of whether the Prague Spring might have fared better if the freedom of the Czechoslovak press had been slightly limited, if some of the Communist intellectuals had been more restrained, if the non-Communist reformers had been more sensitive to the geopolitical and external aspects of the Prague Spring, and if Dubcek and his colleagues had been more frank with the public. The reviewer believes that the answer would have to be affirmative —but then would there still have been a "Prague Spring"?

However, contrary to the belief of many Western scholars, the main mistakes made by Dubcek and his fellow reformers were committed not before but *after* the invasion. First of all, Dubcek and his top colleagues made no attempt to escape from the Central Committee headquarters, where they were in virtual detention, in order to assume direction of the extraordinary 14th Party Congress, which was convened secretly in the Vysocany District of Prague on August 22. If they had participated in this gathering, it would have left no legal grounds for the subsequent nullification of the proceedings of the Congress (which had come out in opposition to the invasion and had liberalized the CPCS leadership bodies)[11] and might thereby have strengthened the position of the Czechoslovak reformers in future negotiations with the Soviet occupiers. This failure was slightly corrected by a resolution of the CPCS Central Committee of August 31, 1968, which—while nullifying the Congress—expanded the CC by 90 members, taken mostly from among delegates to that meeting nine days earlier. These additions belonged mostly to the reform wing of the party and thus partially neutralized the position of the openly pro-Soviet and conservative group in the Central Committee.

From then on, the Dubcek leadership only compounded its errors. Although the invasion obviously was not intended to help the CPCS continue the reform, the leadership persisted in telling both the party and the people that the post-January policies would be carried out, albeit with the elimination of some of their "excesses" and with some concessions (to the Kremlin) reflecting the new situation. Wanting to believe, the masses acted as if the program remained operational. They supported the progressive core of the CPCS leadership by every available means, including demonstrations and strikes. These actions, however, only intensified the dilemma of the leadership. On the one hand, the Dubcek group had no alternative but to live up to its obligations accepted in Moscow (where they had been transported shortly after the invasion), most of which ran counter to the regime's post-January program. On the other hand, it did not want to betray or disappoint the people, who were now acting as a genuine political pressure group. Paradoxically, popular support for Dubcek, while helping him to remain in power for the time being, made his leadership untenable in the long run. A chain of major political crises—precipitated in quick succession by the student strike, the appointment of Dr. Peter Colotka (instead of National Assembly Speaker Smrkovsky) as Speaker of the Federal Assembly, the self-immolation of Jan Palach, and the public demonstrations in the wake of two consecutive Czech victories over the Soviet team at the world ice-hockey tournament in March 1969 —cumulatively provided the pro-Soviet conservatives and the Husak-led centrists with the ammunition they needed to drive out the reformist Dubcek group. They then were able, by using "salami-slicing" tactics, gradually to elim-

[11] Nullification of the proceedings of the extraordinary 14th Congress by the CPCS leadership nine days later (at Soviet insistence) was on the grounds, forwarded by Gustav Husak, that a significant portion of the Slovak delegates due to attend the September 9 official Party Congress had not attended the secret meeting of August 22.

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inate all remnants of the post-January reforms.

Thus, one can conclude that the demise of the Prague Spring resulted from two failures on the part of the Dubcek leadership, one preceding the August invasion and another in the ensuing months. The first was the failure of Dubcek and his colleagues to convince Moscow that they still remained in firm control of the gathering forces of reform in the country. The second was the reformist leadership's failure to make the realities of the post-invasion situation clear to its avid public following. Caught in the middle, Czechoslovakia's Communist reformers found themselves the victims of a lack of communication with those who would destroy them as well as those who would have seen them succeed.

Stalinism and Freedom

By Frederick C. Barghoorn

ROBERT H. McNEAL: *Bride of the Revolution: Krupskaya and Lenin.* Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1972.
NAUM J. JASNY: *Soviet Economists of the Twenties. Names to be Remembered.* London, Cambridge University Press, 1972.
STEPHEN F. COHEN: *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution. A Political Biography, 1888-1938.* New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1973.

THESE THREE WORKS, especially Stephen Cohen's, make significant contributions to our understanding of the processes that shaped the Soviet dictatorship. Each tells a grim tale of the frustration, defeat, or destruction, under Stalin's regime, of individuals and groups who, in a political environment increasingly dominated by ruthlessness, demagogy, and fanaticism, sought vainly to preserve some elements of compassion, personal freedom, and professional integrity. Taken together, they add substantially to our knowledge of the achievements and failures of the first 15 or 20 years of Soviet rule. It should be noted, however, that Cohen is the only one of our authors who considers that the Soviet regime should be credited with substantial positive achievements, at least in the 1920's, which, he says, "brought a remarkable explosion of artistic ferment and creativity in every field" (*Bukharin,* p. 272). The tone of Robert McNeal's and, much more so, of the late Naum Jasny's books is bleakly negative, although McNeal offers qualified praise for the activities of Lenin's wife, Krupskaya, in the field of education.

NADEZHDA Konstantinovna Krupskaya, born in 1869, died in 1939. Like Lenin, whom she married in Siberia in 1898 after joining him there in political exile, she was a child of what today would be called upper middle-class parents. Her social position, however, might be characterized as "marginal." Her father, a civil servant of liberal and vaguely socialist persuasion, was dismissed from government service for taking the side of Polish workers against their employers. His dismissal resulted in hardship for his family, but Nadezhda was able to get a good secondary education at the exclusive Obolensky Female Gymnasium. McNeal appears to believe—although he never systematically develops the hypothesis—that Krupskaya's "loathing" for Stalin (*Bride of the Revolution,* p. 146) stemmed largely from a clash between the values of her intelligentsia culture and Stalin's crudeness. In 1890, after reading Marx's *Capital,* she experienced a "conversion" and became a dedicated revolutionary. As a revolutionary, however, she was not really outstanding, although as Lenin's wife, helper, and secretary she rendered valuable service to the revolutionary cause.

If McNeal had placed his account of the development of Krupskaya's political attitudes before she met Lenin in a theoretical context, perhaps he could have added to our knowledge of the sociology

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or the psychology of revolution in a developing country, but in the absence of such a framework of analysis, Krupskaya's life as presented by him is of interest mainly for what her relations with more powerful figures—such as Lenin, Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, and Bukharin—tell us about them and about the new political order they were building. *Bride of the Revolution* sheds considerable light on the tensions that developed in 1922-23—after a series of strokes had increasingly incapacitated Lenin—between Lenin and Krupskaya, on one side, and other Bolshevik political leaders, especially Stalin, Zinoviev, and Trotsky, who were hastening to fortify their power position against the day of Lenin's death. During this period, leaders such as Kamenev and Trotsky, whose help Krupskaya sought in her efforts to execute Lenin's wish to reduce the already great and growing power of Stalin, failed to support her and thus lost whatever chance they might have had to thwart Stalin's future power plays. In 1925-26, Krupskaya's criticisms of Stalin's and Bukharin's peasant policies, which she considered un-Leninist, were suppressed. Stalin himself threateningly defended the suppression of one anti-Bukharin article. In this and similar incidents, Bukharin and other top leaders, all of whom accepted the concept of the Politburo's infallibility, unwittingly helped pave the way for Stalin's subsequent dictatorship. While Krupskaya even subsequently showed her antipathy for Stalin by intervening—sometimes with partial success—on behalf of victims of terror and by other humanitarian acts, she for the most part lent the prestige of her status as Lenin's widow to the Stalinist "general line" of the party.

McNeal convincingly argues that Krupskaya's efforts to promote the right of party members to dissent from Politburo policies could not succeed because the very tradition of "Leninism," in the name of which she spoke, was itself supremely authoritarian. Bolshevik thinking, including Krupskaya's, not only reflected this tradition but was itself the product of a much older Russian authoritarian heritage. The author cites evidence (p. 195) that Krupskaya as early as 1919 saw in the old Tsarist bureaucracy a model for Soviet educational administration and "had a hand in the formation of the Soviet system of intellectual dictatorship" (p. 202). She was, for example, one of the architects of the elaborate Soviet system of censorship of libraries.

Yet, despite her limitations and confusion and despite her harsh experiences in Stalin's Russia, McNeal sees Krupskaya's life as "marked by . . . an integrity that is her own." He concludes: "Krupskaya was a pathetic figure at the end of her life—a puppet of the dictator whom she hated. . . ." (p. 295).

ACCORDING TO a "Publisher's Note," a draft manuscript of Jasny's book was completed before the author's death in 1967, but it needed "some clarification and systematization before publication." In Part I (pp. 1-57), which summarizes the history of the Soviet economy from 1917 to the early 1930's, Jasny focuses on the disastrous effects of Lenin's policy of "war communism" in 1918-20 and of Stalin's agricultural collectivization and coercive industrialization. He contrasts these policies, which he judges extremely irrational and immensely destructive, to the beneficial effects of the semi-market economy of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which Lenin instituted after the uprising of naval forces at the important Kronstadt base in March 1921 and other urgent evidence had made it clear that without concessions to the starving masses Soviet power was in danger of rapidly crumbling. In this section, we are briefly introduced to several score of economists, such as Vladimir Groman, Vladimir Bazarov, the brilliant theorist Nikolai Kondratev, the journalist Nikolai Sukhanov, and others. Unlike their better known (at least in the West) colleagues such as Julius Martov, Fiodor Dan, Rafail Abramovich, and others, these men—mostly of Menshevik (in effect, social democratic) persuasion but in some cases "neo-narodniks"—loyally and often brilliantly served the Soviet regime in the relatively favorable circumstances provided by NEP. However, although they had no organizational connections with exiled economists, they maintained ties with their former associates by correspondence and in some cases by personal encounters, and they never concealed their aversion to dictatorship and utopianism.

Not surprisingly, they became scapegoats for the "show trial" organized by Stalin's political police in March 1931, to which Part II of Jasny's book (pp. 60-89) is devoted. The author argues convincingly that this trial was a judicial farce —"an episode in the long train of show trials which were part of Stalin's increasingly bitter fight for the dictatorship" (p. 61). A point that Jasny might have made, but did not, is that the scapegoating technique characteristic of the methods used by Stalin against both non-Communist and later against Communist critics and op-

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ponents had been employed much earlier by Lenin and Trotsky, notably in attempting to link the leaders of the Kronstadt uprising with "foreign agents" and "white guard" elements.

Part III (pp. 89-212) of the Jasny volume is devoted to accounts of the professional lives and contributions of Groman, Bazarov, Abram Ginzburg, and Kondratev, as well as of seventeen "other Mensheviks" and nine "other neo-narodniks and other names to be remembered." It is clear from these accounts that the economists tried in 1931 were victimized because they refused to bend their consciences and their high standards of professional competence and integrity to support the demands of Stalin, Kuibyshev, and other Stalin henchmen for fantastically unrealistic production targets. The adoption of these targets, Jasny shows, led not to increased but to diminished output, and entailed catastrophic costs in wasted talent and resources, including widespread death by starvation. For their honesty and devotion to high professional standards, Groman, who according to Jasny was the first economist ever to prepare a macro-economic balance sheet; Kondratev, whose genius was acclaimed by the famous Austro-American economist, Schumpeter; and others paid, in effect, with their lives. Some rotted in labor camps until their premature deaths; others were hastened out of this world by murder in prison. Their collective fate provides one of many impressive bodies of evidence on how circumscribed is the role—in a hegemonic, ideologically rationalized system—of what Robert Dahl calls the "criterion of competence."[1] The difficulties encountered in the contemporary USSR by critics of aspects of official Soviet policy that still make it difficult for highly trained specialists to function with maximum freedom and effectiveness indicate that this problem, though not as acute as in Stalin's time, has by no means been completely resolved. It *cannot* be resolved, all the books reviewed here indicate, in a system in which political loyalty and ideological conformity tend to be valued more than professional competence and autonomy.

COHEN'S EXCELLENT biography of Bukharin deals with some of the issues raised, at least by implication, in the other works discussed here, but it vastly exceeds them in the scope and significance of its subject matter and in its depth and power of interpretation. Even a very long review could only suggest the extraordinary richness of the book's content. We shall be forced, in the relatively brief space at our disposal, to be selective and somewhat schematic.[2]

Perhaps Cohen's greatest achievement is his brilliant and skillful presentation of the thesis that Bukharin devised a viable alternative to his opponents' "voluntaristic" strategy for socialist development. To appreciate fully Bukharin's creativity and innovativeness, it is necessary to recall not only the difficult circumstances in which the internationally isolated, war-ravaged Soviet republic found itself in the early 1920's, but also the nature of the radical Trotsky-Preobrazhensky development strategy, which was the main available alternative to Bukharin's program. The isolation of the Soviet state, coupled with the exhausted condition of the world economy after World War I, meant that Soviet Russia could not obtain from abroad the substantial capital necessary for rapid economic reconstruction and development, and after the experience of civil war and foreign military intervention, it was quite plausible to think that one or more "capitalist" states might again attack the USSR. The Bolshevik "Left" argued that the appropriate development strategy in this dangerous situation was to industrialize rapidly at the expense of the peasantry, which—in Preobrazhensky's model—was in effect, to be treated as a "colony." Of course, when Stalin later broke up the Stalin-Bukharin duumvirate of 1925-28, he was to adopt a program even more radical in concept and far more brutal in execution than the most extreme proponents of the Left's strategy could have imagined.

In conflict first with the Trotsky-Preobrazhensky school and then with Stalin's program for forced-draft collectivization and militaristic industrialization, Bukharin set forth his own model for a gradual, peaceful "growing into socialism." It featured cooperation between workers and peasants, extensive development of agricultural cooperatives and other "voluntary organizations," emphasis on economic incentives rather than coercion, and substantial use of market techniques and mechanisms. Bukharin built this program on the foundation of what he considered to be the spirit and implications of Lenin's NEP and of Lenin's last publications. His was not a "revisionist" program nor a "narodnik" one, as first some Left critics and later the Stalinists were to claim. However, it did bear sig-

[1] *After the Revolution?*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1970.

[2] For a more extended treatment, see this writer's review in *The Washington Post Book World*, Feb. 17, 1974.

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nificant resemblances to non-Leninist social democratic thinking, and these became more apparent over time.

Despite its claim to a good Leninist pedigree and its intellectual brilliance and coherence, the Bukharin model was politically vulnerable. For one thing, its complexity and sophistication rendered it unappealing, and even suspect, to many party cadres. Moreover, although it was compatible with the thinking of Lenin in his last years, it lacked the familiar militancy and dogmatism of the earlier Lenin. Finally, and above all, it was repugnant to Stalin's "warfare personality" and incompatible with the "heroic tradition" of Bolshevism to which Stalin appealed. In the "crunch," Stalin's appeal to the politically relevant elements of Soviet society was far greater than Bukharin's. In part, this was because Stalin, in his campaign to undermine Bukharin in 1928-29, cast himself in the role not of an "adventurer" but of a sober, centrist interpreter of NEP against "rightist pessimism."

Along with his gradualist, evolutionary model for economic development, and indeed integrally associated with it, Bukharin articullated, albeit implicitly rather than explicitly, a critique of the dictatorial tendencies inherent in unchecked, uncontrolled state power, whether "capitalist" or socialist" —a critique that anticipated the "new class" formula of Milovan Djilas and much of the content of post-Stalin "socialist humanism." During the early 1930's, in his greatly reduced but still influential role as editor of *Izvestia,* Bukharin also displayed a much clearer understanding than Stalin of the menace posed by Nazi Germany to both Soviet socialism and Western democracy. In the new situation created by the Fascist threat, he stressed the common interests of Russia and the democracies.

It may be one of modern history's major tragedies that Bukharin was reviled, rejected, and judicially murdered, while his ideas were neither given a fair trial nor, after farcical condemnation in 1938, made accessible to the Soviet public. They still remain inaccessible, though they were partially and indirectly aired while Khrushchev was in power. By his insightful, systematic, and lucid presentation of Bukharin's thought, set in a rich historical context, Cohen has performed a major service to the cause of historical truth.

PERHAPS THE greatest value of these three studies lies in their relevance to what is certainly one of the most complex and difficult issues of our century—namely, the problematic relationship between socioeconomic development and intellectual and political freedom. The politically powerless Menshevik economists, of course, could not play any role in shaping the structure of the Soviet system. However, they were actuated by what Barrington Moore, Jr. has called "technical rationality"[3]: they were committed to professional integrity and autonomy. Bukharin, as well as Trotsky, set much greater store by these values than did the ruthless pragmatist, Stalin. The same values were to be reaffirmed by European Communist reformers after Stalin's death. Presumably, if Bukharin and Trotsky had lived until the era of economic reforms in the Communist countries, they would have enthusiastically supported the reforms, although they probably would also have deplored their relative superficiality. This writer lacks the knowledge necessary to determine whether or not the economists of the 1920's influenced the economic reforms of the 1960's; however, economic reform is certainly one component of the loose aggregation of liberal ideas and proposals that contemporary Soviet and East European critical and dissenting thinkers include under the rubric of "democratization." In this sense, there is clearly an element of continuity between the Menshevik economists and today's dissent in Communist societies.

As for Bukharin (and the same applies, at least to some extent, to the well-intentioned but confused Krupskaya), he offered a spirit and approach—more important, in retrospect, than the specifics of his program—that contrasted sharply with what Alexander Erlich has called the "unique blend of creeping fear, exhilaration of battle, and *la patrie en danger* psychosis"[4] that took hold in 1929, held Russia in thrall for some 20 years, and still permeates the dominant political culture of the USSR today, even if considerably weakened. One measure of the continued high degree of unfreedom still prevalent in the Soviet Union may be seen in the fact that even the relatively liberal Khrushchev, though he absolved Bukharin of criminal charges, was unwilling—or, more likely, as Cohen believes, unable—for political reasons to fully "rehabilitate" him. That would have involved implicitly challenging one of the pillars of Soviet political orthodoxy: namely, the methods and outcome

[3] *Terror and Progress USSR,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954.

[4] *The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924-1928, Cambridge, Mass.,* Harvard University Press, 1960. p. 181.

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of Stalinist agricultural collectivization. Bukharin had denounced Stalin's policy in this field as the exaction of "tribute" from the peasantry and, in effect, as a revival of Tsarist "military-feudal" despotism. The present Soviet leadership has rejected even Khrushchev's partial rehabilitation of Bukharin and has revived, even if in less strident tone, the Stalinist interpretation of Bukharin's role in Soviet history.

It is highly probable that if the limited and unsystematic "democratization" begun by Khrushchev had continued instead of being partially reversed by his successors, Bukharin would today be regarded as a continuator of the Marx and Lenin traditions, and Stalin would be looked upon as a "revisionist." Certainly, full freedom to discuss Bukharin's ideas and a thoroughgoing reexamination of the historical record would have figured prominently in such a process. Instead of liberalization and reform, however, the incumbent Soviet authorities have—except in the scientific and technical spheres, where their record has been better in some respects than Khrushchev's—pursued increasingly repressive policies, especially since 1968.

This backsliding from the limited progress made under Khrushchev toward freedom of expression and protection of individual civil rights indicates how difficult it is in a one-party dictatorship to follow through on a program of liberalization. To some Soviet citizens, especially liberal intellectuals, the failure of Khrushchev, and still more so of Brezhnev and his fellow oligarchs, to implement the freedoms set forth in the Soviet constitution has been a frustrating and disillusioning experience. There is no doubt that this experience has helped many who had already been deeply stirred by Khrushchev's revelations regarding Stalin's abuses of power to begin to shake off the effects of the political indoctrination to which they had been subjected throughout their lives.

IT IS OF COURSE difficult to evaluate, let alone measure, the impact of this and other negative experiences, especially the post-Khrushchev tightening of control over historical, literary, and other nontechnical modes of inquiry and expression. However, it seems clear that these developments, especially since the beginning of the police crackdown on dissent in 1965 and even more since the intensification of that crackdown in 1968, have contributed to an acceleration of ideological erosion. In any case, a striking feature of recent Soviet dissent has been the tendency among critical Soviet intellectuals to reject Marxism, or at least Leninism (as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn clearly does in his *Gulag Archipelago*), and also Soviet "socialism (Andrei Sakharov is a case in point) in favor of either a nondogmatic "scientific" approach to social problems or a universalistic or "eternalist"[5] ethic—or, more frequently, some combination of both. There are exceptions, of course, as witness Roy Medvedev's Leninist "socialist democracy." But even Medvedev, though he tries hard to reconcile Leninism and democracy, is probably more democratic than Leninist.

It would be an exaggeration, at this stage, to conclude that the recent tendency of some of the USSR's best minds, including some important non-Russian intellectuals, to reject or revise official Soviet "Marxism-Leninism" is indicative of a trend toward general acceptance of the concept of polyarchy in the USSR. However, this tendency may well be connected in a very significant way with the events described in the books under review. For it would appear that the consistent failure of the Soviet regime—as evidenced by the repudiation of Bukharin's relatively civilized version of Soviet Marxism and later by the rejection of Khrushchev's reformist course—to achieve a satisfactory synthesis of development and democratization, of modernization and freedom, is becoming increasingly apparent to Soviet dissenters (this is crystal clear in Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag*) as well as to non-Soviet analysts of Soviet affairs.

In conclusion, however, a word of caution is in order. Whatever their other messages may be, the books reviewed here provide abundant evidence of the depth and capacity to survive of Soviet authoritarianism. It would be fatuous indeed to ignore this phenomenon or the challenge it poses and can be expected to go on posing for the polyarchies of this world. Nor can we afford to overlook the fact that the fate of the Medvedev brothers, of Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn—not to mention less well-known and less fortunate Soviet dissenters—is tragically similar to that of Trotsky, Bukharin, Krupskaya, and other protestors of the 1920's and 1930's, at least in terms of the implications for the character of Soviet power.

[5] See Lewis Feuer, "The Intelligentsia in Opposition," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1970.

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Through a Glass Sharply

By Abraham Brumberg

MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE: *Chronicles of Wasted Time.* Vol. I: *The Green Stick.* Vol. II: *The Infernal Grove.* New York, William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1973 and 1974, respectively.

IS THERE ANYONE who doesn't know that Malcolm Muggeridge writes with a flare and brilliance perhaps unequaled by any English language writer on either side of the Atlantic? If there is, let him read these first two of a three-volume series (Volume III is due off the press in 1975). No doubt he will come to the conclusion, as did this reviewer, that if half of our journalists and scholars—and sundry permutations thereof—could write half as well as Muggeridge, a reader's life would be a joy rather than the benumbing ordeal it so frequently is. To be sure, style without substance tends to become tiresome, and if *Chronicles of Wasted Time* rivets one's attention from the first page of Volume I to the last of Volume II, it is because behind the well-turned phrases, the sparkling epigrams, the mordant wit and brittle humor, there lurk a sagacious mind, an infectious humanity, and an extraordinary ability to seize and retain the essence of any event, however trivial or horrendous.

Chronicles of Wasted Time belongs to the genre of biography (in this case autobiography) as history; and, as other reviewers have already remarked, it is probably one of the best this century has produced. Nearly fifty years of British (and not only British) life and politics unfolds in its pages: London and the English countryside in the early 1900's; World War I and the "twilight of empire"; England in the 1920's, Russia in the early 1930's, and India prior to World War II; the Blitz, the war, and finally the "illusory peace," as Muggeridge wrily dubs the end of the hostilities and their aftermath. Muggeridge's father was a genuine proletarian, a stalwart socialist (he eventually became an MP) with a touching faith in the perfectibility of man and society. This faith proved to be, in an odd sort of way, the shaping force of Malcolm's life, imbuing him at one and the same time with an affection for dreamers but an abiding suspicion of the stuff that dreams are made of and a withering scorn for the impostors who traffic in them.

Unlike his father, who held onto the same job throughout his life, Malcolm Muggeridge has always been restless, changing jobs and domiciles as often as some men change their neckties. After an obligatory and not too successful stay at Cambridge, he became a teacher in a small English college in India, then a budding editorial-writer for *The Manchester Guardian.* Next came brief terms as a newspaperman in Moscow, as a bureaucrat in the International Labor Office in Geneva, again as a journalist in India and London, and during World War II as a propagandist for the Ministry of Information, a volunteer in the Home Army, and finally a member of the British Secret Service (SIS)—first in Lourenço Marques (Portuguese Africa) and then, after the landing in Normandy, in Paris. The contacts he made during all these peregrinations produce a dazzling array of portraits: pompous politicians, hard-drinking newspapermen, impotent writers, eccentric generals, pimps, prostitutes, financial tycoons, police informants, intelligence agents, and government officials of one sort or another. There is a lethal description (or rather series of descriptions) of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, authors of that most dubious piece of scholarship, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?*—a title from which, Muggeridge notes, the question mark was dropped "as Stalin got into his stride as the master-terrorist of his age." (Muggeridge married Beatrice

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Webb's niece, thus getting to know intimately the Webb household and the Fabian milieu in general.)

There is also a fascinating—though not unsympathetic—portrait of Kim Philby, the famed Soviet agent, who was Muggeridge's chief in the SIS. Unlike Graham Green, another SIS colleague, Muggeridge is not one to accept Philby's claim that he was drawn to the Soviet Union out of an ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism.[1] Rather, says Muggeridge, it was because Philby, like so many other "gilt-edge defectors" in the 1930's, concluded "that a new giant had arisen in the world with whom they wished to make their number in good time." Philby had

. . . a romantic veneration for buccaneers and buccaneering, whatever the ideological basis—if any—might be. Boozers, womanizers, violence in all its manifestations, recklessness however directed, he found irresistible. . . . On this showing, he would have been more at home among Nazi bully-boys than the pedantic terrorists of the USSR. He actually said to me once that Goebbels was someone he felt he could have worked with.

In 1965, when Philby defected to Moscow, English newspapers published a photograph of him taken in the early 1930's, at a dinner given by a pro-Nazi organization. Philby has claimed that he was at the dinner posing as a Nazi sympathizer as part of his effort to build a cover. "But was he? I think it far more likely," says Muggeridge, "that he attended it as a genuine member. His admiration, if not veneration, for his father [an Arabist and sympathizer of Hitler] would have pointed in this direction. I have always myself believed that he joined up with the Soviet *apparat* at a much later date, when it was clear that the USSR was to be in the victor's camp." As in the case of so many profiles that appear in the book, this assessment is deft, penetrating—and probably correct.[2]

WHILE *Chronicles of Wasted Time* contains an abundance of riches, the passages of the greatest interest to the readers of this journal are probably those depicting Muggeridge's confrontations with communism and Communists, in Russia and elsewhere—in particular the chapter "Who Whom?" (Vol. I), doubtless one of the most astute and frequently hilarious personal accounts of life in the USSR ever written. In 1932, the editor of *The Manchester Guardian* suggested that Muggeridge represent the paper in Moscow—a suggestion the latter accepted with alacrity, having resolved (loyal son that he was) "to go to where I thought a new age was coming to pass; to Moscow and the future of mankind." But already en route, on the boat to Leningrad—with next to nothing in the way of luggage (his wife, who accompanied him, "had burned her only long dress and various little trinkets and oddments" as so many "bourgeois trappings . . . of no relevance in a Workers' State")—his enthusiasm began to wane, largely as a result of the presence of a group of fatuous fellow-travelers. What fervor remained soon evaporated as Muggeridge took up his job as correspondent and came into contact with the realities of Soviet life. He describes these realities with biting (yet never acrimonious) wit and still ardent indignation: the lies, the monumental deceptions, the appalling poverty, the pervasive fear, and above all the people—those who believed, those who rationalized, those who suffered, and those who profited from the sufferings of others.

The profiles, as usual, are memorable: of three censors, all Jewish, yet strikingly dissimilar; of Radek, Borodin, Gorky; of that immensely gifted yet morally flawed literary critic, Prince N. M. Mirsky, who saw everything with remarkable clarity but dismissed the iniquities of the Soviet system on the ground "that what was happening in the USSR had to happen, that forces, interacting, produced a resultant force which was irresistible." There is a marvelous scene featuring Louis Aragon, who at a meeting held for him in Moscow "stood up and announced that he had just received a message from Paris that the members of the French Surrealist Movement had joined the Communist Party *en bloc*. At the news of this addition to the ranks of the World Proletariat there was a burst of cheering." Sketches of Louis Fischer, William Henry Chamberlin, Harold Laski and others are equally vivid. So is one of George Bernard Shaw, who, upon arriving in Moscow, declared "that he was delighted to find there was no food shortage in the USSR"—this in the midst of the most ghastly man-made famine the Russian people had ever experienced.

Some of the lines have an un-

[1] Kim Philby, *My Silent War*, New York, Grove Press, Inc., 1968; see Introduction.

[2] Philby's cautious phrasing tends to corroborate Muggeridge's interpretation: "How, where and when I became a member of the Soviet intelligence service is a matter for myself and my comrades. I will only say that, when the proposition was made to me, I did not hesitate. One does not look twice at an offer of enrollment in an elite force." *Ibid.*, p. xxi.

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canny contemporary ring. Take Muggeridge's observations on the situation of Western correspondents in Moscow *circa* 1932:

The Soviet authorities were able to control foreign newsmen almost as rigorously as they did their own. They had perforce to live and work in the USSR under the constant threat of losing their visas. If this happened, their jobs automatically came to an end, which in most cases was something they wished to avoid. Also, any foreigner resident in the USSR was vulnerable, in the sense that just going about and displaying ordinary curiosity, in Soviet terms, laid one open to a plausible charge of espionage. . . . Add to this that most foreign correspondents, separated from their wives, acquired a Russian mistress of one sort of another who, if not planted on them by the GPU, was bound to report their doings and transactions. This provided a ready means of exerting pressure on them. Thus, one way and another, they were not free agents, and the messages they sent had to be slanted accordingly.

(It would be unfair to suggest that Western newsmen in Moscow today are as cowed as were so many of their colleagues forty years ago. Indeed, the audacity of numerous correspondents in reporting news unpalatable to the Soviet authorities—for which they are often rewarded by scurrilous attacks in the press and unceremonious expulsions—is beyond question. Yet the methods of exerting pressure have not really changed over the years. Nor are such methods wholly unsuccessful: witness the number of exposés of Soviet life written *after* correspondents leave the USSR, this despite the abolition of *a priori* censorship. At times the fear of possible reprisals seems to reach rather absurd proportions. Thus, the relative absence of any durable romantic liasons today is due not only to the fact that most Western newsmen in Moscow are now joined by their wives, but to a perhaps exaggerated respect for the power of the KGB. Some years ago a friend of mine, who represented a Western newspaper, decided, in a valorous act of defiance, to take a Russian mistress; two, in fact. This struck such horror into the hearts of his country's embassy officials that they immediately asked his employers to recall him on grounds of incompetence. My friend is bitter to this day, convinced that had his embassy not interfered, he would have succeeded in initiating a new life-style for Western correspondents in Russia.)

THE ONE-YEAR SOJOURN in the Soviet Union was, for Muggeridge, a searing experience. It produced, as he puts it, "the total reversal . . . of everything I had hitherto hoped for and believed." Looking back, he decided that it was not merely a matter of disillusionment, of a dream punctured by grim reality. Rather, he felt that for many years he had been witness to

. . . a monumental death-wish, an immense destructive force loosed in the world which was going to sweep over everything and everyone. . . . Wise old Shaw, high-minded old Barbusse, the venerable Webbs, Gide the pure in heart and Picasso the impure, down to poor little teachers, crazed clergymen and millionaires, drivveling dons and very special correspondents like Duranty, all resolved come what might to believe anything, however preposterous, to overlook anything, however villainous, to approve anything, however obscurantist and brutally authoritarian, in order to be able to preserve intact the confident expectation that one of the most thoroughgoing, ruthless and bloody tyrannies ever to exist on earth could be relied on to champion human freedom, the brotherhood of man, and all the other good liberal causes to which they had dedicated their lives.

Stalin is dead, and so is Stalinism. The author's picture of one of "the most thoroughgoing, ruthless and bloody tyrannies ever to exist on earth" thus belongs more rightfully to the past than to the present. What is, however, as relevant today as forty years ago is his condemnation of those who believe that good can be born of evil, or that evil must be accepted in the hope that it may, at some unpredictable date, turn into good.

It is customary, in reviewing a book, to point out some "regrettable" flaws, however minor, and to conclude by noting that despite them, the book is to be warmly recommended. It is true that the reviewer found a few errors—to be precise, five, all of a typographical nature. What or where they are escape memory. So let me proceed directly to the recommendation: Malcolm Muggeridge's two volumes provide a delightful feast for any intellectual palate. And like any good fare, they whet the appetite for more. Let us hope that Volume III of the *Chronicles of Wasted Time* will soon be in our hands.

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Systemic Ills in Soviet Agriculture

By Arthur W. Wright

D. J. MALE: *Russian Peasant Organisation before Collectivisation.* London, Cambridge University Press, 1971.
PETER J. POTICHNYJ: *Soviet Agricultural Trade Unions, 1917-1970.* Toronto, Canada, University of Toronto Press, 1972.
KARL-EUGEN WÄDEKIN: *The Private Sector in Soviet Agriculture.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif., University of California Press, 1973.

THE ENTIRE HISTORY of Soviet policy toward agriculture is a record of impatience with the constraints imposed on industrialization by peasant agriculture. That impatience led to repeated attempts to ease or circumvent the constraints administratively, from the top down, with a minimal diversion of resources from industry. At best, the record shows only partial or temporary success, followed by frustration and renewed impatience.

Past writers—*e.g.,* Robert Campbell on Soviet planning as a whole and Erich Strauss and Jerzy Karcz on agriculture—have identified a dysfunctional syndrome which explains why administrative solutions to economic problems so frequently result in frustration. This syndrome consists of three parts: (1) an inherent tendency for administrative measures not to be effective because they try to substitute exhortation for inputs of real resources; (2) a tendency for cadres, responding to incentives signaled by the center, to apply the measures with excessive zeal and in distorted ways; and (3) a tendency, when both the failures and the excesses become apparent to the center, to resort to new administrative measures. Thus, the campaign may "succeed," but the policy fails—and with the next campaign the cycle begins over again.

The administrative syndrome emerges clearly in the three cases of Soviet agricultural policy examined in the books reviewed here. According to Male, Soviet rural policy in the 1920's included a series of attempts, largely unsuccessful, to replace the peasant *mir* with rural soviets by urging the soviets onward and by harassing the *mir*. Potichnyj portrays a rural trade union network decreed into existence in 1919, exhorted to accomplish impossible tasks, almost reorganized out of existence in the 1930's, and finally able to gain institutional integrity only after World War II, when the objective conditions became more favorable. Wädekin details how an overreliance on administrative measures led to interdependence between the collective farms and the private peasant plots, and how in turn administrative measures against the plots detrimentally affected collective agricultural performance. Let us examine each of these cases of *goloe administrirovanie* (administration by mere injunction) in some detail.

FOLLOWING THE *de facto* land reform at the end of World War I, many Russian peasants were reorganized into communes similar to the *miry* of tsarist times.[1] Like their predecessors, the new postwar communes could serve both administrative and landholding functions (including the repartition of land). Even peasants owning "enclosed" farms not subject to repartition often affiliated with a nearby commune for economic purposes.

The new central government moved quickly to organize a net-

[1] According to data assembled by Male, the extent of commune organization varied widely from region to region. The main determinant would seem to have been cultural background: for example, Great Russian peasants tended to prefer the commune, while Ukrainians and Central Asians did not. Tentative and not wholly consistent attempts to relate the variation also to the type of land-use and cropping patterns leave the impression that Male could have derived more insight on this question from his data had he formulated a better economic model of peasant agriculture.

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work of rural soviets to take over taxation and other administrative responsibilities from the communes. The rural soviets were slow, however, in developing any effective capacity to govern because of higher-priority claims on party and state organizational resources. Male shows that, in many instances, it was the communes that exercised effective administrative authority in the countryside, because they still controlled the rights to productive land and could raise funds locally where the soviets could not. Continual reshuffling of the structure and tasks of the soviets had the effect of weakening rather than strengthening those bodies, in spite of considerable exhortation from Moscow.

One tactic in the campaign against the kulaks was to exclude them from participation in the rural soviets; they were not, however, excluded from the communes, even when (at the end of the 1920's) Moscow tried to force them out by legislation. That the communes were stronger than the soviets was interpreted in Moscow —illogically, according to some Soviet writers at the time [2]—as evidence of persistent kulak strength and defiance. This interpretation only hardened the determination of the central authorities to restrict the communes, and the years from 1925 to 1930 saw a succession of ever harsher measures limiting communal landholding and the agricultural techniques that private peasants could employ.

Male tacitly adopts the common view that the crash collectivization begun in 1929 grew out of disappointed expectations for the repartitional commune and other private agricultural institutions. In fact, his own tale of the harassment of private peasants from 1925 on is consistent with the position of Karcz and others that mass collectivization began *before* a systematic attempt had been made to work with private institutions. Thus, the commune was not shown to be inimical to Soviet goals unless one of those goals was the collectivization of agriculture *per se* and not just the alleged benefits of increased productivity, released labor, and rural savings. The only demonstrated failure was, in fact, one of policy rather than of institutions.

IN BRINGING the vast rural areas of the former Russian Empire under their sway, the Bolsheviks faced a monumental task. It was a task made all the bigger by the Bolshevik ideological perspective on the peasants, who were both disdained and seen as hostile to the new government. Professor Potichnyj documents the attempts made by Moscow to use agricultural trade unions to help carry out that task.

Unions of employees in socialist agricultural enterprises, first set up under Bolshevik control in 1919, were viewed as the vanguard of the proletariat in the countryside and as transmission belts from the party and state leadership to the peasants.[3] They would help uplift the lowly peasants to the level of industrial workers and convey the superiority of socialism in productivity and social arrangements. Unfortunately, instead of glorious achievements, the agricultural trade unions yielded at best feeble results until the 1950's.

The beginnings of the agricultural unions were not auspicious. Decreed into existence from on high rather than growing up among the workers, they were from the start regarded with distaste by the rest of the Soviet trade union movement. Moreover, the administrative syndrome operated in classic fashion throughout the 1920's: when the agricultural unions failed to produce the desired results by the prescribed deadline, the union structure was overhauled, outsiders from industrial unions and the party *apparat* were put in charge, union membership rolls were purged of unsavory elements, and everyone was then exhorted not only to make up for lost time but to make new strides as well. At the same time, the agricultural unions (like the rural soviets) never achieved even a semblance of financial independence, being forced to rely instead on central trade union and party subsidies. As a result, no experience was gained by agricultural union officials, and the unions had little effect on wages and working conditions, consequently earning scant respect from the rank and file. The outcome was precisely what a good Marxist would predict

[2] These writers held that repartitioning within the commune worked against the kulaks. Male reports evidence of social mobility, in both directions, within the communes, in part because of the effects of land redistribution; however, he also cites evidence that the richer peasants were able to manipulate commune decisions in their favor (*e.g.*, by getting the commune to allocate pasture rights according to the number of cows rather than per household). The plasticity of the definition of a "kulak" in this period is a good example of the administrative syndrome operating at the local level.

[3] Emphasis was also placed on recruiting *batraki*, or landless peasant laborers, into the unions. The reason for recruiting these people (the least proficient peasant farmers as a rule) was not, of course, to serve as the vanguard of the proletariat but rather to help foment class divisions among the peasantry.

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as a consequence of the basic error of voluntarism.

After 1929, the agricultural unions were continually reshaped —by successive reorganizations in 1929-30, 1931, 1932, 1934, 1937, 1939, and 1941!—to assist in mass collectivization. The administrative measures imposed in this period were, however, even less successful than those taken when agriculture was still largely private. By 1935, with the local and middle-level officials stripped of all authority, the agricultural unions were, in Professor Potichnyj's words (p. 67), "so weak that for all practical purposes they ceased to function." No amount of exhortation or further reorganization seemed capable of reviving them.

Nevertheless, the agricultural unions did begin to come into their own after World War II. As Professor Potichnyj shows, however, the reason was not a new administrative structure but rather (again as a Marxist would argue) the emergence of new "objective conditions." The visible weaknesses of Soviet agriculture following the war led to a shift from political to economic objectives in that sector, and the shift in objectives in turn gave the agricultural unions new scope for a useful role. Now, administrative changes followed rather than preceded the tasks assigned to the unions, and those tasks were rooted in basic economic functions. Two specific developments—the Virgin Lands campaign launched in 1954 and the dismantling of the state-run machine-tractor stations (MTS), along with the sale of their assets to the collective farms (*kolkhozy*), in 1958—highlighted the changed role of the unions after 1945.

The Virgin Lands campaign carried with it a large increase in the state-farm (*sovkhoz*) labor force and the relocation of many workers to areas of poor working and living conditions. The agricultural trade unions were reorganized and their staffs expanded in preparation for the campaign—once again to act as a transmission belt from the center, but this time with more resources and greater authority than previously. With the resources and authority, the unions were both willing and able to exercise the functions vested in them, including communication of workers' complaints and negotiation of remedial measures.

The MTS reorganization enhanced the role of the agricultural unions as representatives of the workers' interests. On the one hand, the sizable bloc of agricultural workers transferred from state enterprises to the cooperative structure of the *kolkhozy* were understandably concerned to retain their rights to the benefits (such as social insurance) associated with union membership. On the other hand, the central leadership was not eager to have large union locals within the *kolkhozy*, whose members were still cooperants and not yet full-fledged workers. The agricultural trade unions were able to parlay the center's strong desire to effect the MTS reorganization and yet also hold the skilled MTS labor force in the countryside into measures protecting the workers' union status and benefit rights.

Professor Potichnyj concludes, quite persuasively, that by the 1960's Soviet agricultural trade unions had evolved from a mere "channel of direction and control from above" (and an ineffectual channel at that) into an institution capable of serving as a "conduit for communication and pressure from below" (p. 128). Even though the book is somewhat overburdened with factual detail and strings of numbers and the descriptive material at times overshadows the analytical, it is a work to which specialists on Soviet trade unions and economic administration will wish to have access.

PERHAPS THE MOST striking example of the administrative syndrome in Soviet agriculture involves the relationship between individual private plots and the socialist sector. It is Professor Wädekin's thesis that the *kolkhoz* economy [4] is a symbiosis, not merely a coexistence, of collective and private farming. As with the lichen, in which the alga provides food for the fungus but depends on the fungus for water, the collective farms provide fodder and other inputs for the peasants' private plots but depend on the plots to produce livestock and labor-intensive crops. Moreover, the income from the plots is a not insignificant supplement to the low real incomes the peasants earn from collective work. Wädekin carefully and clearly documents his thesis in a book which will be a standard reference work on the subject, in the same class with Moshe Lewin's major study of the decision to collectivize.[5]

[4] Wädekin presents data showing that the entire private sector includes more than just the plots of *kolkhozniki*. He estimates that about 40 percent of total private agricultural output originates outside the collective sphere, primarily on the plots of *sovkhozniki* and urban dwellers. We shall focus here on the *kolkhoz* economy, although the analysis applies with some modification to the rest of Soviet private agriculture.

[5] Wädekin's book is an enlarged and revised version of an earlier work published in German; the German edition contains numerous data and calculations cited as the basis of arguments advanced in the English version but not printed there. The translation by Keith Bush is excellent.

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The close interdependence between private and collective agriculture was the direct outgrowth of factors typical of the administrative syndrome in Soviet agriculture: (1) underinvestment in collective farming; (2) defects in the *kolkhoz* as an economic institution; (3) repeated shifts and turns in the policy measures and constraints within which the *kolkhoz* operates in the wider Soviet economy; and (4) substandard living conditions in rural areas. Together, these factors imply that Soviet collective farming cannot by itself produce and market the products (especially food) expected of it by the central authorities.

The other side of the coin is that the collectives do not provide their members with real incomes high enough to make them willing to give up their private plots or, if the plots are heavily restricted, to keep them from leaving agriculture before the collectives can take up the slack.

Whether the leadership likes it or not, therefore, the individual peasant plots are an organic part of the *kolkhoz* economy. To return to the metaphor of the lichen, the fungus may be repulsive, but the alga cannot live without it. The plots thrive in the interstices left by collective farming and the state food-distribution network—for example, where state procurement prices are set below *kolkhoz* unit costs, and where the nonfarm population is unable to purchase food of acceptable quality, in the quantities desired, in the state stores. The plots provide employment to the young and elderly members of peasant families, as well as to able-bodied *kolkhozniki* when they are not engaged in collective work. (For 1964, Wädekin cites an average figure of 84 idle work days out of a possible 296 for the latter group.) When restrictions on the plots are tightened without improvement in collective incomes, the peasants respond by devoting more labor time to their plots.

On the output side, the collectives tend to specialize in land- and capital-intensive crops (*e.g.*, grain and industrial crops) and in large-scale animal husbandry. The *kolkhoznik* families, for their part, tend to specialize in labor-intensive crops (*e.g.*, vegetables and fruits), in small-scale animal husbandry, and in the production of milk, eggs, and poultry products. The incentives to specialize are so strong that when the center attempts to suppress the plots by withholding fodder and hay from the *kolkhozniki*, for instance, the latter respond not by shifting out of livestock activities but by resorting to other means, fair or foul, to acquire the needed inputs. Wädekin stresses that while the specialization benefits both the *kolkhozy* and the peasants, it is not the same pattern of specialization that would emerge if relative costs were the sole criterion. The reason, of course, is the numerous restrictions intended to proscribe private farming and contain it within tolerable limits: restrictions on the maximum size of plots, on permissible outputs, on the hiring of capital goods and extra labor, on the minimum time to be worked on the collective, and on selling prices in the so-called *kolkhoz* markets.

Wädekin demonstrates that the fluctuations in policy toward the private plots cannot be explained by variations in the ideological climate, which has been relatively stable. Rather, the policy fluctuations are a classic paradigm of the administrative syndrome. The cycle that occurred under Nikita Khrushchev went as follows: (1) surprise at the vigor of the peasants' response to the relaxation that followed Stalin's death; (2) overestimation of a true collective productive capacity in the long run (*i.e.*, when unfavorable weather conditions might recur)[6]; (3) administrative excesses, in the form of tighter restrictions on private-plot production in order to attain targeted ratios of collective to private output when collective performance fell below target; (4) disaster as a result of these excesses; and (5) a new relaxation of restrictions on the plots (accompanied by the removal of Khrushchev, partly because of agricultural failure).

The fallacy of Khrushchev's policy was that the repression of private agriculture before the collective farms were capable of making up the resulting reduction in output could only hurt the collective sector. Moves against the *kolkhoz* markets, ostensibly to protect the people from "speculative" prices, only drove prices higher and thus increased incentives to "speculate." Forcing the peasants to sell cattle to *kolkhozy* (unprepared to care for them) only guaranteed above-plan meat deliveries for that year, not the intended increase in breeding stock. In the familiar pattern, these administrative measures appeared to work on the surface, but the policy underlying them failed.

THE CLEAR IMPLICATION of Wädekin's analysis is that one way, perhaps the best way, to

[6] Unwarranted optimism was undoubtedly one factor here, but Wädekin argues that a second factor was simply poor information at the center on collective productivity and especially on resources in the private sector and how this sector would react to different policy measures.

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hasten the day when Moscow can afford to do away with private agriculture is to assist it now, thereby strengthening the collective farms. This implication is distinctly reminiscent of the arguments put forward by the Bukharinist "Right Opposition" 45 years ago, on the eve of the crash industrialization drive and the mass collectivization of agriculture. Pointing to the havoc wrought by *goloe administrirovanie,* which had led to the procurement crises of 1927–28 and 1928–29, Bukharin and his colleagues (and members of the exiled "Left Opposition" as well) warned against declaring war on the peasants and trying to expropriate agricultural goods from them by administrative fiat. Instead, they advocated the interim strengthening of private peasant production—under state direction in order to repress "bourgeois" tendencies—as the best route to a successful socialist agriculture at some future time. We shall never know how the industrialization achievable under Bukharin's agricultural program would have compared (in results and costs) with that actually achieved under Stalin's program. It is perhaps instructive, however, to note the enhanced economic role given to the agricultural trade unions after Stalin's death and, more especially, the decision by the post-Khrushchev leadership to pursue a Bukharinist line toward the private plots. One wonders if the current leadership will continue this unprecedented show of patience, which has already lasted close to a decade, and resist the temptation to mark the jubilee anniversary of the industrialization drive in 1979 by declaring that the private sector is no longer necessary.

Asian Communism in the Crucible

By Justus M. van der Kroef

ANTONIE C. A. DAKE: *In the Spirit of the Red Banteng. Indonesian Communists Between Moscow and Peking, 1959–1965.* The Hague and Paris, Mouton Publishers, 1973.
EDUARDO LACHICA: *The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt.* New York, Praeger Publishers, 1971.
PAUL F. LANGER: *Communism in Japan. A Case of Political Neutralization.* Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1972.

THESE THREE STUDIES are suggestive of the great diversity in the condition of Asian communism today. In Japan, as Langer's useful and comprehensive study indicates, the Communist Party is a viable, legitimate and pragmatically astute organization that is relatively well integrated into the parliamentary political process of a highly industrialized society. With respect to the Philippines, Lachica's readable account presents a sharply contrasting picture of underground Communist sectarianism, insurgency, and brigandage, thriving on the deeply rooted and still unresolved ills of an agrarian society and its feudal traditions. Dake's provocative study records the road to disaster of the Indonesian Communist Party, at one time the largest such party outside the Communist world, whose involvement in the abortive September 1965 coup precipitated one of the most spectacular reverses of any organized Communist movement in recent history. No discernible common theme runs through the experience of the three Communist organizations as here recorded, and to do justice to the studies, they should be considered primarily in terms of their individual contributions. Together, however, they perhaps underscore to the student of comparative communism the importance of not losing sight of the varying and distinctive national matrices in which Communist parties must seek to attain power.

OF THE THREE books under review, Dr. Antonie Dake's volume is the most important—not just

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because of its bulk and documentation but also because it offers new hypotheses and insights on the still murky origins of the 1965 coup in Indonesia and on the role of the Indonesian Communists in that milestone event.[1] Without doubt the most striking aspect of the study is Dr. Dake's controversial thesis that it was Indonesian President Sukarno himself who initiated the supposed coup against his own regime, with the collaboration of the Communist Party (PKI) leadership, in order to eliminate certain top army commanders. The latter presumably were opposed to the developing Sino-Indonesian axis and to the steady, radicalizing, leftward trend of domestic Indonesian policies, a drift in which the positions of Sukarno and of the PKI were becoming more and more indistinguishable from each other.

Much of the evidence for this thesis is derived from the interrogation by Indonesian military security officers of Colonel Banbang Setjono Widjanarko, Sukarno's own *aide de camp,* who, according to Dake, was "continuously in the presence of the Indonesian President, notably in 1964 and 1965." Early on the morning of August 4, 1965, according to Widjanarko's testimony released some five years later, Sukarno met with Lieutenant Colonel Untung (an officer of the President's palace guard generally acknowledged to be a principal plotter of the coup) and asked him to "take action against the disloyal generals." As is known, in the first hours of the coup, on the night of September 30, 1965, six top army generals were slain by Untung's men and by PKI youth and women's front members. Dake claims to have declarations attesting to the Untung-Sukarno dialogue of August 4 from three witnesses "who were present in the palace the same morning." In an interview with Dake in 1972, Indonesia's senior soldier, General A. H. Nasution, affirmed that Untung consented to the scheme. The author surmises that most of the top PKI leadership, which had already developed its own revolutionary momentum, were not told details but probably suspected a good deal about Sukarno's intentions. PKI chairman D. N. Aidit, however, is said to have been directly involved in the planning of the supposed coup; as early as twelve days after the Untung-Sukarno conversation, according to Dake, Aidit knew that "the link between the Communist and presidential conspirators had been laid," and coordination between Untung's group and the PKI coup organizers went into high gear, moving along parallel paths and in a "remarkable rivalry cum cooperation" toward a common climax. On the evening of September 30, in Dake's scenario, Sukarno was informed of Untung's decision to strike that very night; the presidential plot unfolded, and with it, Sukarno's own eventual undoing.

What is one to make of this new construction of the causes of the coup? Let it be noted first that Dake's main contention is not altogether news: as early as mid-October 1965, the American press reported that the US government had what it considered "incontrovertible proof," based on confessions of those involved in the affair, that Sukarno had been in league with the PKI in the coup attempt. But Washington was said to be reluctant to publicize this evidence since, in the post-coup power struggle then developing in Djakarta, it was uncertain whether Sukarno might not still come out on top.[2]

Even if one accepts the theory propounded by many observers that Sukarno had at least some and perhaps a good deal of foreknowledge of the coup, it is not easy to accept the Widjanarko-Dake construction. For one thing, Widjanarko's statement, as Dake notes, was not issued until October-November 1970, while Widjanarko was in jail, and was made before interrogating officers of the military security command (Kopkamtib). Along with the question of why it took five years for Widjanarko to speak up, there is the problem of determining the degree of voluntariness of his testimony—or indeed of many similar statements made by prisoners in today's Indonesia, where tens of thousands remain in detention for alleged complicity in the 1965 coup or even for mere sympathy with the now-banned PKI. The continuing public discussion in Indonesia itself, for a number of years now, about the need to follow "the rule of law," paralled by disquiet over the military's extraordinary judicial powers, underscores the skepticism aroused by the testimony of coup suspects and witnesses. And while General Nasution enjoys a well-deserved reputation for integrity and probity, even Dake's staunchest supporters might wish that Untung's presumed assent to Sukarno's re-

[1] The author's background includes training as an attorney and an early career as a civil servant. After 1960 he turned to journalism and writing. He also serves as a media adviser in The Hague.

[2] See Chalmers M. Roberts' report in *The Washington Post* (Washington, DC), Oct. 13, 1965.

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quest to take action against the recalcitrant generals (as recorded by Dake, pp. 388-89) rested on a base somewhat broader than Nasution's word to Dake alone.

There are other problems as well. According to Dake, three witnesses, "Suratni, Sukardi and Jacob Amanda," confirmed Widjanarko's version of the critically important Sukarno-Untung conversation on August 4, 1965. But Dake does not identify these three witnesses further or explain whether they are in a position to support Widjanarko's testimony directly or through hearsay. One wonders whether Sukarno, had he in fact decided to persuade Untung to "take action" against top army commanders, would have done so in circumstances revealing his intentions to no less than four different persons (his aide Widjanarko, as well as "Suratni, Sukardi and Jacob Amanda"). Again, Dake indicates that Second Deputy Premier Johannes Leimena was present at a September 23, 1965, meeting with Sukarno at the presidential palace when the question of the obstreperous generals came up; yet Dake's references to what Leimena reportedly said about Sukarno's planned purge of his army opponents are contradictory.[3]

One may also note that Indonesia's top army commanders were apparently not agreed on Sukarno's responsibility for the coup even before the Widjanarko testimony. As early as February 13, 1967, in a lengthy statement over Radio Djakarta, General Nasution—who barely escaped the coup assassins himself—laid sole responsibility for the coup attempt on Sukarno. But on March 7, 1967, General Suharto—then the acting head of state and later President—declared in an address to the Consultative Assembly that while Sukarno's behavior at the time of the coup was suspicious, "we cannot mark Bung Karno down as a direct instigator, or the mastermind, or even an important figure of Gestapu/PKI, unless there are indeed still facts we haven't been able to find until this very day." To be sure, these statements were made before the Widjanarko testimony. But publicly, at least, Suharto has not seen any reason to change his mind in light of that testimony (nor, as Dake points out, have his advisers) although since 1970 there have been times when he might well have found it politically advantageous to do so.

Dake, no doubt aware of the controversial nature of his main thesis, has tried to anticipate criticisms that can be made of his heavy reliance on the Widjanarko testimony. However, his defense—presented in the concluding pages of his book—is not very persuasive. (One might immediately add that some of the criticisms of Dake have been less than fair—and thus not very persuasive either.[4])

Of passing interest, Dake's provocative view of the coup contrasts with the assessment of a fellow Dutch journalist and specialist on Indonesia, Willem Oltmans, one of the very few Dutch friends and confidants of Sukarno in the post-coup period. In an account of his experiences published in 1973,[5] Oltmans writes that after the coup—in the course of the spectacular demise of the PKI—the profusion of "authentic and false reports, telegrams and documents" comprised such a "dense witches' brew" that it became an "almost inhuman task" to analyze developments. An interesting example of the crosscurrents at work was a conversation that took place in Oltmans' presence in October 1966, in which Sukarno (then rapidly losing power to Suharto) sought to draw out a Suharto associate about the United States' alleged involvement in Indonesia's internal affairs but also indicated that he was aware of Soviet-backed efforts to disseminate false information implicating the US in the coup.[6] Even so, Oltmans

[3] Thus Dake notes (p. 405) that, according to Nasution, Leimena had indicated to investigators in 1969 that he, Leimena, knew Sukarno wanted to get rid of a number of generals; but in conversation with Dake himself, Leimena was a good deal vaguer, saying "I did not know whether Sukarno wanted to get them out of the way. I was preoccupied with other thoughts during the meeting."

The Widjanarko testimony has now been published: See Rahadi S. Karni, Ed., *The Devious Dalang, Sukarno and the So-called Untung Putsch. Eyewitness Report by Bambang S. Widjanarko,* Introduction by A.C.A. Dake, The Hague, Interdoc Publishing House, 1974.

[4] A particularly regrettable example is a review of Dake's book by Peter C. Hauswedell in *The China Quarterly* (London), October-December 1973, pp. 789-93. In it, Hauswedell refers to a photograph in Dake's book in which Dake appears with General Nasution, remarking that the photo "suddenly" makes "the thrust of Dake's story" somehow "much clearer." Thus he seems to insinuate that a personal relationship influenced Dake's account. He makes no comment, however, about another photo on the same page showing Dake with Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik.

[5] Willem O. Oltmans, *Den Vaderland Getrouwe: Uit het dagboek van een journalist* (Faithful to One's Native Land: The Diary of a Journalist), Utrecht and Antwerp, A. W. Bruna Publishers, 1973.

[6] Oltmans reports (*ibid.*, pp. 317-18) that during this conversation, when he touched on the possibility "that the Soviets through their information services had circulated false documents in order to discredit the Americans," Sukarno angrily seized his arm and exclaimed: "Fellow, don't you think I know that?" The remark

(continued on p. 58)

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notes Sukarno's "unshaken conviction" that it was the Indonesian army and not the PKI which executed the "long-contemplated coup."

There is, fortunately, much more in Dake's volume than his controversial thesis of Sukarno's culpability. His treatment of the PKI's rise to power in the "Guided Democracy" era is admirably comprehensive and balanced. Particularly to be praised is his exhaustive analysis of the involvement of People's China in the events leading to the 1965 climax and the new light he throws on the smuggling of Chinese arms into Indonesia before the coup. It has been difficult for some observers to accept the fact of such covert Chinese arms shipments, even though the Indonesian government and military have repeatedly claimed that such arms were found, and even though well before the coup the Thai and Malaysian press carried reports (with which Dake unfortunately does not appear to be familiar) that such Chinese arms shipments were taking place.[7] Equally incisive is Dake's description of the Communists' "revolutionary offensive" in the months leading up to the coup, in the form of an intensive political and press campaign implementing the PKI slogan that "the revolution should be brought to a peak" and interacting with Sukarno's own policies. Together with what is now known of PKI plans leaked at the close of 1964 (indicating that during 1965 the party intended to further its infiltration of government services and to develop land reform, educational, and other campaigns specifically in preparation for a coup), Dake's book thoroughly refutes occasionally-heard variations of the notion that the PKI's involvement in the 1965 coup was "an almost desperate defensive move," presumably against the army, rather than the culmination of a political offensive.[8]

COMPARED TO THE amount that has been written on the PKI, the literature on the Huk movement of Central Luzon and on Philippine communism in general is rather meager. Thus, Eduardo Lachica had to rely much more heavily than did Dake on personal, "in-the-field" research and contacts to do his study of the Huks. The lack of documentary material, as well as Lachica's journalistic style, gives his narrative an impressionistic and sometimes superficial quality.[9] But the book has a lively immediacy and is extremely informative, especially in its discussion of the roots of the Maoist New People's Army (NPA) and the Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist). What may perhaps be called the extremely personal character of the Huk movement — represented, *e.g.*, by the undisciplined gyrations of Huk figures like Alibasbas, Sumulong, "Freddie" (Efren Lopez) and "Dante" (Bernade Buscayno), and the background and views of sterner Maoist ideologues like Sison—is captured in these pages as nowhere else thus far.

Lachica has been wise in treating the Huk phenomenon historically, depicting it as a kind of independent variable in the development of Philippine communism that has interacted with the latter but has distinctive dynamics. This approach has posed an unforeseen liability, however, in that time has rapidly overtaken the concluding perspective of the study. Lachica's chapter on "The Failed Revolution," recounting the breakdown in the alliance between some of the Huk organizations and the Maoist ideologues and the seeming ineffectiveness of student unrest in Manila, offers a rather dismal outlook for the

is particularly interesting in light of the recent revelations of the Czech defector, Ladislav Bittman, concerning the efforts of Czechoslovak intelligence to carry on a Soviet-inspired campaign of political warfare in Indonesia in the first half of 1965, aimed at discrediting the US through allegations of CIA activity in the country. (*The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare*, Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972, pp. 106-22).

It may be noted that Oltmans was instrumental in bringing about the publication of letters allegedly written by Sukarno to his wife, Mme. Ratna Sari Dewi, during the critical first few days after the 1965 coup. The letters suggest that Sukarno viewed the coup not as the work of the PKI but rather as the result of an ideological struggle within the army leadership. They first appeared in the Dutch daily, *NRC Handelsblad* (Rotterdam), Sept. 22, 1973. The authenticity of the letters, as well as the bona fides of their writer, has been questioned.

[7] *Le Démocrate* (Bangkok), Sept. 12, 1965, and *Sabah Times* (Kota Kinabalu), Sept. 14, 1965. See also *The New York Times*, Oct. 11, 1966, and May 18, 1971, on official Indonesian claims of the discovery of Chinese arms.

[8] Quotations from Harold Crouch, "Another Look at the Indonesian 'Coup,'" *Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.), April 1973, p. 5. Crouch's conclusion is based on a misinterpretation of selective testimony in the trials of captured PKI figures like Njono and Sjam in the late 1960's and ignores all other PKI tactics in the months before the coup.

[9] Like Dake, Lachica is a journalist. The dust jacket of the Philippine edition of Lachica's book, published in 1971 under a slightly different title by Manila's Solidaridad Publishing House, describes him as a veteran reporter for the *Philippines Herald* and presently the Tokyo correspondent for the Asian News Service. The book grew out of the reports of a journalistic "task force" sent to investigate the Huks in Central Luzon early in 1969.

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Philippine Communists and their partners and makes one acutely aware that the author ended his book at the close of 1970. Less than two years later Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos proclaimed nationwide martial law in the face of allegedly continuing disturbances in Manila and of the growing insurgency of the NPA (which, Marcos claimed in his September 1972 announcement of martial law, was now "in control of 35 municipalities out of 37" in Isabela Province, was entrenched in rural sanctuaries in Luzon's mountains, and was attempting to expand into Albay, Sorsogon and Quezon provinces).[10]

In light of the ferment in Manila and in parts of the Luzon countryside in 1971-72, and (if the newest "red scare" is to be believed) in light also of the intrusion of NPA activists and Maoist ideologues into the Muslim insurrection in Mindanao,[11] Lachica's contentions that "there is little evidence of popular support for radical politics" in the Philippines, or that Maoist appeals are doomed because of the hostility of the Filipinos for the Chinese, or that the Huks "cannot expand beyond the Pampanga areas," make for somewhat surprising reading. Lachica's assertion that the Huks do not pose a widening threat in the Philippines, being presumably content to stay within their own "native society," seems to be belied, at least in part, by the incorporation of some Huk elements into the NPA since 1971 and by the concomitant expansion of NPA operations well beyond Luzon.

Lachica has a clear eye for what he calls the "ecology of dissidence" in the background of the Huk problem—*i.e.*, the pattern of "us-against-them" antagonism reflecting the hostility of the Central Luzon peasantry toward the Philippine constabulary and toward the "city-slicker land-reformists," who in the peasant view do not really understand agrarian conditions. Because of this antagonism, the long campaign of terrorism conducted against the authorities by the seemingly indestructible Huk organization won over substantial peasant support. Not everyone would agree, however, with Lachica's assessment of the underlying economic issues. He maintains that while poverty and widespread tenancy are factors "contributing" to the persistence of the Huk phenomenon, their importance should not be overstressed: in substantiation, he argues that the town and countryside of Pampanga Province, where both Huk activity and tenancy rates are at a peak, "do not show widespread and abject poverty." It is, in fact, probably impossible to measure the relative weight of economic, social, and psychological factors involved in the Huks' appeal; but certainly economic issues were important in building up their reputation among the Luzon peasantry as protectors of the poor against heavy-handed landlords and as implementers of a rough, Robin Hood-style justice, "which people thought to be fairer and swifter than the government's version."[12] It may be noteworthy that since the proclamation of martial law by President Marcos, both the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist), and its rival pro-Moscow faction, the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), have continued to stress the plight and revolutionary importance of "impoverished tenants" and "the peasant masses."[13] Lachica himself notes the failures of various government reform programs, including land reform, in the struggle against the Huks.

A final criticism is in order. It is difficult to understand Lachica's conclusions that "industrialization" should be the strategy of modernization in the Huk country of Central Luzon, and, simultaneously, that the government, by "letting Central Luzon alone"—*i.e.*, withdrawing its counterinsurgency units—could encourage Pampanga and Tarlac to become "more peaceful." Lachica cannot be unaware of the urban features of some Huk operations (*e.g.*, extortion, vice, and labor rackets)—features which a laissez-faire security policy, combined with industrialization, would hardly seem likely to mitigate. In this connection, it is relevant and interesting to note a recent report that the NPA is now concentrating its activities in the urban "industrial" areas. According to Philippine Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, new NPA "front organizations" have been established in business, civic, and even religious circles in the cities, with the aim

[10] President Ferdinand Marcos' address, Radio Manila in English, Sept. 23, 1972, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report* (Washington, DC), Sept. 25, 1972. See also Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Philippine Maoists," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Winter, 1973, pp. 892-926, and "Communism and Reform in the Philippines," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver), Spring 1973, pp. 29-58.

[11] SEATO, *Trends and Highlights* (Bangkok), March 1, 1973, p. 17.

[12] Ben Kerkvliet, "Agrarian Conditions in Luzon Prior to Martial Law," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (Boston), September 1973, p. 38.

[13] See the Philippine Maoists' publication, *Ang Bayan*, Oct. 1, 1972, reprinted in *Indonesian Tribune* (Tirana) No. 4, 1972, pp. 27-32. See also a PKP Resolution of Feb. 10, 1973, published in *Information Bulletin* (Prague), No. 13, 1973, pp. 17-36.

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of eventually "seizing state and political power." [14]

TO TURN TO THE study of Japanese communism, Paul F. Langer's brief monograph is one of a series of comparative analyses of non-ruling Communist parties being made by Stanford University's Institute of Political Studies.[15] It does not significantly break new ground, but rather is a well-organized, careful summation of known data on the structure, strengths, and changing tactics of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), providing information that is particularly useful to the beginning student.

After sketching the evolution of the party before World War II—years marked by organizational factionalism and ineffective leadership in a hostile, repressive environment—the author traces the postwar resurgence of the JCP. The party's modest but growing success at the polls in the past decade (despite a membership of only 300,000), its apparently profitable publications, and the Japanese tendency to respond in extremist fashion to "crisis-situations" are all factors that have made the JCP a force to be reckoned with.

At the same time, it would seem that the JCP's preoccupation with bread-and-butter issues, its current united-front pragmatism, and its "autonomy" and relative doctrinal moderation (the latter reflected in its attempt in recent years to avoid being drawn into the Sino-Soviet conflict) are singularly uninspiring and unattuned to the violence-prone dissent and inner turmoil of many younger Japanese today. It is Langer's view that while Marxism is still "the single most potent intellectual and political belief system in postwar Japan," it is losing popularity among the younger leftist intellectuals. If this is true, and if the JCP continues on its present course, then the distinctively Communist character of the party may be threatened.

While these considerations raise questions about the party's future, the relative success of the JCP to the present cannot be gainsaid. As one reads Langer's pages, with the Dake and Lachica works still fresh in mind, the contrast between the JCP's present viability, on the one hand, and the experiences of the Maoist NPA and the PKI, on the other, is striking. Dake's study leaves a clear impression of the gradually radicalizing effect of Peking's influence on the Indonesian political climate in general, and on PKI tactics in particular, in the year or so before the 1965 coup. Lachica similarly shows that Maoist ideology had a radicalizing effect on various youthful Philippine dissidents in the earlier 1960's and heightened their dissatisfaction with the ineffectual, united front policies of the underground PKP. In contrast, the present studied independence and neutrality of the JCP in the Sino-Soviet dispute (after a significant "tilt" toward Peking during 1962-65) has probably strengthened the party's short-term legitimacy and future "establishment" role.

What the long-term costs may be, both in terms of party strength and ideological appeal, remains to be seen. The respectability and yet declining popularity of Marxism in Japan may not be unconnected. To the surviving followers of Aidit and Sison, a glance at the JCP today may underscore the dilemma of all makers of revolution: "damned if you do, and damned if you don't."

[14] Agence France Presse dispatch, Manila, Sept. 30, 1974; from Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report*, Oct. 1, 1974, p. P-7.

[15] Dr. Langer is a member of the Social Science Department of The Rand Corporation.

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Peking's Profile in Southeast Asia

By Lea E. Williams

MELVIN GURTOV: *China and Southeast Asia—The Politics of Survival.* Lexington, Mass., D.C. Heath, 1971.
STEPHEN FITZGERALD: *China and the Overseas Chinese.* London, Cambridge University Press, 1972.

ALTHOUGH FOCUSING on different aspects of contemporary relations between China and Southeast Asia, these two studies effectively demonstrate the fact that for the greater part of the last twenty years Peking has sought—for the best of pragmatic reasons—to maintain an inconspicuous posture and a benevolent mien in her dealings with the nations of the region. With the exception of the brief interlude of militant aberrancy witnessed during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese foreign policy—whether in the broad context examined by Melvin Gurtov or with respect to the specific problem of Southeast Asia's ethnic Chinese populations dealt with in Stephen FitzGerald's masterfully refined analysis—has displayed an inclination to tolerate manifestations of diplomatic independence by Southeast Asian leaders that sometimes approached opposition to Chinese international policy positions. In providing evidence of this tendency, both authors show themselves free of the obsession that drove a vocal segment of a generation of American China-watchers to believe that Chinese statecraft was the product of mindless fanaticism.

In examining what he terms the "foreign policy interaction" between the People's Republic of China and its southern neighbors,[1] Professor Gurtov tends to play down one factor which many view as exerting a predominant influence on the plotting of China's course in international politics. This is the Sino-Soviet confrontation—surely the most compelling single consideration in the minds of the men in Peking. It would not even be reckless to see the motivation behind China's moderation in Southeast Asia exclusively in the context of her rivalry with the Soviet Union — a competition which, by the late 1960's, apparently resulted in Peking's widely publicized fear of a preemptive blow from the north. Yet Gurtov all but ignores this issue.

It is instructive in this connection to recall that in its first years, during the halcyon period of Soviet-Chinese amity, the People's Republic was by no means mild in its pronouncements on Southeast Asia and its nationalist leaders. That was a time of "leaning to one side," in which China saw only friends or enemies and recognized no alternative category in between. Non-Communist Southeast Asian leaders, including such subsequent favorites as Indonesia's Sukarno and Cambodia's Sihanouk, were routinely blasted as lackeys of the West. Only with the birth of the "Bandung spirit" of peaceful coexistence did China abandon revolutionary rigidity to seek the benefits of diplomatic practicality. It is not excessive in retrospect to see the charm manifested by Chou En-lai at Bandung in 1955 as the first expression of an independent Chinese line that soon was to contribute to the shattering of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Criticism of Gurtov's failure to give due consideration to the place of the Soviet Union in Chinese international calculations must, in fairness, be tempered by recognition of the fact that he wrote before Sino-American détente seemed a realistic possibility, at a time when the US still ranked among Peking's major *bêtes noires*. So much has changed in the short period since the publication of his book in 1971 that

[1] While Gurtov deals only with the formulation and implementation of Chinese policy vis-à-vis Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand, the implications of his findings for Peking's ties with other states of the region are reasonably clear.

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the volume is unavoidably more a body of historical data than a currently helpful analysis. Nevertheless, certain enduring patterns have carried over from the years when the United States and the People's Republic, albeit largely through surrogates, maneuvered for influence in Southeast Asia. Most obviously, American power is still directed toward shaping the outcome of the struggle in the Indochinese states in a way favorable to US interests, while China continues to hope for the emergence of a southern *cordon sanitaire* of neutralized neighbors. In the latter connection, Gurtov's treatment of the Chinese connection with Communist insurgencies is of particular interest.

For example, he views the relatively restricted Communist movement of Thailand as significant to Peking only to the extent that it has created unsettled conditions in the northeastern part of that country, where the Americans maintain their major base area in support of intervention in Indochina. The assumption is that a US decision to cease backing its clients east of the Mekong would likely bring an end to the limited support the Chinese have given to the Thai Communists. This, in turn, "would put great pressure on North Vietnam to stop infiltrating guerrillas and military supplies" to the Thai insurgents through Laos. The argument, while in some respects plausible, seems to involve a misunderstanding of the relationship between Peking and Hanoi. The speculation seems to rest on the conviction that the Vietnamese Communists feel accountable to the giant to the north, although no evidence of Hanoi's vassalage to China is offered. The record, as interpreted by most observers, points in the opposite direction. North Vietnam has consistently avoided falling under the Chinese shadow, as demonstrated most recently by Hanoi's unwillingness to support the People's Republic in its territorial dispute with Saigon over contested islets in the South China Sea.

The theme of Sino-North Vietnamese unity of purpose is carried over into the author's discussion of Chinese behavior toward Burma and Cambodia. According to Gurtov, it was possible for China, at the height of the Cultural Revolution, to break with the government at Rangoon and to urge Burmese Maoists to rebel, because Burma was not strategically situated in terms of thwarting American aims in Indochina. Moreover, the Burmese government had earlier invited Chinese retaliation by refraining from denunciation of the US escalation of hostilities in Vietnam. (If Peking was then actually so eager to aid Hanoi, it seems strange that, almost simultaneously, rail shipments across China of Soviet supplies destined for beleaguered North Vietnam were impeded).

Cambodia, of course, is adjacent to Vietnam and therefore, following Gurtov's reasoning, could not be brusquely sent to Coventry by Peking. It is true that for six weeks after Sihanouk's overthrow *in absentia,* on March 18, 1970, the People's Republic sought to do business as usual with Phnom Penh so that war materiel might still flow to the embattled Vietnamese Communists via the port of Sihanoukville (since restored to its former name, Kompong Som). However, in view of the fact that the Soviet Union was then also engaged in trying to keep a foot in the Cambodian door, Peking's initial correctness toward Lon Nol may well be explained by anxieties related less to Southeast Asia than to global politics. If so, the author under discussion would seem again to have overlooked the transcendent importance of Soviet-Chinese animosity.

In sum, the Gurtov volume conscientiously surveys a wealth of material and presents a stimulating interpretation, though there is one serious mechanical problem in the presentation. The author is excessively attached to lengthy explanatory footnotes that appear in tiny print on at least half of the pages, sometimes equaling in verbiage the text above. Surely, anything worth reporting in such careful detail merited incorporation into the main body of the text. More importantly, however, the whole undertaking suffers from its initial premise that China views Southeast Asia as a zone of primary concern, whereas in fact the region is more likely accorded only peripheral attention in the larger context of China's pursuit of national security and great-power status.

FITZGERALD'S EXAMINATION of the connection between China and persons of Chinese ethnicity abroad further documents the fact that the People's Republic has sought to disengage itself from counterproductive involvement in Southeast Asia. He aptly describes the process that began in the mid-1950's as one of "decolonization," suggesting a parallel between Western withdrawal from empire and the Chinese effort to avoid embarrassing entanglements in the countries to the south.

Earlier, beginning around the turn of the century, successive Chinese governments had attempted to strengthen themselves

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through the mobilization of patriotic support from the Overseas Chinese. Particularly in the matter of financial contributions to the motherland, much was expected of expatriate sons, and much was received. However, depression and years of hostilities decisively lowered the rate of Chinese emigration and reduced the proportion of China-born in the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia. After World War II, the northward flow of remittances, long so useful to China, began to decrease as fewer and fewer Overseas Chinese felt personally bound to a distant land. Each year, the value to China of the Chinese abroad lessened.

With the inauguration of the "Bandung spirit," the Overseas Chinese came to be seen as more trouble than they were worth. If the People's Republic aspired to effective influence in countries of Southeast Asia, emigrant sons would have to be left to their own devices and that is precisely what has been done. (In significant contrast, the authorities on Taiwan, who could not conceivably hope to shape the course of events in Southeast Asia, have displayed extreme reluctance to weaken whatever ties may have existed between themselves and the Overseas Chinese.)

Thus, both authors arrive at essentially the same conclusion: China primarily seeks national security and diplomatic freedom of action, and she has chosen to curtail her ties to elements abroad that she cannot control or effectively exploit in order to play for larger international stakes. The indigenous Communist movements and the ethnic Chinese of Southeast Asia are necessarily deemed expendable by Peking, for they are both more of a hindrance than a help to China in her bid for peaceful accord with the non-Communist governments of the region, most of which (with the notable exception of Indonesia and, of course, South Vietnam) have responded positively to Peking's initiatives of the past two decades.

Mobilizing the Chinese Masses

By William L. Parish, Jr.

ALAN P. L. LIU: *Communications and National Integration in Communist China.* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971.
MARTIN KING WHYTE: *Small Groups and Political Rituals in China.* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974.

THE BOOKS by Liu and Whyte, while quite different in their focus and approach, both attack the issue of political mobilization in China—the issue of the degree to which the government has been able to free people from their original commitments to individual, family, and regional goals and recommit them to the goals of the larger political system.

Liu's volume is essentially a "top-down" account, emphasizing the organization and politics of the Chinese Communist Party's Propaganda Department, the radio, the press, book publishing, and films. Though it is the best existing introduction to China's communication system, it contains a number of flaws, the most significant of which is its failure to consider the great volume of communication that flows not through the public media but through closed channels. To learn, for example, how the public knew about Lin Piao's downfall or Nixon's impending visit long before they were mentioned in the press and over the radio, one must supplement Liu's book with Michel Oksenberg's 1974 article on communication.[1] Therein, one finds a description of the system of secret documents and confidential meetings by which information spreads from Peking to all levels of society. Also, because Liu's book was written too early, it does not discuss the Ref-

[1] "Methods of Communication Within the Chinese Bureaucracy," *The China Quarterly* (London), January-March 1974, pp. 1-39.

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erence News (*Ts'an-k'ao Hsiao-hsi*), a digest of news from foreign wire services which has been made available daily since about 1970 to large portions of the urban and even some of the rural population.

Whyte's study of small groups in the People's Republic, with his "bottom-up" emphasis and richer detail, complements Liu's book well. According to the ideal described in government documents of the early 1950's, officially organized small groups, which have over the years emerged as the dominant mechanism for political mobilization in China, consist of some ten-odd peers meeting regularly for study, discussion, criticism, and self-criticism. When effectively organized, such groups confront potential deviants with such forceful social pressure that other kinds of physical coercion and economic inducements to make them behave in a socially and politically desirable manner are less necessary. Enthusiasm for the political system is generated from within the individual rather than imposed from without. (A similar ideal exists in other Communist states, but there it is only applicable to party cells. China has generalized the ideal so that it applies to all segments of society.) By means of interviews with informants in Hong Kong, Whyte examines the degree to which this government ideal is approximated in five different settings: government bureaus, schools, factories, labor camps, and villages. This approach provides a good introduction to the basic-level institutions in China, omitting only urban neighborhood groups and the military. (Alexander George's *The Chinese Communist Army in Action*,[2] to which the Whyte book is in some ways similar, would be a useful supplement for those readers interested in small groups in the military at an earlier period.)

Despite differences in approach, both Liu and Whyte share a number of themes in common. They are: (1) As Chinese society grew more routinized in the 1960's, small groups and political campaigns became less effective in changing basic attitudes. (2) There have been policy fluctuations and disagreements within the central leadership as to the desirability of imposing intensive political study and campaigns on the population. (3) Even if the radicals who want intensive political activities gain a dominant position, the conditions of village and, to a lesser degree, factory and labor-camp life would seem to limit the effectiveness of political activities in these settings. (4) Despite these limitations, the Chinese have been rather successful, in comparison with Chinese societies of the past and with other societies, in mobilizing and imposing order on the society.

Though one could quibble with the details of each of these generalizations, it seems most fruitful to elaborate upon just two issues: the need to study variation within China and its causes, and the need to find a proper basis of comparison when evaluating China's success in achieving its goals.

OTHERS HAVE STRESSED the need to recognize and study variation within China,[3] and there has even been an occasional study at a rather abstract level relating provincial differences in political stability to economic conditions.[4] Whyte's, however, is the first published study to examine systematically the relationship between local background characteristics and the implementation of government policy at the basic levels of society. His study illustrates the need to precede any global statements about the success of this or that policy by an examination of the conditions that are likely to temper the particular policy's success. Whyte lists conditions that promote small-group activities in bureaucracies and weaken them in villages: the prestige and career advancement possibilities in bureaucratic work, the greater relevance of study to tasks in bureaucracies, and the concentration of the work group in a small office as opposed to the dispersion of peasants in fields where close observation is not as easy. He also lists conditions that will make groups more effective in one village than another: more income and more people willing to serve as local leaders; closeness to and greater influence from a city; test- or key-point status, which brings in more outside government guidance and attention.

The specific list of conditions, of course, may vary slightly for other programs. Take birth control, for example, which is now a major government program being shown to foreign visitors. Its progress in rural areas is likely to be hindered by the absence of a generalized social-security program

[2] New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1967.

[3] The most systematic discussion of variation and its causes in rural China is Michel Oksenberg, "Local Leaders in Rural China, 1962-65," in A. Doak Barnett, Ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1969, pp. 193-204.

[4] For example, Frederick C. Teiwes, "Provincial Politics in China: Themes and Variations," in John M. H. Lindbeck, Ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1971, pp. 116-89.

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and the consequent necessity for peasants to have one or more sons to support them in old age. It is also likely to be hindered by the value of children for supplementary household labor and by the influence of grandparents who live in the same private house. Among villages, the program will probably be most successful where urban contact is great, where incomes are high and there is thus less need for supplementary household labor, where there are many party members and retired servicemen to lead in the adoption of birth-control measures, and where key-point status in the birth-control campaign brings in extra administrative assistance. (For instance, one group of visitors found that adjacent villages had a birth rate twice as high as the key-point village that they were touring.)

At a minimum, then, the visitor and other analysts of China should inquire into the income level, the proximity to urban areas, the party membership, and the key-point status of the places that they visit or study. If the circumstances are opportune, it would also help to look at the background of leaders, the degree of leadership turnover, the revolutionary history of the village and how it fared in past campaigns, the number of demobilized soldiers, and the existence of surname and ethnic cleavages that may create conflict.[5] Only when this type of information is reported can we begin to generalize from the specific case to the nation.

THE SECOND ISSUE that deserves elaboration is the need to find a proper basis for comparison. Whyte's evaluation of the success of small groups in mobilizing Chinese society consists basically of comparisons of the actual operation and functioning of small groups to the government's ideal for small groups as detailed in books written for bureaucrats and urban intellectuals around 1950. Measured against such an extremely high standard, small-group practice cannot help but fall short, even within the party bureaucracy. Whyte does moderate this rigorous standard at times: partly by drawing comparisons with the Soviet experience (in which there has been greater reliance on physical and economic sanctions), partly by drawing comparisons with the pre-1949 past (which was much more disorganized), and partly by comparison with other societies (most of which, he senses, have a greater number of competing subgroups and other means to impose sanctions on politically- and socially-deviant people). Viewed from such perspectives, small groups in China seem to have been rather effective in unifying the society. Despite this tempering of the 1950 ideal as a yardstick of evaluation, however, Whyte's heavy recourse to it for this purpose produces a view which may be bleaker than that which the Chinese themselves, the originators of the ideal, hold about the successes of small-group undertakings. This is particularly true with respect to village political life, about which both Liu and Whyte write rather pessimistically. To come to a balanced assessment, one should recognize that the government's own ideal varies for different target groups, that some political values are learned in contexts not overtly political, that small-group processes in the village have been more successful in the economic than in the political realm, and that a variety of comparisons, not just a single comparison, is necessary. Let us dwell briefly on each of these points.

The government attenuates its ideal of a strict political atmosphere imposed through an intense small-group life in the cases of both factories and villages. In factories, as Whyte notes, the government, operating from Marxist biases, tends to assume that the outlooks of workers pose fewer problems, and that workers are therefore less in need of intense political study. In villages, the shifts in political-study approaches from moderate to radical and back again suggest a division among the top leaders. The moderates do not want to apply to the villager immediately the strict political ideals that they find appropriate for bureaucracies and schools. And even the radicals may not hold an ideal quite so extreme as the one Whyte uses as the standard. For example, the otherwise extremist Tachai brigade—which the radicals have held up for national emulation—has now modified its methods of intense criticism and self-criticism. Though meetings to assign work points inevitably involve evaluation and implied criticism, the present Tachai ideal is that there should be no criticism of people by name. Whenever possible, praise is to be given to specific individuals, but criticisms are to condemn only the error and not the individual who has erred.[6] This indirect ap-

[5] See Whyte and also Oksenberg, "Local Leaders . . .," *loc. cit.*, for further discussion of pertinent background conditions.

[6] See "Using Mao Tse-tung's Thought in Labor Management," in the journal of agricultural technology, *Nung-yeh Chi-shu* (Peking), No. 11, 1967, p. 26.

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plication of negative sanctions to individuals represents a moderation of the 1950 ideal for small groups.

Even when none of the more modest forms of political study and criticism exist in the village, it seems possible that values that the government espouses are learned through other channels, particularly through the economic meetings that everyone attends. The greatest changes in the village are the new economic arrangements, which include a much greater level of sharing and cooperation than in the past. It appears likely that the values of sharing and cooperation are regularly argued about and reaffirmed in village decisions to institute cooperative health programs or to enlarge the proportion of grain allocated according to need, for example, and such arguments must have some effect on individual values.

To be sure, the spirit of sharing is in some ways limited to one's own production team of 20 to 30 households, for the efforts to enlarge the unit of sharing to the township-size commune in 1958-59 and to the village-size brigade in 1968-71 generally failed. But the very success of the neighborhood-size production team illustrates the usefulness of small-group procedures in at least the economic realm. In the efforts to use the larger commune as the sharing unit, the "free rider" problem was encountered. Certain individuals who received benefits regardless of how hard they worked began to loaf. In the large unit, it was difficult to apply social and economic pressure to halt such behavior. However, the change to the smaller unit caused members to be more concerned about the problem because they were more directly affected, and it also gave them more opportunities to apply pressure in that they saw the potential loafer daily. People may have acted as much out of economic self-interest as on the basis of political ideals, but the small-group approach solved the problem. Viewed in this perspective rather than in terms of the extreme ideals developed for bureaucrats and urban dwellers, the spread to the countryside of new political values and ways of organizing would probably appear even more impressive.

Besides modifying its own expectations slightly for different target groups, the government seems to maintain a tension between comparison with the ideal state of the future and comparison with the bad conditions of the past. Moreover, which past is emphasized also varies depending on the audience. In public, officials tend to compare present conditions with the disordered civil-war years of 1948-49. In economic publications in the 1950's and in private today, we are told, they tend to produce a more moderate evaluation of progress by using the more stable prewar years of 1930-36 as the basis of comparison.

Either way, of course, it is difficult to make a balanced judgment.[7] The foreign observer can avoid the twin problem of creating too black a picture by comparison with an unrealistic ideal or too rosy a picture by comparison with a disordered past by comparing the Chinese society with other developing societies. Even if the conclusions that result vary according to whether one uses, *e.g.*, India, Russia, or Japan as the standard of comparison, the flaws inherent in any society are still included, and one has a more realistic set of expectations as to what is possible. Unfortunately, there is no right comparison; hence, one should use multiple comparisons in evaluating the Chinese experience.

[7] On the difficulties of such comparisons, see Harrison E. Salisbury, *To Peking and Beyond*, New York, Quadrangle, 1973, Chap. 6.

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Views of the Latin American Left

By Benedict Cross

LUIGI VALSALICE: *Guerriglia e Politica, L'esempio del Venezuela, 1962-69* (Guerrillas and Politics; The Example of Venezuela, 1962-69). Florence, Centro di Ricerche per L' America Latina, Valmartina Editore, 1973.
DANIEL H. LEVINE: *Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela.* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1973.
ARTURO C. PORZECANSKI: *Uruguay's Tupamaros; The Urban Guerrilla.* New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973.
MARIA ESTHER GILIO: *The Tupamaro Guerrillas.* Translated by Anne Edmondson, with an introduction by Robert J. Alexander. New York, Saturday Review Press and Ballantine Books, Inc., 1972.
DONALD C. HODGES: *The Latin American Revolution; Politics and Strategy from Apro-Marxism to Guevarism.* New York, William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1974.

TO STUDY Latin America is to have compassion for its poor. Students of the Western hemisphere tend to become obsessed with the injustice, corruption, poverty, and inadequacy of some of the social systems "south of the border." This concern for the human condition seems to have resulted in a pronounced bias for the revolutionary Left on the part of Latin Americanists in the United States and Europe. Marxist radicalism is often seen as a valid—if not *the* only valid—solution to the ills of Latin political systems. This notion persists despite the repeated failures of the Left, and despair deepens as military governments take over more of the Latin republics.

It is ironic that American Sovietologists have been disposed in the past to condemn most everything Communist because of their understandable rage at Stalin's distortion of socialism and their impatience with post-Stalin Russia's pace of "evolution," whereas Latin Americanists have—with some outstanding exceptions—continued to see the Marxist Left as the only hope for a new social order. If Sovietology has been plagued by the cold war (*i.e.*, by the long emphasis on studying and teaching communism as a contribution to the conduct of cold-war diplomacy[1]), American studies of Latin America have been heavily influenced by the Vietnam War, by real and imagined US interventionism, and by the social revolution within the United States. The flowering of Latin studies coincided with the political awakening of a generation of scholars who saw in South America the Manichean struggle that they were predicting would become well-defined in their own country. The ubiquitous poster of "Ché," the martyr to unrealized social justice, testifies to the passions that have dominated thinking about Latin America.

The five books under review all deal directly or indirectly with the Latin Left: two are by writers born in Latin America (Porzecanski and Gilio), one by a Texas-born American raised in Latin America (Hodges), one by an Italian (Valsalice), and the fifth by a US citizen with only a peripheral interest in the Left (Levine). Together, these books demonstrate some of the interesting perspectives that are current among today's students of Latin American affairs.

A REFRESHING TWIST to the "Left bias" of foreign observers is seen in Luigi Valsalice's study of the Venezuelan guerrillas in the 1960's. This work is a valuable addition to the existing literature on guerrilla movements, and it well deserves translation into other languages besides Italian.

[1] On this subject, see H. Gordon Skilling, "Soviet and Communist Politics: A Comparative Approach," in Frederic J. Fleron, *Communist Studies and Social Sciences*, Chicago, Rand McNally and Co., 1971, p. 45.

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Sparing the reader a detailed account of historical events, the author has concentrated instead on an analysis of the Venezuelan guerrillas' ideological beliefs, tactics, organization—*and* mistakes. Valsalice deromanticizes the guerrilla by placing the blame for his failure squarely on him—for his lack of organization and a coherent ideology, and for his general incompetence. Valsalice's insights and information support the reviewer's inclination to feel that Italian intellectuals have a special capacity for penetrating the Leftist mentality and comprehending the politics of Marxist-Leninist parties.

Valsalice maintains that the Venezuelan Left was guided—or misguided—by "revolutionism," which has nothing in common with the Marxist concept of revolution. "Revolutionism," he holds, was typified by Guevara's contention that if the conditions for armed struggle do not exist, they must be created. The fall of the dictator Pérez Jiménez in 1958 and the establishment of a left-of-center democratic regime in Venezuela took place almost simultaneously, it will be remembered, with Fidel Castro's victory in Cuba (January 1959). The largely spontaneous creation of nuclei of armed struggle in Venezuela over the next few years was, according to Valsalice, "both the cause and the effect of a new 'climate,' of a revolutionary atmosphere of young people impatient with formal democracy and sensing a duty to fight." The mentality of the radical Venezuelan Left in those early years of the *lucha armada* is little understood. Valsalice has succeeded in conveying the compulsion for action and the poverty of ideology that characterized those early innovators. "There was," he writes, correctly, "a certain romantic aspect in this first appearance of the guerrilla phenomenon; romantic, not in the sense of progressive, but simply irrational." A former leading participant in that movement, in conversation with the reviewer, used the exact same words to deprecate it—*romantic,* in the sense of *irrational.*

The most instructive and valuable parts of Valsalice's book are the final chapters, which analyze the guerrilla in the social and historical context of Venezuela. The author describes the ineptitude of both the rural and the urban guerrillas. The rural guerrillas selected areas for struggle that were mountainous, sparsely populated (containing only 2.2 percent of the population), and far removed from the country's communication centers. They were never able to control even these remote areas. It took them half a decade (until 1966) to begin to realize that there was a contradiction between fighting in unpopulated areas and creating a social base for a "revolutionary civil war." Incredible but true!

In his chapter on urban activity, Valsalice describes how the guerrillas' lack of ideological purpose and revolutionary goals led urban terrorism to become hardly distinguishable from common crime. He attempts to evaluate the charge of the Left that urban violence was a necessary reaction to police brutality. He concludes that if one side was to blame for making violence a "permanent element in the Venezuelan panorama," the responsibility must rest with those who adopted urban terrorism as a political tactic to achieve specific ends.

Summing up, the author defines the tragedy of the Venezuelan guerrilla movement as its failure to distinguish between mass struggle and plain violence. The revolutionism of the guerrillas was in fact, he says, "petty bourgeois revolutionism"—*i.e.,* revolutionary effort in which the goal of liberating the proletariat gives way to the conquest of power *per se.* Valsalice believes that the Venezuelan rebels, in pursuit of this "petty bourgeois" objective, demonstrated the vulnerabilities of the Castro myth, weakened the Left, and strengthened "formal and bourgeois democracy" in Venezuela.

This otherwise valuable work has one flaw, in that the author, in his concentration on the Marxist Left, fails to give due credit to the Venezulan government and to *Acción Democrática* (AD), the party in power from 1959 through 1968, for the collapse of the guerrilla movement. He correctly points out that the guerrillas, by failing to secure the support of the masses, violated one of the first principles of Mao Tse-tung and Ché Guevara. But he does not stress sufficiently that the Venezuelan masses, particularly the peasants and workers, were in fact preempted from the Left by the *Acción Democrática* through agricultural reforms and trade union activism. AD also managed to accommodate and reassure other elements that made up the institutional backbone of Venezuelan society, particularly the military. It was, first and foremost, the resilience of the regime and its support by the military that doomed the *lucha armada* in Venezuela.

THERE IS ABUNDANT scholarly testimony to the effectiveness of Venezuela's institutions and leftist democratic parties during and since the years of the insurgency.

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One of the best studies on this theme in recent years is Daniel H. Levine's *Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela.* Levine's volume focuses sharply and with insight on the Venezuelan political system. Although it was not designed to explain the failure of the radical Left, it does serve as a counterpoint to the Valsalice book. Using a behaviorist approach, Levine is less concerned with who wins the conflicts than with "why the players act the way they do." He argues that Venezuela has avoided falling into the pattern of the clash-prone society described by Samuel P. Huntington—a "praetorian system in which social forces confront each other nakedly, no group is recognized as intermediaries to moderate conflict, and no agreement exists on methods to resolve conflict." [2] (This was also Ché's idea of a society ripe for revolution.) Using two aspects of the Venezuelan scene as case studies (church-state relations and students in politics), Levine demonstrates how the Venezuelan system of political parties has evolved so that "opposition is constrained to work within a set of common procedures and forms." It is the role of political parties to mediate and moderate conflict.

In his chapter on "Conflict, Conciliation and Exclusion," Levine contends that in the years 1936-48—a period of respite from Venezuela's previous history of harsh dictatorial rule—the several political parties that emerged penetrated all social spheres in Venezuela; however, there was no concomitant development of accepted procedures for resolving conflict. During the *triennio* (1945-48)—the period of Venezuela's first brief but ambitious experiment in democracy—the ruling *Acción Democrática* thought that "even minimal accommodation" with other political parties was alien to the AD "mentality," and it failed to "establish a set of mutual guarantees with major sectors of the society, from the foreign investors to the Church and the military."

In Levine's view, the ensuing ten-year dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez, followed by the challenge from the radical Left after 1960, set AD and other political parties —including AD's chief democratic rival, the Social Christian Party (COPEI)—on the course to accommodation. Levine argues, as does Valsalice, that "perhaps more than any other factor, the development of a left-wing strategy of insurrection and guerrilla warfare helped consolidate the AD regime." But unlike Valsalice and others, Levine looks upon AD's course in this period as one reflecting a maturing realization that it must extend its appeal to other sectors of the society rather than as a process of polarization in which AD recoiled to the right in reaction against the *lucha armada.*

On the basis of the Venezuelan example, Levine concludes that "a crucial vehicle for organizing political change is the modern mass political party." He says that the Venezuelan system "works" because "it is open-ended and builds conflict and change into its operative mechanisms." The cost of such a system has been the need to forego more radical programs of social change.

One argument could be picked with the author—notably, the fact that his focus on the Venezuelan political system apparently excluded his consideration in any depth of two major factors that make for political stability in Venezuela: the oil wealth and the military. Largely as a result of her "black gold," Venezuela has among the highest per capita incomes on the Latin American continent. Despite the contrast between the riches of the urban suburbs and the poverty of the burgeoning *barrios,* there is still upward mobility in the country, and one does not find in the city slums the *miseria* that characterizes the poor of other Latin countries. Insofar as the second factor is concerned, it is fair to state that no party or coalition of parties of the left, right, or center could achieve or hold onto political power in Venezuela without gaining the support, or at least neutralizing the attitude, of the military. There is no acknowledgment in Levine's book that (1) military acceptance of AD was essential for the establishment of an open political system in the 1960's, and (2) this acceptance hinged on the top military command's perception that AD was ready to accommodate opposition, abandoning any aim of a one-party monopoly of power.

THE ESSENTIAL FALLACY of Latin American "revolutionism," as described by Valsalice in terms of the Venezuelan experience, is demonstrated even more clearly by the failure of Uruguay's Tupamaros. In contrast to the conditions of relative economic health and political stability that confronted the guerrillas in Venezuela, the Tupamaros waged their struggle in a country which—after a long history of efforts to function as a viable social welfare state—was faced by the late 1960's with a failing economy, crippled politi-

[2] *Political Order in Changing Societies,* New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1968, p. 196.

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cal parties, and growing national malaise. The Tupamaros could also draw support from a powerful leftist labor movement and from discontented youth in all sectors of Uruguayan society. In addition, the internal organization, tactical innovations, unity of purpose, and propaganda impact of the Tupamaros were surely unmatched in Latin American history.

The failure of the Tupamaros despite so many factors in their favor makes them an important testing ground for the study of Latin American "revolutionism"—specifically, in their case, for an assessment of the validity of the ideas of Ché Guevara and Brazil's Carlos Marighella. Unfortunately, neither of the books on the Tupamaros under review is addressed to such broader ideological considerations. Each, nonetheless, makes a useful addition to existing studies of the Uruguayan guerrillas.

Arturo C. Porzecanski's book, *Uruguay's Tupamaros; The Urban Guerrillas,* is a compact analysis that tends to underscore what was unique about the Uruguayan experience in revolutionary struggle. Born in Uruguay, Porzecanski is an economist by training, with little in-depth knowledge about similar political movements in other Latin American countries. As a consequence, he attributes to the Tupamaros an originality that is not always fully deserved. In the process, he makes no effort to conceal the sympathy he feels for these self-styled Robin Hoods, who sought in vain to change Uruguay's political system for the benefit of the masses of poor.

Porzecanski's special contribution is to provide a concise schematic view of the vague ideology yet remarkable organization and imaginative tactical approaches of the Tupamaros. He is at his best in describing the composition, internal structure, and *ad hoc* tactics of the guerrillas. On the basis of a study of the profiles of 648 captured Tupamaros, he shows that up to 42 percent were educated and professional people, about one-third were workers and peasants, and most of the remainder were students. They were almost without exception Uruguayans, and most of them were in their twenties. About one-fourth were women. Over several years, they developed a complex, tightly organized, and highly effective secret organization to carry out their terrorist activities. In the end, this organization was penetrated by the Uruguayan security forces, but at the cost of an increase in the military role in the political life of the country.

Compared with the chaotic, almost leaderless Venezuelan guerrillas, the Tupamaros were certainly a model revolutionary movement. One cannot help but share some of Porzecanski's respect for the skill, daring, and spirit of these young guerrillas, who were motivated by a passionate desire to highlight the political and social injustices of Uruguayan society. Here was a significant number of the nation's youth, whose malaise was transformed not into apathy but into an activist search for a better society. But what a waste! What did they achieve aside from a further inflation of the romantic image of the guerrilla? In Porzecanski's view, their "achievement" was to make urban terrorism a way of life: "Now revolution can, so to speak, start in anybody's living room." The "lasting and historic contribution of the Tupamaros is that revolutionary activity not only can but must become an urban phenomenon." If this is their heritage, it is a sad and destructive one. Indeed, the slogan of the Tupamaros, "There will be a fatherland for all or for nobody," seems like a preview of the apocalypse.

A similar sympathetic bias marks Maria Esther Gilio's study, *The Tupamaro Guerrillas.* This work, originally published in Spanish, has now been translated into English by Anne Edmondson, with a fine introduction by Robert J. Alexander that places the Uruguayan revolutionary movement in historical context. Ms. Gilio conducted extensive interviews of Uruguayans from all levels of society, whose views of guerrilla activity were tied to broader concerns about the Uruguayan economy and political system. While there is much useful information and analysis in the study, the author's bias tends to lead her into wishful thinking. It is her hope that the Tupamaro experience will have a lasting impact on future governments of Uruguay and indeed of other countries, impelling them toward the pursuit of greater social justice. Unhappily, the Tupamaros' example could just as well serve the less noble purpose of encouraging terrorism and repression in the hemisphere and strengthening dictatorial regimes in those societies which are vulnerable to terrorist tactics. Why is it not said that, however brave the Tupamaros were, they may have fought (and died) in vain; that their notion of revolution was ill-conceived and misdirected; and that the waste they perpetrated probably left their country worse off than it was before?

THE SUPREME EXAMPLE of guerrilla glorification, at least among the books considered here, is

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Donald C. Hodges' new book, *The Latin American Revolution; Politics and Strategy from Apro-Marxism to Guevarism*, a blatantly *"Fidelista"* view of Latin American history. Read from that vantage point, however, it is probably one of the best compendiums in print on the revolutionary American Left's interpretation of Latin American events. There is a fascinating section on Trotskyism which seems to present an insider's analysis of what is surely one of the most confusing chapters of Latin American leftist activity. The book also offers an extensive country-by-country study of the impact of Guevara's key approach to guerrilla warfare: the notion that a small urban group can go into the countryside and organize an insurrectional *foco*—a center of activity directed at destroying the governmental authority in a limited area—and can succeed in this effort without preparing the ground among the peasants and without organizing a political party.

Hodges holds that "Apro-Marxism"—consisting of the reform parties typified by APRA in Peru and AD in Venezuela—"has been left behind and no longer constitutes a revolutionary current in Latin America." What remains, he says, are three Marxist currents: the Marxism-Leninism of the "Old Left" and the pro-Moscow Communist parties; the revived Left of Trotskyite and Maoist parties; and the New Left, including the Guevarist wing. Of these three he believes the first two have lost ground, leaving the revolutionary future to Fidel and the spirit of Ché and the New Left, whose direction is "more bold" and "more Latin."

Hodges sees the Cuban revolution and its offshoot guerrilla groups as the polarizing force in Latin America. He concludes that the success of this movement so far has been to force political forces into a win/lose situation, with the result that the "Cuban revolution temporarily has culminated in the prevalence of counterrevolutionary regimes, through a process roughly comparable to the triumph of fascism in Europe over the revolutionary upsurge after the Russian revolution." He has this accolade for the revolutionary Left: "At best, the escalation of armed struggle has achieved the preliminary goal of unmasking democratic regimes as flimsy façades readily sacrificed by the oligarchies in the event of a major crisis." Hodges, as an apologist for Cuban Marxism, would not understand Levine's thesis that the very strength of the Venezuelan democratic regime is its ability to accommodate and absorb conflict.

Scholarship is ill-served by the romanticism and fantasy that pervade so much writing on the Latin American Left. European and American writers influenced by the Latin New Left often appear to be living revolution vicariously in analyzing Latin political systems. There is a need to develop understanding of and compassion for Latin America's problems—and thus to encourage dispassionate scholarly research that can illuminate them. But Latin America can do without efforts to glorify urban terrorism, violence, and the confused revolutionary rhetoric of Fidel, Ché, Debray, *et al.* If the Left is to advance in Latin America, it will do so with the acquiescence and collaboration of the military—and despite, not because of, the *lucha armada.*

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Notes & Views

Some Perspectives on Chinese Politics

EDITORS' NOTE: In its March-April 1974 issue, this journal carried an article by Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein entitled "The Chinese Political Spectrum" (pp. 1-13), which formulated a new typology for analyzing Chinese politics in terms of four broad policy positions based on responses to the challenge of finding "a proper route to a Chinese modernity." This article has since drawn comments from several China specialists. One letter of comment, by P. B. Harris of the University of Hong Kong, was published in the Correspondence Section of the July-August 1974 issue (p. 80). Here we present three more views, together with a reply by the original authors.

How "Useful" a Model?

ALTHOUGH THE article by Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein is a bold and impressive attack on a vital problem in our understanding of Chinese politics, I feel it could be improved if the authors were to take into account other cultural factors besides Chinese leaders' concern with how to manage the impact of barbarians upon "China's essence."

The authors begin by acknowledging that there are a "number of valid perspectives" from which to analyze Chinese politics, but they in fact cite only two other analytical approaches, both of which they somewhat cavalierly dismiss. They uncharitably label the work of Andrew Nathan and William Whitson "efforts to explain Chinese politics in totally issue-less terms—that is, in terms of individuals or factions solely interested in power and reward, or five field armies jostling for position and hegemony." Actually, both Nathan and Whitson have clearly described the role of political issues as providing opportunities for maneuver during Chinese power struggles. Unlike Oksenberg and Goldstein, however, they also stress the importance of personalized ties based on shared experience (field armies) and personal recruitment by leaders ("factions") which bind together some individuals involved in high-level Chinese politics more closely than particular issues of ideology or policy preference. Whether or not they have accurately identified the relevant political groups, Nathan and Whitson have not neglected the human element in Chinese politics.

Can Oksenberg and Goldstein reconcile their approach to the research findings of Ezra Vogel, Richard Solomon, Lucien Pye, Andrew Nathan, and others describing the personalized nature of Chinese political culture? Such research contrasts sharply with the impression left by Oksenberg and Goldstein that the outcomes of Chinese political struggles are little influenced by the idiosyncracies of uniquely shared group experience, organizational interests, or revenge-seeking personalities conscious of old scores to settle. Their article implies that Chinese elite politics is nothing but the random interaction of ball bearings that come in four colors—the four "lines" or "opinion clusters"—which are shaken up from time to time by exogenous factors to produce political coalitions and policy compromises like kaleidoscopic color combinations. Such an image requires revision. It leaves out the role of entrepreneurial politicians.

The authors explicitly reject the group-politics approach linking occupational, economic, or organizational groupings to particular political interests. They assert instead that psychological variables are more important because all Chinese groups contain individuals from each of the four schools. Without evidence like organizational case studies to the contrary, it is difficult for me to imagine a Chinese foreign ministry, military unit, or budget bureau successfully functioning with four equal portions of militant fundamentalists advocating "strict isolation from alien influences," radical conservatives encouraging "selective borrowing from the West," eclectic modernizers promoting "an extensive Western presence in China, . . . specialization and expertise," and Westernized Chinese championing "dependency upon the (Western) country to be emulated"—unless most of these men completely disguise their views on political issues much of the time. Deception must be an essential ingredient of the Oksenberg-Goldstein model of Chinese politics, unless different institutions have varying mixes of the four "opinion clusters." Yet if the portions are not equal, then how does the new approach differ from group politics?

But even if we admit that the Chinese leaders practice as much deception, deceitful masking of motives, and adoption of "protective coloration" as the authors describe, then the question still arises whether the Oksenberg-Goldstein perspective really differs from that of analysts they have criticized for underestimating the immediate significance of specific political issues. If things are seldom what they seem in China, how can publicly discussed issues really be a reliable guide to anything?

The authors portray Chinese leaders as men who seldom say what they

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mean or mean what they say for very long: "Americanized Chinese can pose as eclectic modernizers . . . pro-Soviets can pose as militant fundamentalists. . . . The eclectic modernizers of yesterday can be the militant fundamentalists of today." In this sort of environment, Western interpretations of Chinese politics become more tenuous and problematic than is already the case because of our lack of data. Perhaps this explains why the authors offer so few examples of the current members of the four schools. The implication of the model that deception runs rampant in China makes further empirical analysis precarious, yet the authors state that their new perspective is more "useful" than others in highlighting Chinese policy issues.

Let us take one example of the potential usefulness of the approach: What different kinds of policies (if any) would the People's Republic follow if Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing succeeded Chou and Mao? Presumably, the first research task for Oksenberg and Goldstein would be to assign Teng to one of their four opinion clusters, then project forward some increased influence for the opinions of, for example, "eclectic modernizers" during future Politburo debates. Yet how confident can they be in categorizing Teng? He may well have changed his "psychological proclivities" since 1966 ("individuals change over time"), or may even be dissembling now to preserve his position as Vice Premier.

A factional-politics approach might safely ignore Teng's psychological proclivities about how China should "modernize with pride" and focus instead upon the more conventional facets of his image: his extensive personal ties with PLA leaders, including most of the reshuffled military regional commanders, his experience as Second Field Army political commissar, his absence and therefore relative neutrality during the grudge-creating heat of the Cultural Revolution and Lin Piao years, his reputation as a deft civilian administrator while he was Party Secretary-general from 1954 to 1967, and his notoriously anti-Soviet tongue, apparently still remembered by the Soviet media, which recently attacked him. From these five bits of information, we may cautiously forecast that China under Teng Hsiao-p'ing in the late 1970's will be characterized by continuing concern with administrative normalcy, attempts to restore full civilian party control over the provinces and the PLA, little radical economic experimentation, and little change in ideological opposition to Soviet revisionism.

Any analyst familiar with the personalized politics of the Chinese elite, however, would probably not only hedge this forecast but also seek additional information about Teng's past relationships with other key figures—information not deemed significant by Oksenberg and Goldstein. Has Teng been a rival or factional ally of Chou En-lai, Wang Hung-wen, Li Hsien-nien, Li Te-sheng, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Hsu Shih-yu, and other leading figures? What kinds of cooperation and conflict have already occurred or may occur between Teng and his fellow Politburo members over such issues as: (1) further reshuffling of military units and commanders; (2) appointments of new civilian provincial party secretaries; (3) Sino-Soviet border talks; (4) Soviet proposals for a nonaggression pact; (5) the school examination system and "back-door" elite privileges; (6) continuing resource allocations to the ICBM program; (7) negotiations with the United States over Taiwan's "liberation" and advanced technology transfer; (8) military attacks on threatened areas like the Paracel Islands or the Sino-Sikkim border; (9) budget allocations between provinces and central ministries; (10) the level of material support for revolutionary forces in the Third World and (11) innovative, expensive agricultural policies, such as purchase and geographical distribution to wealthy areas like Szechwan and Manchuria of American fertilizer plants to supplement Ch'en Yung-kuei's spartan, undeniably attractive policies in the poor areas.

One final point. When the authors fine-tune their model, they may wish to revise the category "Westernized Chinese," which lumps together Chinese leaders who seek a Soviet-type China and those wishing China to emulate the United States. These would be two quite different Chinas. Perhaps Tseng Kuo-fan, Tso Tsung-t'ang and Li Hung-chang could not readily distinguish between American and Russian barbarians, but Chou En-lai and even Chiang Ch'ing certainly could. This "Westernized Chinese" category reflects overemphasis on the categorization scheme of one axis with two polar opposites: xenophobia *vs.* worshipping-the-foreigners. While handling barbarians has always been an important issue in China, it is not always the most salient. If other issues were considered, a more flexible pattern of Politburo debates could be envisaged. For example, how would the four schools be arrayed on the eleven concrete policy issues listed above?

I hope you will continue to publish articles and comments on new approaches to Chinese politics.

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Limits of a One-Dimensional Approach

IN THEIR recent article, "The Chinese Political Spectrum," Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein have provided us with an extremely stimulating and thought-provoking thesis. Concerned with a prevailing tendency to view Chinese politics in rather oversimplified terms—either as a persistent confrontation between "radicals" and "moderates," or as a series of "power struggles" over positions in the hierarchy—the authors have formulated a more sophisticated typology of "opinion clusters" centered around the "core theme" of China's search for a modern form. When all is said and done, however, I question whether the finished model really achieves the authors' purpose.

Despite the elaboration of categories, the typology does not move us very far from the familiar "two-line struggle" model. Leaders are arrayed in a "spectrum" and differentiated in terms of their positions on a single, albeit complex, issue. One end of the spectrum is occupied by the most "radical" individuals (those who fundamentally reject the Western experience), the other end by the most "moderate" (those who are most open and eclectic). Granted

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Importance of Outside Assistance	Relevance of Western Model as Goal: Greater	Relevance of Western Model as Goal: Less
Greater	Eclectic Westernizer	Eclectic Modernizer
Less	Nativist Westernizer	Nativist Modernizer

we are given some intermediate categories, we are nevertheless left with an essentially "left-to-right" description of the leadership.

As the authors themselves point out, this tendency to analyze leaders in terms of a left-right continuum likely obscures the intricate nature of Chinese politics. But there is another danger involved, namely, that one oversimplified view can lead to another: that the "two-line struggle" model can lead to the "power struggle" model.

Take, for example, the behavior of Chou En-lai. As Roderick MacFarquhar documents in his recent study of the mid-1950's,[1] Chou shifted frequently and radically in his relations with Mao Tse-tung, at times being diametrically opposed to the Chairman's policies, at other times warmly in support. Viewing Chou's actions in terms of a one-dimensional spectrum of opinion clusters, one gets the impression of an individual who moves with remarkable ease from left to right to left again. In other words, Chou En-lai emerges as an essentially unprincipled leader, unwedded to any particular opinion cluster (indeed, the authors intimate as much when they remark that Chou "played down his eclectic-modernizer commitments in order to survive" the Cultural Revolution). When leadership behavior becomes explicable only in terms of "survival" or "struggle for power," the proposed typology of opinion clusters begins to lose its power as a tool of analysis.

I share the authors' conviction that substantive issues play a critical role in the Chinese political process and that leadership coalition behavior can best be explained in terms of opinion clusters. In order to retain that primary focus on issues while avoiding the frequent but necessary recourse to "power politics" explanations, I suggest that we move away from the concept of a single-issue left-to-right continuum and try to analyze Chinese politics in terms of "cross-cutting issues." Where two or more "issue spectra" are involved, relationships among individuals are highly complex. Within the leadership, at any given time, there are innumerable potential coalitions, groups of individuals allied on certain issues, opposed on others. As issues become salient, coalitions become manifest; as issues shift in importance over time, so coalitions change, uniting former opponents, splitting former allies. Perceiving things in this light, we need not resort so often to the "power politics" model in order to explain leadership behavior. It is not the leaders who change, but the issues.

As an example of what I have in mind, the typology offered by Oksenberg and Goldstein can be modified in such manner that opinion clusters are ranged along two dimensions rather than one. Lurking in the authors' discussion of the "core theme" of Chinese politics are two rather different, and potentially crosscutting, issues: (1) the extent to which the Western model is to be a relevant *goal* of political development for China; and (2) the degree to which China is to depend upon outside assistance during the process of development. Crossing these two issues, we emerge with four distinct opinion clusters (see accompanying diagram). The *Eclectic Westernizer* corresponds to the "Westernized Chinese" of the Oksenberg-Goldstein typology: an individual who both seeks to emulate the Western model and is relatively open to drawing support from abroad. The *Eclectic Modernizer* is one not terribly enamored of the Western model as a goal but quite willing to borrow selectively from the West in the course of development. The *Nativist Westernizer,* while willing to accept Western-style organization as a goal of development, is nevertheless firmly committed to the policy of "self-reliance." The final category, *Nativist Modernizer,* includes those leaders who reject the West as both model and source of assistance.

Modified in this way, the typology of opinion clusters may enhance our ability to interpret leadership behavior in terms of substantive issues. Let us look again at Chou En-lai, an individual whom I would classify as an "eclectic modernizer." When the issue concerns the relevance of the Western model as a *goal* of Chinese development, modernizer Chou is closely allied with Mao Tse-tung and faces the opposition of such nativist "Westernizers" as Liu Shao-ch'i. Shift the issue to the question of outside assistance, however, and the coalitions change: Chou, the "eclectic," now finds himself allied with such leaders as P'eng Te-huai and confronts the combined opposition of "nativists" Mao and Liu. Viewed in this two-dimensional space, Chou's behavior becomes more explicable in terms of his positions on specific issues. There is less need for recourse to the catch-all "power struggle" model.

I have focused on the theme of "China's response to the West" only for purposes of illustration and do not mean to imply that this is the only, or even the most important, issue which divides the leadership. Indeed my central argument has been that the Chinese leadership may be arrayed on a number of different and potentially crosscutting "issue spectra," and that issue areas change in importance over time.

The purpose of my comments has not been to detract from the Oksenberg-Goldstein thesis. Far from it. The authors are right in directing our attention to the broader issues and context of power struggle. I would only add a plea that we begin to think in terms of cross-cutting issue areas and move away from one-dimensional views of Chinese politics.

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[1] Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: 1. Contradictions Among the People, 1956-1957,* New York, RICA and Columbia Univ. Press, 1974.

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A Problem of Definition

IN THEIR ARTICLE on "The Chinese Political Spectrum," Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein specify four opinion "clusters" that they believe have characterized China's response to the West during the past 100 years. While I agree that there is considerable merit in looking for intellectual continuity over a period of half a century or more in China, I found myself uneasy with the specific arguments they made.

First, it seems that the authors themselves are unclear as to what an opinion "cluster" really is. At a minimum, one would assume that it consists of a set of views that can be shown to have co-varied in the past—*i.e.,* that people holding views A and B almost invariably also held views C and D. In the final section of their article, the authors imply that this is very much what they have in mind, as they speak of the "militant fundamentalists" and "radical conservatives" in terms of identifiable factions within the CCP. However, on pp. 9-10, they comment that "Individuals change over time. . . . Ambiguousness, vacillation, efforts to blur distinctions . . .—these are the ways in which some Chinese seek to avoid commitment to a particular school. The result is a lack of a clear-cut self-identity, but also a capacity to shift as the prevailing opinion changes." Thus, individuals may in fact embody ideas from different "clusters" seemingly as political expediency demands. These "clusters," then, seem to be less than meets the eye, for they do not represent *sets* of ideas that for one reason or another most Chinese find individually compelling.

Second, the definitions of the four types themselves are not always clear. I instinctively recoil when I see an intellectual typology that places Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek under the same rubric, as does category No. 2 (the radical conservatives) in this article. Upon closer examination, we see that the introductory sentence on this category defines "radical conservatives" as those who "seek to preserve the *essence* of China, but with selective borrowing from Western technology." By the final sentence of the definition, "radical conservatives" have become "radical in their view of China's need for a *restructured society and value system,* but conservative in their determination to preserve Chinese autonomy, flexibility, and distinctiveness" (emphasis added). It is a peculiar type of "essence" that includes neither the social structure nor the value system. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek clearly slips in under the scope of the first sentence, while Mao Tse-tung fits more neatly under the latter. The attempt to reconcile these differences in paragraph 2 of page 7 is insufficient, given the severity of the problem. Indeed, if Mao and Chiang share a single classification, how many of China's 800 million people can be excluded from that category?

Third, given the definitional problem and the difficulty of specifying empirical referents for these opinion clusters, why try to categorize all Chinese leaders according to their response to the West in the first place? Here, Oksenberg and Goldstein are clear and consistent. They affirm that the question of a proper response to the West has been *the key* question of Chinese politics over the past 100 years (p. 3). I think that there is no doubt that this has been a key question over this entire period and perhaps *the* key question since the Sino-Japanese war of 1895. But this is in fact debatable, and there is a growing literature that casts doubt on the real importance of the West (unless one includes Japan in one's definition of "West") during the past century in China. Clearly, those who were most impressed with the Western impact were the Westerners themselves. Should we beware, then, when Westerners say that the best way to understand the cleavages in Chinese politics is to look at how the Chinese respond to *us?*

Lastly, I would quibble with the authors' assertion that "militant fundamentalists" and "radical conservatives" are "value neutral" terms (p. 2). They sound distinctively more negative to the Western analyst than do "eclectic modernizers" and "westernized Chinese."

I reiterate that I believe the idea of thinking in terms of cleavages based on clusters of opinion concerning basic political issues that have not changed substantially over many decades is a fruitful way to gain insights into the contemporary Chinese political milieu. The Oksenberg and Goldstein piece has, therefore, raised an important question for consideration by the scholary community. Much work remains to be done in providing a satisfactory answer.

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A REJOINDER

OUR REMARKS primarily respond to Mr. Michael Pillsbury, who rejects the usefulness of our approach. In the course of the rejoinder, we hopefully meet the requests of Professors Lieberthal and Chamberlain for greater conceptual rigor and clarity.

Let us note, hopefully without appearing to be contentious, that Pillsbury distorts our argument. At no point do we "explicitly reject" the utility of a group-politics approach, as he claims. To the contrary, we say (pp. 2-3) that full explanations of Chinese politics require reference to bureaucratic politics and personality. Further, although Pillsbury claims we assert that "psychological variables *are more* important" than sociological groupings, in fact we carefully suggested that "psychological variables *may be as important as* sociological ones" (p. 10). These distortions cast us in an unfortunate light. As our other publications demonstrate, we clearly believe that structures, personalities, and *ideas* are all necessary objects of political analysis.[1] Pillsbury is certainly correct, however, in concluding that we assign a lesser priority to studying personality than he does. And we certainly attach greater weight than he would to the intellectual milieu —*i.e.,* the language of debate, the concepts of the era, and prevailing beliefs as to what is at stake—in which policy debate takes place.

[1] Steven Goldstein, "Explaining Politics in China," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles) Winter 1975; Michel Oksenberg, "Policy Making under Mao, 1949-1968: An Overview," in John Lindbeck, Ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society,* Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1971.

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Here, in fact, is the real point of contention we have with Pillsbury. We consider knowledge of the broad intellectual concerns in China from the 1840's on to be essential for an understanding of contemporary Chinese politics. These concerns shape the ways in which Chinese leaders discern and evaluate the problems pressing upon them. After all, problems have to be *seen* before they become grist for political debate. Once the problems have become the subject of debate, leaders must define and weigh their choices. These steps in the decision-making process, as Harold Lasswell stressed years ago, involve perceptions, definitions, and values.

In sum, students of politics have long stressed the importance of the intellectual constructs used by the leaders and the led to structure and give meaning to their common environment. Perhaps the classic work along these lines is Louis Hartz's *The Liberal Tradition in America,* which illuminates the perceptual framework of the American political community for nearly two hundred years—a framework which has done much to define the issues in American politics and to structure how the choices with respect to those issues have been perceived.

Approaching Chinese politics in this fashion, our article sought to explicate the underlying concerns which the Chinese bring to the challenges they face. Our approach is hardly alien to the China field. With far greater elegance and subtlety than we exhibited, Joseph Levenson, Benjamin Schwartz, William DeBary, and Donald Munro, among others, have demonstrated the necessity of intellectual history to understand the nature of issues and policy alternatives in contemporary China.[2] That is the tradition that our article sought to follow, and that is the tradition which Pillsbury so blithely dismisses.

Instead, Pillsbury sketches a personal-faction model of Chinese politics, heavily oriented toward analysis of individuals. He proposes that *the* topic meriting his attention is Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Need Pillsbury be reminded that 18 months ago he probably would have advocated study of Li Teh-sheng? And with the conclusion of the recent National People's Congress, he might now emphasize Chang Ch'un-ch'iao. One thinks of two earlier Rand studies growing out of Pillsbury-like assumptions. One was on Lin Piao and was completed just before Lin's death in a plane crash in Mongolia; the other was on Chou En-lai, whose role in Chinese politics has since declined because of ill health.[3] Both were indeed valuable studies, illuminating the interaction between personality and policy, but they rapidly became dated. They pertained to the era when the individuals concerned were politically active. Even granted that Pillsbury's legitimate prime interest as a member of the intelligence community lies in prediction of Chinese short-run behavior, how useful can personality-oriented indicators be when China is in a situation of high elite instability and when the data on individual leaders is so absolutely sketchy? To repeat, we recognize the validity of Pillsbury's concern with personality, factions, and organizations, but we do not start there.

We respond to Pillsbury's criticism vigorously for several reasons. First, he is hardly alone, and his position is to be taken seriously. Journalists, and many scholars as well, have attempted to analyze the current China scene in highly personal terms. Gossipy, intriguing, fun, such analyses have nonetheless usually proved wrong. Second, we recall what happened in the Soviet field, where many heeded Pillsbury-like calls, only to have the further development of Soviet studies reveal the frequently superficial, noncumulative nature of the over-personalized approach. And, finally, it seems to us that the study of Chinese politics is at a crossroads. The governing models of the past—the totalitarian model, the earlier Almond model of the modernization process, and so on—have been tested and found wanting. Now, we wonder, in what direction should we strike out? What new areas seem to hold promise, in terms of both data and concepts? What "paradigm" should we use to order our research choices? We are attracted to intellectual history as the point of departure because of the insight it yields into the way the Chinese identify and perceive their choices.

To respond to Lieberthal and Chamberlain, let us clarify and amplify our views. If one examines policy debates in post-1949 China over specific issues, one is struck by the repetitive nature of the argumentation. In the sphere of public health, for example, many specific issues have been on the agenda, but differing views on two fundamental concerns have underlain much of the debate.[4] First, how much technology should be borrowed from the West, and how useful is indigenous Chinese medicine? Second, should the Chinese public health system ultimately resemble the Western pattern, particularly the professionalism of the doctors, the large hospitals, the research orientation, and so on? Or should China seek to create a distinctive "Chinese" system?

In military policy, similar issues have been at stake.[5] First, to what extent should the military modernize and adopt Western modes of warfare—frontal war waged with advanced weaponry? Second, to what extent should the military adopt the professional values and play the roles of armies in other societies, including the Soviet Union? And to what extent should it preserve its distinctive guerrilla tradition and play a broader social role in Chinese society, without clear-cut distinctions between military and civilian professions?

In the cultural realm, the same issues have been highly visible. First, to what extent should the cultural leaders employ Western modes of cultural expression—in terms of the medium, the instrumentation in music, the style in literature or painting, and so on? And to what extent should they draw

[2] Joseph R. Levenson, *Confucian China and its Modern Fate,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1958, 1965; Benjamin Schwartz, *Communism and China: Ideology in Flux,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968; William T. DeBary *et. al.,* Eds., *Sources of Chinese Tradition,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1964; Donald Munro, "Man, State, and School," in Michel Oksenberg, Ed., *China's Developmental Experience,* New York, Praeger, 1973, pp. 121-43.

[3] Thomas Robinson, "A Politico-Military Bibliography of Lin Piao, Pt. II, 1950-1971" (ms., August 1971); "Chou En-lai and the Cultural Revolution in China," in T. Robinson, Ed., *The Cultural Revolution in China,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972, pp. 165-312.

[4] See Michael Lampton, *Health, Conflict and the Chinese Political System,* Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1974.

[5] See particularly Ellis Joffe, *Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964,* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965.

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upon and adapt various traditional Chinese art forms? More important than the choice of techniques for achieving a cultural regeneration is the choice of goals: whether to create a distinctive Chinese moral order or, as in the early and mid-1950's, to create a culture that would facilitate exchange with other socialist countries.

On issue after issue—agriculture,[6] industrial management,[7] the legal system,[8] and so on—one sees similar debates over means (particularly, the utility of Western experience) and ends (particularly, the degree to which the goal should be to preserve a Chinese distinctiveness). Repeatedly, opinions have tended to cluster around three or four nodes—the nodes we sketched in our article.

This does not mean that the same individual was at the same node on every issue. Chou En-lai in 1963, for example, appears to have supported the eclectic modernizer approach on economic policies while supporting a fundamentalist cultural policy.

So, our four descriptive categories are not "opinion groups" but political positions that reappear as leaders debate specific issues. What becomes even more striking is that the same nodes appear in monograph after monograph on modern Chinese history: in Lloyd Eastman's analysis of Ch'ing foreign policy during the Sino-French War of the 1880's,[9] in John Schrecker's study of Chinese nationalisms in Shantung,[10] in the different Levenson and Hao portraits of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's intellectual migration,[11] and in biographies of leading Chinese intellectuals of the 1920's and 1930's.[12] Indeed, in this context, the similarity between the Chiang K'ai-shek of *China's Destiny* and Mao Tse-tung can be fruitfully stressed. For, in their responses to most problems, both have been reluctant but willing to borrow from the West and Japan, while insisting that the purpose is to cultivate China's distinctiveness—although for Chiang the distinctiveness to be acquired through spiritual transformation has been Confucian,[13] whereas for Mao it has been, in large measure, the virtues of the peasantry.

The research directions toward which our approach points can be summarized in this way: Why have so many policies been radical-conservative? What has made fundamentalist solutions so appealing, particularly in cultural policy but even in such matters as rural organization or national security? Have particular occupations, regions, or economic strata proven prone to support one view more than another?

These questions can be asked in the aggregate for a particular moment in time: Why do radical conservative solutions predominate? What is the social basis of each view? But perhaps even more fruitful would be to explore policy debates with respect to one problem—such as public health or agriculture—over a long period of time. We suspect that while a fundamentalist position in medicine has been espoused throughout, it has also evolved over time.[14] Certainly in debates on educational policy, the eclectic modernism position has been voiced throughout, but the position itself has changed slowly. Indeed, this is where we suspect that major payoffs await researches on Chinese politics: in tracing the evolving political spectrum on specific issues over a very long period of time. This will enable current policy debates to be placed in their appropriate historical context and will sensitize the researcher to the long-term underlying forces at work in China. Only in this way can the "After Mao, what?" question be placed in proper perspective. If Mao's concerns on educational policy, for example, long preceded him and have had strong social support for over a century, the chances of their surviving Mao are much greater than if Mao's views were a historical anomaly.

Here, then, is our final disagreement with Pillsbury. Not only does an approach to Chinese politics that pays proper attention to the intellectual milieu generate interesting avenues of inquiry for academics, but it may—given the current insufficient level of our knowledge about Chinese personalities, factions, and structures—yield better intelligence estimates about the future contours of the China scene. We can identify the major problems that will be facing the Chinese leaders in the years ahead: to increase agricultural production, to hasten industrialization, to adjust party-army relations, to acquire and deploy an adequate defense system, and so on. A sense of the intellectual climate and of the historic debates on these issues provides perhaps the best clues about where the Chinese will come out on these issues. This sense persuades us that, though not easily or irreversably, the eclectic modernist response to most but not all of these problems will increasingly prevail. If the analyst's concern is what policies rather than which individuals will dominate in the years ahead, an approach rooted in intellectual history seems to have its merits.

Michel Oksenberg
Steven Goldstein

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[6] Benedict Stavis, "The Political Implications of the Technological Transformation of Chinese Agriculture," Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, 1972; Michel C. Oksenberg, "Policy Formulation in Communist China: The Case of the 1957-58 Mass Irrigation Campaign," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1969.

[7] Steve Andors, "Factory Management in China: The Politics of Modernization in a Revolutionary Society," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1974.

[8] Victor Li, "The Evolution and Development of the Chinese Legal System," in Lindbeck, *op.cit.*, pp. 221-55.

[9] *Throne and Mandarins: China's Search for a Policy during the Sino-French Controversy, 1880-1885*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967.

[10] *Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism: Germany in Shantung*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971.

[11] Joseph R. Levenson, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1953, and New York, Harper and Row, 1969; Hao Chang, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971.

[12] *E.g.*, Charlotte Davis Furth, *Ting Wen-chiang: Science and China's New Culture*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970; Jerome Grieder, *Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance: Liberalism in the Chinese Revolution, 1917-1937*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970; Laurence Schneider, *Ku Chieh-kang and China's New History*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971.

[13] Note the praise bestowed on Chiang K'ai-shek by Chou En-lai in talking to James Reston—"a man who can stand up to American pressure . . . [and] has a sense of national respect." Cited in Gene Hsiao, "Prospects for a New Sino-Japanese Relationship," in *The China Quarterly* (London), No. 60 (December 1974), p. 733.

[14] See Ralph C. Crozier, *Traditional Medicine in Modern China: Science, Nationalism, and Cultural Change*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968.

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Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20547.

UKRAINIAN DISSIDENTS

TO THE EDITORS: May I point out one or two misconceptions and imprecisions in Professor Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone's otherwise excellent and perceptive article, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR" (*Problems of Communism*, May-June 1974)? Referring to my article, "The Western Republics" (*Ethnic Pressures in the Soviet Union: Conflict Studies*, No. 30, London, December 1972, p. 4), she states that "a number of . . . underground groups existed in the Ukraine in the 1960's, some as a continuation of wartime independence-seeking groups, as exemplified by the Ukrainian National Liberation Front" (p. 17). Actually, the Ukrainian National Front (its correct name) is the only group about which there is positive knowledge that it was "conceived as the continuation of the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists)" (see M. Browne, Ed., *Ferment in the Ukraine*, New York, Praeger, and London, Macmillan, 1971, p. 233). Professor Rakowska-Harmstone also adds that "the Front reportedly attempted to enlist Chinese aid to appeal to Western journalists to protest political arrests in the Ukraine in the summer of 1973," and further on (pp. 21-22) that "in at least one case, nationalist dissidents have sought Chinese approval," this time again referring to my article, pp. 6-7. This is definitely a misunderstanding, which is to be found also in the work of certain other scholars.

The facts, as far as they can be ascertained, are as follows. The Ukrainian National Front, organized in 1964 and based around Ivano-Frankovsk in the Western Ukraine, was uncovered in 1967. Its members were given sentences of between 11 and 17 years (see Browne, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-34), and there is no reason to suppose that any part of the organization has survived. Four years later, in 1971, a "Ukrainian National Front" leaflet was reported to have been distributed in the Soviet Far East, north of the Chinese border; though obviously produced by Ukrainians, the leaflet had a definite Chinese Maoist orientation, and it stated that the UNF was "composed of Ukrainian patriots, including Ukrainian Marxists-Leninists." Subsequently, sporadic broadcasts of UNF statements over Radio Peking have been reported. This fact, together with a detailed examination of the text of both this leaflet and an appeal by the UNF in the summer of 1972, lead to the conclusion that this particular UNF is apparently centered in China and most likely consists of Ukrainians resident there. There is so far no evidence of its being active in the Soviet Ukraine. There is also no evidence whatsoever of any connection between this UNF and the Ivano-Frankovsk UNF of 1964-67 (see my article, pp. 6-7)—no evidence, that is, if one disregards their common name. But then, "National Front" is not an unusual appellation; it recurs, for instance, in the Estonian National Front formed in 1972 (see my article, p. 9). One would surely not suppose, on the evidence of the names alone, that the latter was connected with a UNF in the same way as, say, the Communist Party of Estonia and the Communist Party of the Ukraine are connected within the CPSU.

There also seems to be no *samizdat* evidence of any Ukrainian dissidents being connected with China or even favorably disposed toward Maoism; the few references to Mao's China found in Ukrainian *samizdat* are either neutral or critical, as for instance in Valentyn Moroz's "Report from the Beria Reservation," or in Vyacheslav Chornovil's 1968 letter (see Browne, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-52, 171).

Finally, Professor Rakowska-Harmstone remarks (p. 13) that "the formal complaint [against Piotr Shelest] was his hard-line opposition to the policy of détente with the West." Surely, in order to be called formal, a complaint (or a charge, or an accusation) has either to be

CORRECTIONS

In Sergius Yakobson's essay-review, "The State of the Word" (*Problems of Communism*, November-December 1974), the editors inadvertently misidentified Nikolai Pogodin's play, *Kremlin Chimes*, as a novel (p. 49).

In the Correspondence Section of the same issue (p. 60), Professor Alvin Z. Rubinstein of the University of Pennsylvania is incorrectly said to be on leave at Oxford University; he is at Clare College, Cambridge University.

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published in an appropriate formulation by the Soviet press or other media, or at least to be reliably known to have been voiced at a formal meeting of an appropriate political body. The former has not occurred, and there is no evidence of the latter. The one and only definitely known accusation against Shelest fully deserving to be described as "formal" is the scathing critique, mentioned by Professor Rakowska-Harmstone, of Shelest's *Our Soviet Ukraine*, accusing him of placing "inordinate emphasis on the special features of Ukrainian history and culture" and thus giving comfort to "nationalists," and also charging him with the probably much more serious crime of "autarkism." It may perhaps be noted that the latter offense seems to be peculiar to Shelest, and the word had apparently to be coined to "fit the crime": *"avtarkizm"* does not occur in any of the largest and most recent Russian or Ukrainian dictionaries, nor does "autarkism" in English ones.

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MS. HARMSTONE REPLIES: I am grateful for the clarifications provided by Dr. Swoboda on the subject of underground groups in the Ukraine, where data are scarce and frequently confusing. In reference to Shelest's removal, the word "formal", to which Dr. Swoboda objects, was admittedly used imprecisely. What I meant to convey was that the "hard-line opposition" theory was the one originally accepted as valid by most Western commentators.

TERESA RAKOWSKA-HARMSTONE
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